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**A role modification model: The foreign policy of the Palestine  
Liberation Organization, 1964–1981**

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University of North Texas, 1993

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This study is a Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) analysis of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) foreign policy behavior from 1964 through 1981. This study develops and tests a role modification model that accounts for evolutionary changes in foreign policy behavior. One of the major premises of this research is that what often appears as dramatic restructuring in foreign policy is actually the culmination of a series of modifications that transpired over an extended period of time.

The model relies on a total of six independent variables as determinants of PLO foreign policy output representing multiple levels of analysis. There are a total of 12 dependent variables expressed as either foreign policy tactical roles or strategic goals. Relying on content analysis of relevant PLO documents, the role modification model demonstrates that the foreign policy output of the PLO experienced a gradual, over time change in both the means and ends of its foreign policy. The model also identifies the conditions under which any one of the

independent variables is able to exculsively determine foreign policy output and which roles one can reasonably expect the PLO to exercise under a given circumstance.

A ROLE MODIFICATION MODEL: THE FOREIGN POLICY  
OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,  
1964-1981

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A ROLE MODIFICATION MODEL: THE FOREIGN POLICY  
OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,  
1964-1981

DISSERTATION

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By

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHC	Arab Higher Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement
CC	Central Council
CFP	Comparative Foreign Policy
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DON	Dimensionality of Nations
EXCOM	Executive Committee
IBA	Interstate Behavior Analysis
NGC	National Guidance Committee
OAP	Organization of Arab Palestine
PASC	Palestine Armed Struggle Command
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PPP	Palestinian People's Party
PPSF	Palestine Popular Struggle Front
UAK	United Arab Kingdom
UAR	United Arab Republic

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE:  
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF DOCUMENTS  
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

There has been a growing dissatisfaction among some members of the scholarly community regarding the lack of theoretical progress in the field of comparative foreign policy (CFP). Critics of CFP allege that the broad range of concepts and approaches developed over the years as explanations of foreign policy behavior have provided us with only a "checklist" of factors that might affect foreign policy without any means of appraising each factor's relative importance. Further, critics charge that the multitude of variables employed as foreign policy determinants only leave us perplexed and empty of any procedure for ordering and integrating these concepts (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988). In spite of these criticisms, CFP as an approach to foreign policy behavior and as a methodology for scientific research continues to flourish. In part, its ability to endure stems from the shared belief that CFP can never answer all our questions regarding foreign policy behavior because its goal is to provide middle range theory (Rosenau 1975). Another feature of CFP's capacity to endure rests on the solid theoretical



foundation that contributed to its conceptual development and sustains its present growth.

#### Development of Comparative Foreign Policy

Pre-theories and the study of foreign policy precipitated the conceptual development of CFP as a legitimate field of inquiry (Rosenau 1966). Rosenau's essay argues that theories of foreign policy cannot flourish unless the ingredients of the field are made comparable through the use of "pre-theories" (Rosenau 1980).

"Pre-theories" consist of five sets of independent variables representing the individual along with his/her values, beliefs, and idiosyncracies; the roles that an individual plays, as well as governmental, societal, and systemic influences. The use of "pre-theories" allows the researcher to account for variations in the foreign policy behavior of states based on factors such as size, condition of the economy, and political accountability. The presence of variations, in turn, permits meaningful comparisons of state behavior that should lead to stronger theoretical explanations of foreign policy behavior. As a result, individual case studies that focus exclusively on either single international events or individual nations are no longer unique or nonrecurrent (Rosenau 1966, 1980).

Rosenau notes that two major reorientations converged regarding foreign policy phenomena that eventually led

scholars down the path of foreign policy comparisons. These reorientations consisted of both an intellectual trend, and a historical trend (Rosenau 1968).

The intellectual trend began with scholars inspired by the tenets of behavioralism. This group placed a heavy emphasis on the use of comparison as a means of examining processes at the domestic level of politics. The benefit of this trend was that it enabled researchers in domestic comparative politics to compare "seemingly dissimilar phenomena" within the conceptual framework of structural-functional analysis (Rosenau 1968). The problem with this approach for international relations theory and foreign policy analysis revolves around conceptualizing the methods of comparative politics to account for the influence of external variables upon domestic sources of external behavior (Rosenau 1968).

The relationship between the external and domestic environment is important since the micro level of analysis does not exclusively determine foreign policy behavior. Macro, or systemic, variables do account for foreign policy, particularly as actors respond to changes in power distributions that occur in the international system. Yet, instead of taking an either or approach regarding the determinants of foreign policy behavior, scholars began to combine both micro and macro levels of analysis as sources of this behavior. The development of "linkage politics"

facilitated this conceptual end (Rosenau 1969). Researchers could now broaden the range of foreign policy comparisons to include both the internal and external environment using "pre-theories" as their guide.

The second reorientation affecting the development of CFP was historical: the demise of colonialism in the post-World War II era ushered onto the world stage a host of new national actors exercising a variety of foreign policy behaviors. Instead of searching for and comparing unique patterns in external behavior, researchers based their explanations of foreign policy on the similarities in state behavior. Although explanations of like or similar behavior proved more intellectually stimulating in a newly fashioned world of some 120 nation-states, these efforts did little to advance the cause of CFP (Rosenau 1968).

Despite the lack of attention given to foreign policy diversity, the scholarly commitment to keep CFP functioning as a legitimate field of inquiry continued. That commitment was reaffirmed well into the late 1970's both in terms of the body of research that it produced and through the continued efforts of its founding father, Rosenau (1975).

Subsequent CFP research efforts include the work of Brecher (1972, 1975) who attempted to establish a relationship between factors in the external or operational environment, and the psychological environment of individual decision makers. Although Brecher's efforts provide a

foundation for comparison between the environment and cognition across a number of cases, the lack of cumulative knowledge relevant to theory building is absent because Brecher's definition of foreign policy behavior focuses exclusively on crisis situations (Korany 1986).

Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project (1972, 1977, 1979) adds significantly to the conceptualization of CFP. It focuses on the differences in tangible characteristics of paired nations and the likelihood of international conflict. Future CFP research can then direct attention to the national attributes of any given nation-state and the probability that its foreign policy behavior would lead to conflict situations. However, the shortcoming to this approach is the exclusive use of foreign policy as conflict behavior (Hermann and Peacock 1987).

The Interstate Behavior Analysis (IBA) project spearheaded by Wilkenfeld *et. al.* (1980) represents an overarching attempt to combine a host of variables representing several levels of analysis as a means of producing stronger foreign policy explanations. This is the first major effort to incorporate the "pre-theories" of Rosenau in a comprehensive framework, utilizing statistical techniques to permit empirical testing. Notwithstanding its contribution, IBA's major drawback stems precisely from its strengths, *i.e.*, by allowing technique to determine the relationship of the variables, statistics can not

adequately account for how variables might combine to yield foreign policy behavior in the real world (Hermann and Peacock 1987).

Scholarly attempts to theoretically integrate multiple levels of analysis as a means of providing stronger explanations of observable behavior were the driving force behind the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project. East, Salmore, and Hermann (1978) consolidate seven disparate approaches to foreign policy into two potential models of explanation for both long-term (pattern) foreign policy behavior and short-term (discrete) foreign policy actions. Even though this study makes a significant theoretical contribution to CFP, the shortcoming of the CREON project is that it remains only at the theoretical stage of development, void of any empirical testing.

In the late 1980s, a group of CFP adherents subjected the field to a major conceptual investigation. Their findings provide valuable insight into how CFP might be strengthened both conceptually and empirically (Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987).

Hermann and Peacock's (1987) assessment points to the existence of a gap between the expectations of CFP as a field of study and the status of CFP in terms of theory building. They maintain that part of the problem centers around two diverse orientations that have guided the

theoretical development of CFP: neopositivist inductionism and Kuhnian normal science. Scholars approaching CFP from a neopositivist orientation have different criteria of evaluation and distinct lines of inquiry than do scholars who approach CFP from a Kuhnian orientation. While neopositivists advocate a "building block" approach based on successive layers of empirical findings, Kuhnian supporters stress the paradigmatic aspect of comparative methodology. Even though the neopositivists have been successful in gathering a substantial body of empirical findings, they have yet to integrate their results into any broader theoretical perspective. In a similar vein, the Kuhnian perspective rings hollow because of its inability to furnish a shared theoretical perspective on anything other than methodology. This divergence in conceptual orientations results in a lack of shared theoretical commitments upon which to build adequate theoretical CFP foundations. Hermann and Peacock maintain that CFP should rest more upon the development of adequate theoretical frameworks that project multi-level as well as multi-variable explanations as a way of including a broad range of conceptual approaches (Hermann and Peacock 1987).

Part of the reconceptualization of CFP in the late 1980's attempts to reaffirm the two central assumptions that guide CFP research: (1) a commitment to foreign policy phenomena as objects of inquiry and (2) a commitment to

the comparative method of inquiry which includes both cross-national and longitudinal studies (Hermann and Peacock 1987; Rosenau 1968, 1975, 1987).

Prospects for new directions in foreign policy studies constitutes the other part of CFP reconceptualization. One of the major aims of this research is to provide a multi-level, multi-variable theoretical framework as a means of enhancing present attempts at CFP theory building and foreign policy behavior. The framework this research advances draws its theoretical significance from the call for papers that proposed a reconceptualization of CFP as an approach to foreign policy phenomena, and as a methodology for foreign policy explanation (Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987).

This study takes its cue from the need to concentrate CFP research efforts on diverse topics such as political economy (Moon 1987); decision regimes (Kegley 1987); domestic regimes (Hagan 1987); cultural influences (Sampson 1987); small states and the environment (Papadakis and Starr 1987); international organizations (Karns and Mingst 1987); and, in particular, role theory (Walker 1987a).

Moreover, this study recognizes the merit of incorporating new conceptual perspectives in foreign policy studies for the continued development of CFP research. It is my contention that, as an approach, role theory offers strong potential for use as a theoretical framework for the

advancement of CFP research. The choice of role theory as a framework over other potential approaches stems from its longstanding association with previous foreign policy research. Even though the connection between role theory and CFP is fairly recent, its individual conceptual development and use is not a recent phenomenon.

#### Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

In 1970, Holsti claimed that our existing explanations of foreign policy needed more precision. This observation led Holsti to develop a typology of national role conceptions as a framework for understanding foreign policy output. According to the assumptions of this framework, both state and non-state actors often pursue a variety of foreign policy behaviors. These behaviors, or national performance roles, often exhibit patterns that reflect an actor's orientation toward the overall configuration of international political life. Orientations then manifest themselves in the form of national role conceptions. These conceptions are often a reflection of a decision maker's image of his or her state's role in international affairs. Orientations differ from role conceptions, in that orientations take into account the overall power configuration in the international system and represent a general approach to global affairs (Holsti 1970, 1988).



Even though Holsti confines his efforts to foreign policy roles as output, his model did trigger a wealth of additional studies that came to be conceptualized in a body of scholarly work that falls under the heading of role theory and foreign policy analysis. Scholars who incorporate role theory in the context of their research include East (1978); Hermann (1974, 1976, 1977, 1980); Korany and Dessouki (1984, 1991); Rosenau (1987); Sampson (1987); Singer and Hudson (1987); Walker (1977, 1981, 1987); and Wish (1980, 1987).

Wish (1987) highlights the significance of incorporating role theory into studies of foreign policy behavior, noting that few studies have attempted to examine the relationship between these two phenomena. Her earlier research underscores the need to account for the origin of national role conceptions on the part of individual decision makers based on factors such as status, motivation, and issue-areas (Wish 1980). The drawback to her work remains the exclusive focus on the perceptual role of the individual decision maker in the foreign policy process.

East (1978) began to develop a framework to combine roles and foreign policy behavior based on the concept of capacity to act. This concept involves the resource base, or national attributes, of a nation-state. East argues that national attributes have both a direct and indirect influence on foreign policy behavior. He proposes that

national attributes directly determine foreign policy behavior based on the capacity to act, which consists of the total amount of resources, the ability to use them, and a decision maker's predisposition to act. National attributes indirectly influence foreign policy behavior depending on the personal characteristics of leaders, regime constraints, and decision structures. The limitation of his model is its inability to account for the mediating effects of national roles on foreign policy choices (Wish 1987).

Sampson (1987) approaches the notion of role theory and foreign policy behavior from the perspective of national culture. Though his study underscores the need to focus on the impact of culture as a determinant of an actor's role in the foreign policy process, current research has yet to move beyond the level of the individual as a manifestation of that cultural role.

Walker (1979) is one of the first to suggest that the limitations of Holsti's initial 1970 research, along with subsequent scholarly efforts, could be overcome by searching for the origins of and variations in national roles. This led him to project a possible relationship between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior as a two-step process that incorporated both source and implementation.

Walker was also instrumental in bringing role theory to the forefront of CFP research. He asserts that the utility of role theory as an analytical framework is threefold.

First, it offers what he calls descriptive value, in that any level of analysis can be evaluated. Second, it offers organizational value in the sense that a researcher can adopt either a structural or process orientation. Third, it is significant for its explanatory value, provided the concepts employed are theoretically informed by "an appropriate set of self-contained propositions and methods" (Walker 1987a, 1987b).

Despite the abundance of role theory research, its theoretical contribution to CFP is wanting for several reasons. First, as Walker demonstrates, synthesized models of role theory that enable a researcher to map and compare different sources of roles and how varying situations affect role performance are missing in CFP research (Walker 1987). Walker contends that a "strong" role theory should answer four basic questions: what is a role; how does it come into existence; what factors are responsible for the implementation of one role over another; and, why other roles are not enacted (Walker 1987a, 1987b). To date, the scholarly challenge to construct such a model and test it empirically has not been met.

The second limitation of role theory within CFP research is its neglect of the geographic region of the Middle East (Korany 1986). While studies of comparative foreign policies specific to the Middle East region do exist (Korany and Dessouki 1984, 1991; Ismael and Ismael 1991),

they remain merely juxtaposed case studies devoid of any meaningful comparisons between and among actors, between and among multiple levels of analysis, as well as longitudinal studies of a single actor over time. Nor do these studies operationalize the importance of roles and their influence on foreign policy behavior.

The third limitation surrounding the use of role theory within CFP research is its neglect of non-state actors. The incorporation of non-state actors in any foreign policy analysis provides substance to the pluralist assumption that states are not the only entities that conduct foreign affairs (Viotti and Kauppi 1987). Even though traditional wisdom may hold that nation-states are the most important analytical units in the study of international relations and foreign policy, historical foundations for their continued survival are nonexistent (Taylor 1984).

#### Non-State Actors and Foreign Policy

Role theory and CFP are suited to the study of non-state actors because, in their day-to-day operations, non-state actors often perform one or more of the following roles: (1) provide security in order to promote or maintain peace; (2) increase the economic standards of its members; (3) preserve or promote ethnic or ideological identification; (4) promote political and social goals among nations; (5) coordinate collective positions and speak with

a unified voice before the United Nations and other international organizations; and (6) respond collectively to other non-state actors such as multinational corporations (Taylor 1984).

In their day-to-day performance of these roles, non-state actors are able to affect both structures and processes in the international system. This makes them an important entity for theoretical scrutiny in terms of foreign policy role behavior.

In light of the deficiencies surrounding the application of role theory to the enterprise of CFP, and the importance of incorporating non-state actors in foreign policy research, this study accepts the challenge to develop a theoretical model grounded in role theory and to incorporate it into a longitudinal and comparative analysis of a non-state actor's foreign policy behavior consistent with the demands of CFP research. The development and application of such a model not only enhances the status of role theory and foreign policy analysis, but it offers a new direction in the search for theory building in CFP research.

#### Significance and Purpose of the Study

The foreign policy behavior of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) serves as the test case for the model. Justification of the PLO as a single actor is significant because a theoretical and longitudinal study of one actor

offers a "laboratory for scientific inquiry" and because structures, processes, and foreign policy outcomes tend to vary across data points (Rosenau 1987). By looking at a sufficient number of data points across time, a researcher can make meaningful before-and-after comparisons of roles to discern if patterns of relationships exist and, if so, at what level of analysis (Rosenau 1987). Furthermore, such an enterprise has generalizable potential in that the model should prove useful for its applicability to state as well as other non-state actors in the region, such as the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

In addition to the above mentioned broad theoretical concerns, this study has four specific objectives: (1) to identify, map, and compare the range of discrete PLO foreign policy behaviors that developed, evolved, and changed over time; (2) to offer an explanation of how discrete foreign policy behaviors brought about an over-time change in the PLO's overall pattern behavior; (3) to offer an explanation for the origin and performance of one role over another; and (4) to offer a theoretical explanation of both discrete and pattern behaviors within the context of a role modification model.

This study carries additional theoretical significance for the contribution it makes regarding the use of change, which is the underlying theme of this study. Despite the acknowledged need to concentrate research efforts on

explaining change, there still remains an overemphasis on explaining continuity in world affairs. Since international relations theory and foreign policy both experience mixtures of change and continuity, theoretical advancements should proceed along more balanced lines of inquiry (Buzman and Jones 1981). However, the notion of change still remains a pervasive factor in both international relations theory and foreign policy analyses. In international relations theory, conceptualizations of change vary according to the theoretical orientation of scholars who choose to adopt it in any framework.

The realist paradigm of international relations theory approaches the notion of change from the perspective of the international system. The stimulus for change always originates in the external environment. For realists, war has been the principal vehicle of change (Viotti and Kauppi 1987). Realists who have attempted to go beyond war as the primary explanation of change, have, for the most part, incorporated other external variables such as economics (Gilpin 1982); cycles of growth and decline (Modelski 1962); and factors such as the emergence of China as a dominant power and the rising issue of nuclear proliferation (Holsti 1988).

In contrast, the pluralist paradigm focuses on the effects of peaceful change and the transformation of world politics through such processes as integration (Haas 1964;

Mitrany 1966; Deutsch 1957); international regime formation (Krasner 1983); and transnationalism and interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1989; Rosecrance 1977; Rosenau 1969, 1984).

Explanations of change specific to foreign policy behavior remain equally constrained. To date, Holsti (1982) offers the most accomplished work on foreign policy change. However, his study confines itself to the dramatic and immediate restructuring of foreign policy as opposed to an ongoing and evolutionary process.

In 1990, Charles Hermann proposed a model of foreign policy change. The significance of his model, parts of which this study incorporates, allows the researcher to account for change as part of a deliberate process rather than as part of a "deterministic response" based on conditions in the international system, e.g., regime change (Hermann 1990). The limitations of his work are twofold. First, he fails to address the issue of evolutionary change in foreign policy behavior. Hermann is still concerned with dramatic and more immediate change. The second limitation is the assumption that foreign policy change occurs as part of a progressive, graduated process, implying that previous behaviors are no longer employed. This study attempts to overcome this deficiency by demonstrating that the implementation of one role at the expense of another does not necessarily mean the elimination of a particular role,



nor does it correspond to a graduated process. Instead, roles are subjected to a simultaneous process where they are continually adjusted, adapted, or redirected in an evolutionary fashion. This study uses the PLO as the test case for observing and recognizing modifications in discrete foreign policy roles.

#### Empirical Significance of the PLO

The use of the PLO as a test case is empirically significant. The PLO represents one non-state Middle East actor whose foreign policy behavior is often the focus of international attention, yet its actions escape any comparative and longitudinal theoretical scrutiny.

In terms of its foreign policy behavior, the PLO is often depicted by the press and policy makers alike as a "terrorist" organization bent on the destruction of Israel. However, a theoretical examination and comparison of PLO foreign policy behaviors resulting from resolutions passed by the Palestine National Council (PNC) reveals that the foreign policy behavior of the PLO has proceeded along a changing and evolutionary purposeful course of foreign policy action not just confined to terrorist roles. In fact, over the years, the PLO has accumulated and transposed a variety of foreign policy roles that approach the range of roles utilized by nation-states. As such, the PLO has at its disposal a repertoire of roles that it can employ as

part of its long-term or pattern foreign policy behavior of attaining an independent state, or as part of its immediate and more discrete foreign policy actions. Moreover, these roles allow the PLO to exercise foreign policy diversity by providing it with a range of optional behaviors from which it can choose a deliberate foreign policy output.

The diversity of PLO foreign policy role behavior can be characterized and evaluated according to four distinct phases. Each phase exhibits a range of roles that were either internally initiated or externally prescribed in order to achieve express foreign policy objectives.

#### Phases of PLO Foreign Policy

Throughout the first phase, which began with the 1st PNC (1964) until the 4th PNC (1968), the PLO's primary foreign policy objective centered around the notion of return. For the Palestinians, this concept entailed both a political return to reconstructed Arab Palestine and a physical return of the 1948 refugees to their homes. Many Palestinians believed that the primary responsibility for securing these objectives remained the collective military and political responsibility of the broader Arab world. This reliance upon the Arab states constrained the PLO into accepting externally prescribed roles as part of its foreign policy output, despite attempts by the leader to steer the organization in a different direction. PLO role behavior

during this time primarily exhibited the roles of subservient and regional subsystem collaborator.

Lasting from the 4th PNC (1968) through the 11th PNC (1973), the second phase of foreign policy role behavior commenced with the appearance of the guerrilla groups within the decision-making apparatus of the PLO following the 1967 June War. The introduction of bureaucratic advocacy as an internal determinant of foreign policy behavior contributed to the PLO's adaptation, positive adjustment, and redirection of the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles. The former role initially served a strategic purpose by advancing the slogan of armed struggle as both an organizing and mobilizing principle. When the PLO had achieved this short-term goal, they tactically adapted armed struggle as the principal means for attaining their long-term goal of total liberation.

The PLO also initially worked toward attaining strategic recognition for the independent role based on their belief in Palestinian self-reliance as a means to all ends concerning PLO activity. This view stands in contrast to the first phase, whereby the PLO now considered the burden of total liberation to be primarily Palestinian. The organization also experienced role redirection with the added concept of forming a democratic state in all of Palestine, once total liberation had been achieved.

The third phase began with the 12th PNC (1974) and concludes with the 15th PNC (1981). This phase involved a significant amount of positive and negative adjustments in all existing roles and the adaptation of new strategic goals. The modifications in goal redirection concluded with the PLO's ultimate acceptance of a two-state solution. The evolution of PLO goal redirection officially began in 1969 at the 5th PNC when the PLO called for the establishment of a democratic society to accompany the goal of total liberation. The PLO gradually expanded this concept to include a democratic state in 1974 at the 12th PNC when the organization called for the establishment of an independent national authority on any part of Palestine. By 1977, the 13th PNC formally expanded this interim goal to include the concept of an independent state.

During the fourth phase, which began with the 16th PNC (1983), the PLO further redirected this goal by calling for the confederation of the future Palestinian state with Jordan. A year later, the PLO endorsed majority rule and abandoned consensus-building in the making of its public policy and assigned a more positive role for diplomacy to bring about evolving goal redirection. In 1988, a modification in goal redirection culminated during the 19th PNC when the PLO officially declared the West Bank-Gaza state; accepted U.N. General Assembly resolution 181 (Appendix A), and U.N. Security Council resolutions 242

(Appendix B) and 338 (Appendix C); and commenced direct peace talks with Israel. By the time the 19th PNC (1988) had convened, the PLO had initiated the entire range of foreign policy roles contained in the typology of national role conceptions. Moreover, the organization has modified those roles in both positive and negative directions through such means as the increased use of pragmatism and accommodation and the decreased application of visionary revolutionary liberator behavior. These modifications in foreign policy output demonstrate that the PLO has the capability to develop new policy in accordance with international reality. They also indicate the organization's willingness to relinquish previously applied behaviors that often hindered its strategic aims.

#### Literature Review

Use of the PLO as a test case for the theoretical role model advanced in this study carries additional significance when viewed against the backdrop of prevailing approaches that purport to explain foreign policy behavior in the Middle East. The existing literature on the foreign policy behavior of both state and non-state actors in the Middle East is beset with a number of limitations. As Korany and Dessouki (1984) note in their review of the literature, foreign policy analysis suffers because it is primarily descriptive in nature and "belongs to the tradition of

diplomatic history or commentary on current affairs" (Korany and Dessouki 1984).

Korany and Dessouki identify three approaches that dominate Middle East foreign policy studies: the psychologistic, the great powers, and the reductionist or model-builders approach (Korany and Dessouki 1984).

The first approach, the psychologistic, asserts that foreign policy originates from a single leader's impulses and idiosyncracies. According to this view, "kings and presidents" are the sources of foreign policy and decisions regarding war or peace become a matter of "personal taste and individual choice" (Korany and Dessouki 1984). The shortcoming of this approach is that it characterizes foreign policy as an "erratic, irrational activity not subject to systematic analysis" (Korany and Dessouki 1984). Furthermore, the psychologistic approach disregards the influence of domestic, regional, and systemic variables as sources of foreign policy behavior. In the case of the PLO, this approach assumes that PLO foreign policy behavior is subject to the whims of its organizational leader, Yasser Arafat. In addition, this approach completely ignores decision making structures, such as the PNC, that participate in the foreign policy process of the PLO.

The second approach that dominates foreign policy studies of the Middle East is the great powers approach, whereby foreign policy is merely a "function of the East-

West conflict" (Korany and Dessouki 1984). The limitation of this approach is the assumption that actors in the Middle East have no purposeful foreign policies of their own and that they lack autonomy. Regarding the PLO, foreign policy analysis according to this approach is often guided by the assumption that the PLO has been a terrorist proxy of the Soviet Union (Freedman 1975). It disregards autonomous and purposeful foreign policy behavior undertaken by the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people independent of other actors, both in the region and in the international arena (Korany and Dessouki 1984).

The third approach that dominates Middle East foreign policy studies is the reductionist or model-builders approach. This approach assumes that the same set of issues that accounts for foreign policy formation in the industrialized world can also explain foreign policy in the developing Middle East but at a lesser level of development. The drawback to this approach is that it fails to account for specific features of the developing region, such as modernization, low levels of political institutionalization, and dependency. In the case of the PLO, this approach is not applicable since the long term foreign policy objective of the PLO is to acquire a defined piece of territory over which it can exercise sovereignty. The issues confronting the PLO are not the same as those that beset the industrialized world, even at a lesser level of development.

Additionally, there is also an overemphasis on domestic factors to account for foreign policy behavior. Adeed Dawisha (1977) asserted that the great quantity of scholarly works that deal with the region have been "primarily concerned with the domestic politics of the Middle Eastern states, and many of these have been essentially biographical essays of the various leaders" (Dawisha 1977). Furthermore, researchers who utilize these variables to explain the foreign policy behavior of single states also rely on the same set of limited variables to account for variations in foreign policy output. As Korany notes, these limited approaches suffer from a lack of any systematic comparison among the actors involved (Korany 1986). Since most researchers direct their attention and scholarly efforts to a single entity without broadening their range of independent variables to include multiple levels of analysis, they often overlook subtle differences and similarities in foreign policy behavior. In addition, overemphasis on the function of the individual leader and on the domestic attributes of a single entity have led researchers away from focusing on the decision making process, as well as decision structures, which are also components of foreign policy behavior.

An overview of the literature specific to the PLO reveals many of the shortcomings discussed above. Only two



studies exist that incorporate aspects of the PLO as a non-state actor in international affairs (Bertelson 1977; Taylor 1984). Bertelson's research builds on the non-state nation (NSN) project and the effect of systemic variables on the development of Palestinian Arab nationalism. Her study ends with the formation of the PLO as a manifestation of that nationalism. Taylor's work, on the other hand, begins from the limitations of the state-centric model as a means of understanding the importance of non-state actors. He classifies the PLO as a "transnational ethnic group" and focuses solely on the institutional infrastructure of the organization. Even though this study is significant for the insight it provides regarding the component parts of the PLO, the substance of foreign policy is missing from the analysis.

Despite the plethora of books and articles written about the PLO, the literature indicates that little has been done that transcends a purely descriptive analysis of PLO foreign policy behavior. Some works on the PLO concentrate primarily on the personal attributes of the individual leader that are essentially biographies of Arafat. Primarily, these works describe his early childhood experiences and his later efforts at forming Fatah (Hart 1989; Mishel 1986; Gowers and Walker 1992).

A host of other works focuses on the history and formation of the PLO (Becker 1984; Cobban 1984; Frangi 1982;

Hamid 1975; Ismael and Ismael 1991; Muslih 1990; Rubenberg 1983). Works that attempt theoretical explanations concerning PLO decision-making are confined primarily to analyses of single events that are devoid of any longitudinal comparisons. For example, Alain Gresh's (1985) study of the PLO's decision-making process focused only on the single decision made by the PLO in 1974 to accept nothing short of a Palestinian state. Emile Sahliyah's (1986) study concentrated on the issues that confronted the internal mechanisms of the PLO in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Helena Cobban's (1984) study represented a monumental but limited effort to examine the internal dynamics of the PLO. The drawback to her study was that it remained confined only to the organizational role played by Fatah. Cheryl Rubenberg's (1983) work on the infrastructure of the PLO has proven to be instructional in the sense that it defines the organizational makeup of the PLO and it identifies the factors instrumental in the decision-making process. It falls short in providing a theoretical framework as to how the various factions arrive at foreign policy decisions. Rashid Khalidi's (1986) work concentrated only on PLO decision making during the 1982 war, while Kirisci's (1986) study focused on the PLO's efforts to mobilize international support for their cause among the European community.

Recent works have focused on Palestinian state formation (Abed 1990; Ahmed 1990; Brand 1988; Segal 1989) and descriptive accounts of the *Intifada* (Aronson 1987; Brand 1990; Chomsky 1988; Dunn 1988; Nassar and Heacock 1990; Peretz 1990; Schiff and Ya'ari 1989; Tamari 1991; Umar and Brynen 1988). Other works abound, but they limit themselves to descriptive accounts of the PLO as well as its standing in inter-Arab politics within the regional environment (Ajami 1981; Gerner 1991; Hudson 1977, 1990; Quandt 1977; Selim 1991; Shemesh 1988; Taylor 1982).

The search for scholarly works that incorporate CFP or role theory, as well as multiple levels of analysis serving as independent variables, has not produced tangible results. The absence of role theory and foreign policy analysis utilizing the PLO as a test case underscores the theoretical significance of both the model and the actor under scrutiny.

In sum, this study develops and tests a role modification model to account for evolutionary changes in foreign policy behavior. This study represents a response to the call for stronger CFP theoretical explanations of foreign policy behavior and the need to broaden the application of role theory within CFP research. The test case for the model is the PLO.

The following chapter discusses the significance of the model for CFP, describes its component parts and identifies the dependent variables under investigation along

with the independent variables. It also operationalizes the concepts used throughout this study and sets forth the specific hypotheses to be tested.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ROLE MODIFICATION MODEL

#### Origin of the Model

As stated in the previous chapter, the specific model advanced in this research is that of role modification. As its title suggests, this model represents a synthesis of divergent theoretical frameworks comprised of both role theory and foreign policy change. The role theory aspect derives its strength from the earlier research of both Holsti (1970, 1988) and Walker (1987a). From Holsti, the model engages many of the features contained in the typology of national role conceptions developed several years ago. Role theory not only provides a conceptually rich backdrop to observe foreign policy behavior, it also allows the researcher to broaden Holsti's earlier work by surmounting the conceptual limitation of focusing only on foreign policy output to include both process and outcome. The model also responds to the four basic questions required by Walker (1987a) as part of a "strong" role theory. Specifically, what is a role; how does it come into existence; what factors are responsible for the implementation of one role over another; and, why are other roles not enacted?

The modification or change aspect of the model employs the independent variables of the Hermann model, namely leader-driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks. The modification portion of the model expands the work of Hermann in two ways. The first is the focus on less dramatic and more evolutionary foreign policy change as opposed to immediate restructuring. The second expansion, discussed shortly, is the assertion that roles are evolutionarily adapted, adjusted, and redirected in a simultaneous fashion and not as part of a four-step graduated process implied in the Hermann model.

In its totality, the model is significant because the combination of role theory and foreign policy change in a synthesized model answers the call for stronger explanatory frameworks that utilize role theory within a CFP research design. The model also proves valuable for advancing the cause of role theory in that CFP provides the needed "methodological refinement" to move role theory in the direction of genuine theory as opposed to only a conceptual framework (Walker 1987a). The benefit of a CFP research design is that it functions both as an approach for understanding foreign policy phenomena and as a methodology for scientific research based on the comparative method.

### CFP as an Approach

As an approach, CFP requires an explicit definition of foreign policy behavior. One of the long-standing criticisms of CFP has centered around the lack of unanimity regarding such a definition (Hermann and Peacock 1987; Papadakis and Starr 1987). Adherents to CFP generally conceptualize foreign policy as either an output, process, or outcome, i.e., effect. This division of foreign policy behavior into three analytically distinct categories perpetuates the lack of theoretical accumulation within the field. As a result, scholars continue to search for theoretical frameworks that are able to integrate all three definitions as a means of achieving theoretical accord (Hermann 1987; Papadakis and Starr 1987). The significance of this study relative to those concerns is that it works within a framework of analysis that includes the three conceptualizations of foreign policy behavior: output, process, and outcome. Specifically, the dependent variables in this study, defined as roles, represent foreign policy output. The independent variables that seek to account for the output of those roles analyze both the foreign policy formation process and the outcome or effect of roles on subsequent foreign policy outputs as determinants of foreign policy behavior.

### CFP as a Methodology

Methodologically, CFP utilizes the comparative method of analysis within the confines of the behavioral sequences of interaction that constitute the foreign policy process.

The application of the comparative method of analysis adheres to the following procedures:

1. the systematic comparison of each case utilizing the same set of independent variables;
2. the systematic comparison of variations and similarities among the cases under investigation;
3. the prior conceptualization of all variables and the projection of possible relationships among and between the cases (Hermann and Peacock 1987).

The sequences of interaction that host the comparative method of analysis unfold in three basic stages:

1. initiatory, which is the stimulus that prompts the need for a foreign policy role;
2. implementative, which concerns itself with how and what mechanisms translate the stimulus of the initiatory stage into specific roles; and
3. responsive, which serves as a feedback mechanism (Rosenau 1975).

The sources that give rise to an occasion for a foreign policy decision constitute the initiatory stage of foreign policy formation. These sources are divided into two general types: feedback or reciprocity, and prior behavior. Feedback rests on the assumption that an actor's foreign policy output is largely determined by the response it receives from other actors. Prior behavior, often characterized as bureaucratic inertia, yields foreign policy



output that is often a function of an actor's previous policy toward a given situation (Phillips 1978). However, feedback and prior behavior both require a stimulus. That stimulus usually presents itself in the form of either a threat or an opportunity. A threat initiates the need for a foreign policy decision when it is thought to interfere with the attainment of long-term foreign policy objectives or the continued viability of the actor. An opportunity initiates a foreign policy decision when it is thought to facilitate progress toward the achievement of goals (Brady 1978; East 1978). Factors that constitute threats or opportunities that are not part of feedback or prior behavior from previous roles are treated as intervening variables. In this study, they include, but are not limited to the 1967 June War, the 1973 war, the Camp David Accords, the 1972 United Arab Kingdom Plan (UAK), and the 1972 and 1976 West Bank Municipal Elections.

The implementative stage of interaction consists of the option formation and choice stage of foreign policy formation. Taken together, option formation and choice constitute the process or decision making phase of foreign policy formation. The foreign policy output that results from the implementative stage is a role that responds to either a threat or an opportunity. This stage also takes into consideration the decision structure of the foreign policy making body. Decision structures are crucial for

understanding the process by which foreign policy decisions are made. Their inclusion in any study of foreign policy is based on the assumption that foreign policy is often the "unintended" outcome of a bargaining process rather than part of a deliberate strategy (Allison 1971; Hermann 1978). Additionally, because the implementative stage is where foreign policy roles are actually chosen, it is possible to determine which variable or combination of variables yields a particular foreign policy role. Furthermore, this phase also permits one to explain which roles, if any, were adapted, adjusted, or redirected over time.

The responsive stage of interaction takes into consideration the outcome or effect of a particular role on its subsequent use or modification. The responsive stage is important. The effects of a particular role reenter the foreign policy process in the form of independent variables, thus setting into motion a new behavioral sequence of interaction beginning with the initiatory stage. This, in turn, leads to another implementative stage of foreign policy making. The entire process is circular, rather than linear. The key to understanding this process is to determine under what conditions the independent variables yield a specific role or lead to a modification in role use.

### Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in this study are the foreign policy behaviors, expressed as both roles and goals, that followed from resolutions enacted during Palestine National Council (PNC) sessions between 1968 and 1981. To date, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has held twenty PNC sessions (see Table 2.1). Primarily because of the nonavailability of consistent data following the 15th PNC (1981), this study does not extend beyond 1981 even though the PLO's foreign policy continues through the 19th PNC (1991). The absence of congruent data precludes an exact analysis and comparison of the remaining five PNCs within the parameters of the role modification advanced in this study.

The PNC sessions are important because they mark significant structural and political events in PLO foreign policy behavior. The specific foreign policy behavioral roles investigated include visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, independents, regional subsystem collaborator, active independents, pragmatists, and accommodationists. Their operational definitions are presented in Table 2.2. The goals of the PLO include total liberation, secular democratic state, national authority, confederation, and a two-state solution.

Each phase of PLO foreign policy has characteristic PNC resolutions articulating a corresponding set of roles

that constitutes a repertoire of foreign policy choices the PLO has at its disposal. As the PLO broadened its range of regional and international support, subsequent phases and their corresponding PNC resolutions reveals both the positive and negative adaption and adjustment of new and existing roles. The PLO uses roles independently or collectively, depending upon threats or opportunities that confront the organization. Furthermore, these roles are not exclusively progressive; thus the PLO can revert back to earlier roles when making foreign policy choices. This aspect accounts for adjustments in role behavior.

#### Independent Variables and Hypotheses

This study makes use of six independent variables. Four variables that purport to explain roles originate directly from the Hermann model and consist of leader-driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks. Two additional variables are formed by collapsing the original four into a decision making process variable and an environmental process variable.

Use of the leader-driven variable centers around the influence of Arafat, the PLO's organizational leader. This variable permits one to test the hypothesis that the choice of PLO foreign policy roles is more the result of the determined efforts of an authoritative decision maker and less the product of other variables. This hypothesis

asserts that, as chairman of the PLO, Arafat has the ability to mobilize competing elements within the organization to either select, implement, or modify the use of one role over another.

Bureaucratic advocacy takes into consideration the various factions that comprise the decision structure of the PNC such as Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). This variable allows one to test the hypothesis that the choice of a foreign policy role is more the outcome of bargaining among competing groups within the PNC at the expense of other variables. This hypothesis rests on the premise that competing elements do exist within the internal dynamics of the PLO's foreign policy process and that the process is not rational (Allison 1971; Viotti and Kauppi 1987).

Domestic restructuring is concerned with the constituency of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territories. The notion of a constituency is probably more acute for the leadership of the PLO than for state actors because the PLO does not exercise direct control over its people. The continued legitimacy of the PLO and its leadership requires that it take into consideration the aspirations and demands of its people in the diaspora and the occupied territories. Therefore, this variable allows one to test the hypothesis that the

Palestinian people themselves have both a direct and indirect influence on foreign policy role selection. This hypothesis presupposes that the domestic constituency functions as a determinant of PLO foreign policy. It presupposes that the PLO takes into consideration factors such as accountability and representation when choosing or modifying foreign policy roles.

External shocks take into consideration stimuli that originate in the regional and international environment that constitute both threats and opportunities for the PLO. Use of this variable permits one to test the hypothesis that stimuli in the regional and international environment are more responsible for producing foreign policy roles than other variables. It is further hypothesized that a stimulus in the form of a threat leads to a positive or negative adjustment in existing roles, whereas a stimulus perceived as an opportunity leads to the adaption and redirection of new roles.

As noted earlier, the four independent variables when collapsed form two additional independent variables consisting of a decision-making process variable and an environmental process variable. The decision making process variable combines the leader-driven and bureaucratic advocacy variable. The environmental process variable combines domestic restructuring and external shocks. This dichotomy permits one to evaluate foreign policy behavior in

terms of an internal-external process leading to the following additional hypotheses.

First, the stimulus for PLO foreign policy role selection and modification originates more often in the decision-making process than in the environment. This hypothesis asserts that a threat or opportunity can originate internally. The PLO initiates and modifies roles within the internal dynamics of the organization primarily to maintain unity and cohesiveness and to preserve the position and status of the member groups as well as the organizational leader. As such, foreign policy role behavior is more initiatory than reactionary.

Second, the stimulus for PLO foreign policy role selection and modification originates more in the environment than in the decision making process. This hypothesis contends that both domestic restructuring and external shocks, in combination, prescribe a particular role upon the PLO when responding to threats or opportunities. In this scenario, PLO foreign policy roles are more reactionary than initiatory.

All six independent variables analyze behavior from PNC resolutions that produced discrete foreign policy roles in response to a threat or an opportunity. This study discerns which variable or combination of variables led to the adoption of and modification in foreign policy roles that the PLO attended to in specific situations. Comparisons are

then made across the cases to determine the extent of variations and similarities in role behavior and to assess under what conditions a particular role comes into play and if its use has been modified.

Questions this study attempts to explain through comparative analysis ask, for example, what variable or combination of variables led the PLO to adopt a more active independent and opportunist role when it abandoned its drive for a democratic state and opted instead for a two-state solution? Was the decision making process variable as opposed to the environmental variable more instrumental in leading the PLO to garner international support for its role as active independent when the Arab League declared the organization the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974? Was the adoption of these and other roles more the result of leader-driven influence, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, or external shocks?

The answers to the above questions should reveal a number of important implications regarding the foreign policy behavior and process of the non-state actor under investigation. For example, is foreign policy behavior better explained in terms of the decision making process variables that unite the organization behind a particular role or does the formation of foreign policy rest more on the environmental process variable that prescribes a



particular role? Additionally, this study asks whether these variables are merely situationally specific and, if so, under what conditions or sets of conditions any one independent variable tends to dominate. Furthermore, our predictive capacity increases in that it allows us to assert that under a specific set of conditions one can expect the PLO to behave in a particular manner and act according to a predefined role.

#### Modification in Role Behavior

In the process of comparing the origin of discrete foreign policy roles, this study also evaluates the extent that these roles were modified across time. As noted earlier, the stimulus for focusing on the possibility of role modification emanated from the conceptual limitations surrounding the use of change proposed by Hermann. According to Hermann, fundamental foreign policy change occurs as part of a four-step graduated process that begins with an adjustment change which is the quantitative, i.e., more or less, changes made in the level of effort in the application of each foreign policy behavior.

Hermann abandons this factor as an aspect of change. Instead, he proceeds to the next level without ever explaining how an actor moves beyond foreign policy adjustments to the next phase of change. However, this study argues that adjustments in foreign policy roles remain

even as actors move to the next level. According to Hermann, the second phase, or program change involves a change in the means or methods in which a threat or opportunity is addressed. Hermann implies that an actor develops a new foreign policy behavior to initiate a means change. When that behavior fails to achieve the desired end an actor then moves on to the third phase, which involves a goal change. This occurs when a long-term goal is replaced or abandoned and foreign policy output is redirected toward another end. While this is certainly demonstrated in the case of the PLO when they decided to opt for a two-state solution rather than pursue their earlier demand for a secular democratic state in all of Palestine, the PLO did not dispose of previous roles. Roles that had been employed for different means still remained subject to either positive or negative quantitative adjustments capable of being implemented as foreign policy output should the appropriate situation arise. The fourth and final phase of change that Hermann describes is an international-orientation change, which involves the redirection of the actor's overall foreign policy orientation (Hermann 1990). In the case of the PLO, this aspect is not applicable because an orientation change would involve a change in the tenets of the 1968 National Charter (Appendix D).

The premise of this research is that modification in foreign policy roles is not subject to a graduated

progression. The study posits that contrary to what Hermann implies, roles are not abandoned at one stage in order to implement a new role at another. For example, even though the PLO began to acquire additional foreign policy roles, such as active independent when it was externally recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, it did not relinquish its visionary revolutionary liberator role altogether. Instead, this role stayed at the level of adjustment change where it could be employed in a more or less fashion while the new active independent role was adapted as a tactical change. Furthermore, roles are subject to a more or less continual adjustment in their use at any level of modification, particularly as new roles are tactically adapted to attain long-term objectives. Such an adjustment can consist of either a gradual increase or decrease in role use over time. The extent to which a role may increase or decrease in use is relative to when it was last employed.

It is my contention that foreign policy role modifications should be based on more dynamic explanations that account for evolutionary change. The role modification model developed for this study projects such an interpretation. According to this model, modifications in foreign policy roles contain the following three component parts that are not exclusively progressive: role adjustment, role adaptation, and role redirection.

Role adjustment involves the quantitative, i.e., more or less, changes made in the level of effort in the application of each role. Roles that fall within the adjustment category are tactical in the sense that they serve as a means for the advancement of other means, immediate ends, and ultimate strategic goals. For example, the PLO can increase its use of terrorist acts to promote military struggle, or it can rely less on terrorism and more on diplomatic efforts in order to bring about a political solution to the Palestinian question.

Role adaptation involves a change in the means or tactics with the added allowance of new roles coming into play. Roles in the adaptation category serve as a means to a strategic end. For instance, the accommodationist role was introduced to promote the goal of establishing a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state. Adaptation also permits the reincorporation of previous roles that may have been abandoned or were no longer appropriate following a strategic change. The PLO's renunciation of terrorism in 1988 as an element of a strategic change does not preclude the eventual return of armed struggle should conditions warrant its use.

Role redirection involves a change in goals that are of a strategic nature. At this level, roles are then redirected toward achieving another end. New roles may be adapted and previous roles can be adjusted to achieve a

strategic end. For example, in the mid-1970s, the PLO modified the goal of total liberation and introduced an intermediate goal of establishing a national authority on any occupied territory liberated from Israel. This interim goal redirection required that the organization adjust its foreign policy behavior to include more regional subsystem collaboration while positively adapting the active independent role to gain international recognition as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Foreign policy roles are modified in a number of ways. Indicators of role performance involve comparing the actual number of times the PLO did or did not perform a specific role across time. Role adjustment involves counting the actual number of times the PLO positively or negatively articulated the need to implement or suspend specific role performance; adaption involves the substitution or incorporation of a new role in addressing a threat or opportunity; role redirection is identified by the use of previous roles toward a new end as well the overt articulation of a new goal presented in the form of a declaration, resolution, official statements, and speeches by political elites.

#### Foreign Policy Behavior and its Indicators

The overall foreign policy behavior of the PLO is the deliberate selection of a role(s) and a goal(s) articulated

in official PNC resolutions, achieved initially through the politics of consensus and later majority rule, that is directed toward the external environment for the express purpose of accomplishing a foreign policy objective. As noted in Chapter One, for the purpose of this study foreign policy behavior is divided into two types: pattern and discrete. Pattern behavior is aggregated behavior over a period. Discrete behavior represents a single foreign policy act at a specified moment in time. Earlier theoretical perspectives projected separate analytical frameworks for explaining both pattern and discrete behaviors (Salmore, Hermann, Hermann, and Salmore 1978).

However, this study contends that the analysis and aggregation of discrete behaviors over time provides the researcher with an actor's pattern behavior. These perspectives do not have to exist separately. The underlying assumption supporting this contention is the notion that pattern behavior reflects over-time role choices intended to achieve long-term objectives. Discrete behaviors are the short-term role choices an actor employs to achieve those objectives. Discrete behaviors, therefore, are the more immediate goals or needs an actor addresses that either hinder or enhance the attainment of its long-term foreign policy objectives. They are both problem oriented and goal oriented in nature. In the case of the PLO, the organization has utilized roles in a number of

discrete foreign policy situations over the years. For example, the PLO has positively adapted the pragmatic role to conclude regional agreements with other actors that fostered the goal of total liberation. The growth and expansion of roles resulting from discrete behaviors have provided the PLO with a range of foreign policy choices that constitute its overall pattern behavior. It is precisely the short-term or discrete foreign policy roles over time that this study evaluates.

PNC resolutions were chosen to mark data points across time because roles resulting from PNC resolutions represent the concrete realities that confront the organization at the local, regional, and international level of analysis (Muslih 1990). The PLO holds PNC sessions because the occasion for a foreign policy decision surfaces.

#### Data Requirements

The data requirements for this research are the running record. Of the running record documents the following items are used:

1. the 1964 and 1968 PLO National Charter;
2. the official resolutions published after regular and special sessions of the PNC;
3. members in attendance during PNC sessions;
4. written texts of formal treaties that the organization entered into;
5. texts of speeches made by the official representatives of the organization;

6. texts of interviews given by official members of the organization;
7. official journals and other publications sponsored by the organization;
8. mass media material, particularly media coverage of the organization's decisions, meetings, and policies as reported in The New York Times, Le Monde, Le Monde Diplomatique, Al-Fajr; Washington Report on Middle East Affairs; and Middle East International.

The International Documents on Palestine (IDP), 1967-1981, serves as the primary data source for this study. Each yearly volume contains relevant international, United States, and Arab world statements, communiques, interviews, resolutions, and minutes of official meetings. Moreover, the Arab documents are consistently translated throughout the entire IDP series. This study gives prime consideration to translation consistency because many of the documents in the data set were originally published in Arabic.

Because this research reviews all documents associated with the PLO, it is necessary to develop a coding system to measure the data. This research uses content analysis as the tool to measure role and goal changes.

#### Methodolgy and Decision Rules

Of the 1800 documents reviewed for this study, 824 were content analyzed and form the data set which spans a period of 149 months. To obtain an even distribution of documents, this study derives the arithmetic mean by dividing the total number of documents by the total number of months. Monthly



raw totals for each variable are converted into an average difference which represents the average number of positive endorsements and renunciations for each role on a per month, per variable basis.

In determining which documents to content analyze, the following decisions rules apply: (1) the PLO initiates the document; (2) the PLO and another actor jointly issue the document; and (3) if another actor other than the PLO issues the document, they must specifically reference the PLO. In addition, whenever the PLO and another actor jointly issue a document, both variables are assigned the appropriate scores.

In the process of content analyzing, the following indicators identify the tactical roles under investigation:

visionary revolutionary liberator: armed struggle, armed resistance, Palestinian revolution, program of military action, commando activity.

defender of the faith: heroic masses, people's struggle, vanguards of the struggling people, Palestinian resistance, Palestinian struggle, masses of the struggling people.

regional subsystem collaborator: pan-Arabism, arab unity, regional cooperation, Arab brothers, regional unity.

independent: independent decision-making, independence of action, freedom of action,

active independent: sole representative, legitimate representative,

pragmatic: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, international conferences, specific agreements, international forums.

accommodationist: compromise, partial solutions, concessions, moderation, accommodation.

Indicators for the goals of total liberation, secular democratic state, national authority, confederation, and two state solution are self-evident.

### Conclusion

This chapter has described the particular model advanced in this research, identified the dependent and independent variables, and set forth the specific hypotheses to be tested. The chapter also discussed the comparative methodological approach that this research utilizes.

The following chapter opens the "black-box" of foreign policy decision making within the PLO by discussing the importance of decision structures and foreign policy. Specifically, it identifies the type of decision structure of the PNC, the types of behavior associated with the decision structure of this body, and how the various component parts of the PNC arrive at foreign policy decisions.

Table 2.1

## PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL SESSIONS, 1964-1991

First	Jerusalem	28 May - 2 June 1964
Second	Cairo	31 May - 4 June 1965
Third	Gaza	20 - 24 May 1966
Fourth	Cairo	10 - 17 July 1968
Fifth	Cairo	1 - 4 February 1969
Sixth	Cairo	1 - 6 September 1969
Seventh	Cairo	30 May - 4 June 1970
Emergency	Amman	28 August 1970
Eighth	Cairo	28 February - 5 March 1971
Ninth	Cairo	7 - 13 July 1971
Tenth	Cairo	6 - 12 April 1972
Eleventh	Cairo	6 - 12 January 1973
Twelfth	Cairo	1 - 9 June 1974
Thirteenth	Cairo	12 - 20 March 1977
Fourteenth	Damascus	15 - 23 January 1979
Fifteenth	Damascus	11 - 19 April 1981
Sixteenth	Algiers	14 - 22 February 1983
Seventeenth	Amman	22 - 28 November 1984
Eighteenth	Algiers	20 - 25 April 1987
Nineteenth	Algiers	12 - 15 November 1988
Twentieth	Algiers	23 -28 September 1991

Table 2.2

TYOLOGY OF PLO FOREIGN POLICY ROLES

<u>Role</u>	<u>Operational Definition</u>	<u>Specific Indicators**</u>
Visionary Revolutionary Liberator	force, i.e., armed struggle in the form of terrorist activities for the express purpose of liberating all of Palestine and dismantling Israel	armed struggle, armed resistance, Palestine revolution, commando action program of military action
Defender of the Faith	acts that reflect a commitment to the ideological value of Pan-Arabism and Arab unity	resistance, heroic struggle, people's war, national freedom, vanguards, struggle, masses, popular uprising
Independent	acts that underscore the notion of Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty over their own affairs	freedom of action, independent dm, independence of action
Regional Subsystem Collaborators	acts that represent a commitment to cooperate and intergrate with other actors in the region	arab solidarity, arab unity, pan-arabism, regional cooperation

Active Independents	physical acts that stress Palestinian independence	sole representative, legitimate representative
Pragmatic	acceptance of legal, i.e., U.N. Arab League, international conference solutions, etc.	U.N. resolutions, Arab League resolutions, agreements, international conferences, forums
Accommodationist	acts that demonstrate willingness to negotiate on issues in a quid pro quo, willingness to compromise with divergent groups within the PLO,	compromise, accommodation, moderation, concessions, partial solutions

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\*\* - all roles are also indicated by the overt articulation of a specific role in speeches, written documents, interviews, resolutions, and communiques, voting behavior for a particular role in regional organizations as well as PLO groups.

## CHAPTER III

### THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

#### The Formation of the PLO

Between 28 May and 2 June 1964, a congress of 422 Palestinian representatives assembled in East Jerusalem for the first meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC). On 1 June, this delegate assembly formally declared the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The creation of the PLO was not a spontaneous event. Its culmination had been kindled by nascent Palestinian nationalism that resurged in the 1960s along with an increase in factors at the inter-Arab level of the need to forge a common strategy against Israel (Selim 1991).

Palestinian nationalism flourished in response to two major events that altered the political environment in the Middle East. The first event concerned the 1961 breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a pan-Arab nationalist union fashioned between Egypt and Syria to which many Palestinian political activists had been dedicated. The second event was the realization of Algerian independence in 1962 after a long and costly revolution. The breakup of the UAR triggered the conviction among many Palestinians that Arab unity was not a prerequisite for liberation; Algerian

independence signaled the belief that a nation could wage a successful struggle against foreign oppression by relying on its own resources (Hamid 1975). Armed with the principle of self-reliance, the Palestinians began to form their own organizations that would lead them toward independence. It was the growing militant nature of these organizations, along with a revival of the Arab-Israeli conflict over Israel's plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River, that prompted the members in attendance at the January 1964 "First Arab Summit" in Cairo to propose a plan that would, *inter alia*, allow the Palestinians to play a leading role in the liberation of their homeland (Cobban 1984).

That plan led to the 1964 founding conference in late May and early June marking the start of the PLO. At that meeting, the delegates of diasporian Palestinian groups proclaimed the liberation of Palestine as their primary objective. They also adopted two major documents that would hereafter form the core of future PLO policy: the Palestine National Charter and the Basic Law. The National Charter and the Basic Law serve as the constitutional framework for the organization (Hamid 1975). The National Charter embodies the more substantive aspect of PLO behavior in the sense that it contains the ideological manifesto of Palestinian beliefs. The Basic Law is more procedural, in that it prescribes the legalistic framework within which the PLO operates.

Over the years, the PLO has undergone a number of structural changes particularly in its political character made possible by annulling or amending articles in the Basic Law. Some of these organizational changes have included the expansion of the PNC to incorporate the growing influence of the fedayeen groups, the provision providing for a separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and the creation of the Central Council (CC) to serve as an intermediary body between the legislative and executive branches.

Unlike the Basic Law, the PNC has amended the National Charter only once since the founding of the PLO in 1964. That modification occurred at the 4th PNC (1968) in which the guerrilla organizations participated in the National Council session for the first time. It was during the 4th PNC that the attending guerrilla representation succeeded in drawing up seven new articles that were to form the core of the new 1968 National Charter. These articles guided foreign policy choices over the years by essentially proclaiming the primacy of "armed struggle," as the only means of liberating Palestine, rejecting a compromise solution short of total liberation, and eschewing pan-Arab efforts that threatened to subordinate or intervene in the PLO's role as liberator of mandatory Palestine (Cobban 1984).



In its present structural form, the PLO is a complex umbrella organization comprised of an elaborate set of political, social, cultural, military, and economic institutions that works for the attainment of Palestinian national goals. The PLO, not unlike any other organization, is structured to permit a division of labor and specialization within its ranks. Each specialized department within the overall organization supports a decision unit or structure in which the participants decide and implement their respective policy decisions. It is the political apparatus of the PLO that retains the prerogative of foreign policy decision making.

The political sphere consists of three separate bodies that simulate executive and legislative branches of government analogous to many state systems. These bodies include the PNC, the CC, and the Executive Committee (EXCOM). In the broad terms of foreign policy decision making, the PNC is responsible for formulating the course of PLO behavior and the EXCOM implements resolutions endorsed by the PNC. Although the CC neither formulates nor implements, it acts instead as an internal check on both institutions ensuring that each group acts in accordance with the tenets set forth in both the Basic Law and National Charter. All three political bodies support distinct decision structures or units that play a vital role in the entire foreign policy process. Because the primary purpose

of this chapter is to examine the internal mechanisms of PLO foreign policy decision making relative to these structures, a theoretical overview of the perspective and its relationship to the foreign policy process remains indispensable.

#### Theoretical Introduction to Decision Structures

The relationship between decision structures and the foreign policy process grew out of the literature on bureaucratic politics (Neustadt 1970; Allison 1971; Halperin 1974), along with studies that examined decision making from the vantage point of both the individual (George 1974; Anderson 1987) and small groups (Barber 1966). The underlying premise behind these approaches has been the conviction that how foreign policy decisions are made determines the substance of foreign policy output. Even though decision-making studies that utilize bureaucratic politics, small groups, or individual behavior as an approach do provide a more prosperous view as to how an entity might arrive at a foreign policy decision, they remain conceptually limited for Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) research on at least two counts. The first limitation centers around the inability to account for variations in foreign policy choices over time (Hermann 1978). The second drawback has been the isolated use of each perspective and the lack of any attempt to determine why, or under what

conditions, a particular unit commands the decision making process at the expense of another (Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan 1987). The concept of decision structures emerged as a means of advancing our understanding of the foreign policy decision making process within the parameters of CFP research (Hermann 1978).

The notion of decision structures proceeds from three basic assumptions: (1) that foreign policy decisions are made by individuals who are located in some kind of decision unit or structure; (2) that variations in the nature of the decision structure alter the decision making process; and (3) that alterations in the decision process lead to variations in foreign policy behavior.

Rather than abandon previous perspectives altogether, decision structures combine the features of bureaucratic politics, small groups, and individuals as components of the foreign policy process. Earlier studies of decision structures projected a typology of eight possible decision types. These types include leader-staff; leader-autonomous groups; leader-delegate groups; autonomous groups; delegate groups; autonomous assembly; delegate assembly; and consultative autonomous and consultative delegate assemblies (Hermann 1978). Recent studies have collapsed the original eight into three broad categories comprised of a predominant leader, a single group, and multiple autonomous groups (Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan 1987). The distinguishing

feature of each type in both studies relies on structural characteristics that purport to account for variations in the foreign policy process based on dimensions of physical size, power distribution, and member role (Hermann 1978).

Physical size refers to the number of participants who are located in any one decision structure. Because boundary distinctions between small and large groups are often arbitrary, the dividing line is marked by changes in the foreign policy process. This occurs when subgroups within the larger organization begin to dominate the decision making process, as in autonomous groups; or when individual participation is greatly reduced owing to an expanding group size, as in delegate groups (Hermann 1978).

Power distribution is marked by the attendance or absence of an authoritative leader. This person is able to commit the decision structure to a foreign policy decision despite opposition from other members.

Member role refers to the relative freedom that individual participants in any decision structure may or may not exhibit regarding a particular decision. For example, members may be autonomous in that they have the latitude to adopt any position they prefer. In contrast, delegate members are not provided the flexibility that autonomous actors preserve because delegates serve as representatives for groups that typically remain outside the decision structure. As such, their decision latitude is severely

constrained by organizational demands.

Each decision structure also exhibits a unique decision-making process and behavior. By decision-making process is meant the procedural techniques, rules, and norms that the participants employ in order to arrive at foreign policy output. In a leader-staff decision structure, behaviors that serve to positively reinforce the leader's view of the world are likely to define the decision making process. Such behaviors can include positive feedback and quick response time. However, a leader-autonomous decision unit is more likely to experience a high level of advocacy among the members because the participants are unfettered by organizational constraints. Moreover, this structure is more receptive to innovative behavior that often results from the open expression of diverse views and the shifting of member positions.

Targeting the decision structure of any organization under observation enables the researcher to venture inside the "black box" of foreign policy decision making. Once inside, the influences that shape the unit's decision-making processes, as well as the techniques, rules, and norms that define the group's behavior, are subject to theoretical scrutiny. Additionally, the knowledge of how any complex organization arrives at foreign policy decisions provides a powerful foundation of insight into the behavior of any actor. In this regard, the PLO's decision making methods

and conduct are not exceptional.

#### The Decision-Making Apparatus of the PLO

As noted earlier, the political department of the PLO is composed of three distinct bodies: the EXCOM, the CC, and the PNC. The PNC is the highest policy making body within the PLO. It performs the legislative functions of a "quasi-parliament" that defines the PLO's official policies and guidelines (Brynen 1990; Gerner 1991; Gresch 1983; Muslih 1990; Selim 1991). It not only has the power to create or abolish any institution of the PLO, but it also elects the members who serve on both the EXCOM and the CC. All other specialized departments within the PLO secure their authority from the PNC (Mussalam 1988; Selim 1991).

The resolutions of the PNC, which are binding on the EXCOM, symbolize the candid expression of an inner dialogue forged by an authoritarian decision maker. Individuals who represent competing groups that have a political base and foreign policy perspective independent of the leader also participate in the dialogue (East, Salmore, and Hermann 1978; Gerner 1991; Gresch 1983).

In terms of its physical size, the PNC is somewhat elastic because membership depends on the proportional representation of all Palestinians dispersed throughout the international community. At present, there are approximately some 450 active PNC members who illustrate

that community of political interests. The Israeli government prohibits Palestinians living in the occupied territories from attending PNC sessions; therefore, there is a block of 188 seats reserved for representatives from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their numbers are not required to reach a quorum of three-fourths to conduct a session, or the simple majority needed to ratify resolutions. Prior to 1984, the PNC relied on consensus decision making to adopt resolutions.

In theory, power distribution within the PNC is based on the proportional representation of the various groups and independent members. Because the member role of each autonomous group is to promote their own ideological agenda for achieving Palestinian objectives, foreign policy decision making is often coalitional. The groups do not always act as a homogeneous unit. Despite their agreement on the objective of Palestinian politics, *i.e.*, the liberation of Palestine and the creation of a Palestinian state, they often differ on strategy and tactics for attaining that end. These differences are the by-product of characteristic ideological orientations held by each group that were born out of dispersion and their subsequent exposure to a wide variety of political influences (Shemish 1988).

Member role in the leader-autonomous constitution of the PNC includes Chairman Yasser Arafat in the position of

authoritative decision maker. Arafat also represents Fatah, the largest guerrilla organization within the PLO apparatus. The autonomous groups include the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) now split into two factions, one headed by Naif Hawatmeh based in Damascus, the other directed by Yasir Abed Rabbo stationed in Tunis; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under the tutelage of George Habash; the Palestine Communist Party recently "rebaptized" the People's Palestinian Party (PPP); Al-Sa'iqa, which tenders Syrian interests; the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) that promotes Iraqi concerns; and trade unions, professional organizations, and "independents" who represent Palestinians inside the occupied territories and those dispersed throughout the international community (Brynen 1990; Gerner 1991; Hamid 1974). Taken together, these autonomous groups under the direction of the Chairman of the EXCOM form the basic core of the leader-autonomous PNC.

The EXCOM is the second most important body within the political and institutional framework of the PLO. According to Articles 15 and 16 of the Basic Law, the EXCOM functions as the "supreme executive authority of the PLO" imparted with four major functions: (1) to represent the Palestinian people; (2) to regulate and supervise the various bodies and institutions of the PLO; (3) to issue directives and adopt programs for the PLO in accordance with the Charter and



Basic Law; (4) and to execute the PLO's financial policies and prepare its budget (Hamid 1974; Mussalem 1988; Rubenberg 1983; IDP 1968 DOC 361).

Unlike the PNC, which normally convenes biennially, the EXCOM remains in permanent session and its members work on a full-time basis. Originally structured to consist of twelve persons, the 20th PNC (1991) expanded membership in the EXCOM from its previously amended fifteen to eighteen representatives. Its present composition is presented in Table 3.1.

The EXCOM of the PLO, as mentioned earlier, essentially supports a leader-delegate decision structure that conforms to the defining characteristics of physical size, power distribution, and member role. In terms of member role, the delegates furnish the official position of the organizations or individuals they represent whereas the authoritative decision maker has the discretion to take an independent stand. In theory, the discretion of the chief decision maker remains confined to the resolutions adopted by the PNC and the tenets of the National Charter. In reality, however, the chairman of the EXCOM has not always subscribed to this practice.

The PNC determines the physical size of the EXCOM. It is the PNC that elects the members of the EXCOM, who in turn, elect the chairman of the PLO. Given the EXCOM's dependency on the PNC, the potential for delegate groups to

proliferate in number and alter the decision making process at the expense of the PNC remains nonexistent. Even though the EXCOM enjoys far greater "real power" because it is in permanent session, in theory, the PNC retains preeminent political control because of its command over membership in the EXCOM (Rubenberg 1983).

Power distribution within the EXCOM clearly rests in the hands of the authoritative leader. Since 1969, Yasser Arafat has held that post in his position as chairman of the PLO. Even though he has the ability to commit the delegate group, Arafat's decisions are not self-executing. His ability to "command" is circumscribed by the Basic Law. His real power rests in his negotiating skill in building consensus by convincing others that their interests are furthered by what Arafat does as chairman of the PLO (Rubenberg 1983). The remaining delegates, who represent various factions and individuals, cannot sponsor an independent policy stand without the risk of losing their political positions.

Because the PNC is primarily a political body of dispersion, it is not logistically possible to convene legislative sessions more than once a year. To compensate for the need to make policy decisions on a daily basis and to ensure that the resolutions of the PNC are carried out, the 7th PNC (1970) established a third body, the CC, to serve as an intermediary between the EXCOM and the PNC when

the latter is not in session (IDP 1970 DOC 397).

The 17th PNC (1984) further defined the role of the CC in terms of its size, power distribution, and member role. The ensuing resolutions expanded its functions to include the following responsibilities: (1) to make necessary decisions on issues and questions referred by the EXCOM within the framework of PNC resolutions; (2) to discuss and adopt plans put before it by the EXCOM; (3) to ensure that the EXCOM implements the resolutions adopted by the PNC; and (4) to oversee the various activities of the different PLO departments and to submit relevant recommendations to the EXCOM (Musallam 1988).

Membership in the CC is drawn from the PNC. Its current 100 member body includes proportional representation from the EXCOM, the PNC secretariat, independents, and the various guerrilla organizations. In its entirety, the CC behaves as a delegate assembly decision structure. Member role and power distribution are much more constrained within the CC than in any other political decision structure of the PLO. Members are roughly equal in the power that they are able to exercise within this body. Moreover, the members in a delegate assembly may not override the positions taken by the official organizations and individuals of the organizations they represent. Nor are the delegates empowered to contradict the resolutions of the PNC. Consistent with the delegate functions of the CC, the

decision behaviors within this assembly are generally ideological in nature. The primary responsibility of the CC is to assure that PNC resolutions are implemented. As such, the CC administers the ideological consensus of Palestinian beliefs and objectives articulated in PNC resolutions.

In terms of foreign policy decision-making within the PNC, an internal dialogue of bargaining among the players often occurs before reaching consensus on key policy decisions (Cobban 1984; Frangi 1982; Gerner 1991; Gresh 1983; Khalidi 1985; Kirisci 1986; Rubenberg 1983). This process of consensus building on a pluralistic basis indicates the presence of a leader-autonomous decision structure (Muslih 1990). Prior to convening a PNC session, the individual autonomous groups meet in advance to outline their respective organization's policy position. They also attempt to form coalitions with other groups to facilitate the formation of foreign policy. Bargaining among the groups is meant to attain consensus on an issue, which is often achieved through coalition building. Since the groups normally do not deviate from their ideological positions, they advocate instead their respective party line and try to form compacts with others who share a similar policy platform on a specific foreign policy issue. The entire process of advocacy, bargaining, and coalition building occurs primarily among the guerrilla organizations. The guerrilla organizations retained this process even after the

PLO abandoned consensus decision making in 1984 in favor of majority rule.

Although the guerrilla organizations constitute roughly 20% of PNC membership, their presence dominates PLO foreign policy decision making. In a broad sense, they act like political parties effecting change from the inside out. The dynamic interaction among them mirrors their diverse ideological orientations and political constituencies drawn from both the Palestinian people and the larger Arab world (Brynen 1990). The bureaucratic interplay among them has led to the formation of rejectionist fronts, loyal opposition groupings, and exclusion politics from power sharing roles (Sayigh 1989). Because bureaucratic political activity constitutes a major focus of this study, a brief examination of the ideological components of the primary guerrilla organizations warrants attention.

#### Guerrilla Organizations of the PLO

Chief among the guerrilla organizations are Fatah, the PFLP, and the DFLP. Founded in the late 1950s, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, or Fatah, is the largest guerrilla organization within the PLO. Since 1968, under the direction of Arafat, Fatah has managed to prevail over the PLO's entire administrative edifice. Its talent to persist has rested on the preeminent popular support Fatah receives from Palestinians living in the occupied

territories and in the Diaspora. The ability to garner mass popular support stems from the espousal of an unassuming, pragmatic philosophy of Palestinian nationalism that lacks divisive dogmatic conviction. Fatah also has profited from stable leadership throughout the course of its history.

Ideologically, Fatah places heavy emphasis on the "Palestinian" aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This guerrilla organization essentially views the conflict as Palestinian in origin, Arab in depth, and pan-Arab in magnitude (Shemish 1988).

In its relationship with neighboring Arab regimes, Fatah maintains a policy of non-interference and rejects all attempts at outside control that threaten to reduce its maneuverability in inter-Arab politics (Brynen 1990; Selim 1991).

Fatah's initial aversion to the PLO rested on the ideological tenet that the liberation of Palestine must be undertaken by the Palestinians themselves (IDP 1967 DOC 451). Fatah based its decision not to participate in the PLO under the leader-driven efforts of the PLO's first leader, Ahmed Shuquairy, on the conviction that the organization "did not spring from below, but was imposed from above" (IDP 1969 DOC 409). This belief, on the part of Fatah, would serve to reinforce the PLO's sustained rejection of subservient role behavior endorsed in subsequent PNC resolutions. It would also serve as a major

impetus for Fatah's drive to adapt and positively adjust the independent and active independent roles.

Another group that retains appreciable support among diasporian Palestinians, as well as those living in the occupied territories, is the PFLP. The PFLP is also the second largest autonomous group within the PLO. George Habash established the PFLP on 7 December 1967 by consolidating three splinter groups that had broken away from the broader Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). These groups consist of the Vengeance Youth, the Palestinian branch of the ANM under the direction of Habash; the Heroes of the Return, a pro-Egyptian military faction formed in late 1966 by anti-Shuquairy cadres; and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Syrian-backed movement headed by Ahmed Jibril (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981).

Unlike Fatah, the PFLP affixed its doctrine of Arab nationalism to a Marxist-Leninist ideology vehemently opposed to Western imperialism, zionism, and conservative Arab regimes. For the PFLP, the revolutionary struggle remains part of a class struggle to be waged under the banner of scientific socialism (IDP 1969 DOC 379).

The PFLP has been a principal and long-standing critic of mainstream Fatah/PLO policy. Critical of diplomatic solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, their antagonism dates back to the 1970s and their boycott of EXCOM meetings, their participation in the Palestine

National Salvation Front in the 1980s, and their current membership in the "loyal opposition"--a coalition critical of Arafat, yet loyal to the PLO (Brynen 1990; Sayigh 1988).

Unlike the broad Arab roots of the PFLP, Fatah remained composed of mainstream Palestinian nationalists unfettered by dogmatic left-wing ideology. Although Fatah and the PFLP shared the similar goal of totally liberating Palestine, the remainder of their ideological tenets are diametrically opposed. Fatah has consistently emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the problem at the expense of pan-Arabism. Its stress on the non-interference in internal Arab affairs has enabled Fatah to align itself with both conservative and reactionary regimes and to steer a slightly left of center social course.

In contrast, the PFLP has been the most productive champion of pan-Arab sentiments reminiscent of the ANM with the added distinction of Marxist-Leninist ideology (IDP 1968 DOC 377). Differences between Fatah and the PFLP over the nature and direction of PLO foreign policy fueled bureaucratic debate throughout successive PNCs.

The third largest guerrilla organization within the PLO is the DFLP. Like the PFLP, the DFLP also traces its origin to the ANM and its image as a mass-based Marxist-Leninist organization opposed to Western imperialism, zionism, and conservative Arab regimes (Brynen 1990). The DFLP's Political Program, adopted at its Second National Congress



in May 1981, called for an escalation in the struggle for liberation; the opening of all Arab borders to the resistance; closer relations with socialist forces; and an emphasis on the historical role of the Palestinian proletariat (Brynen 1990).

While the PFLP preferred to be the self-appointed ideological watchdog over Fatah/PLO policy, the DFLP would prove to be a leading generator of strategic political change. It was the DFLP that first proposed the idea of a democratic, non-sectarian state in all of Palestine, and later the notion of establishing a "mini-state" in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Brynen 1990). In the late 1980s, the DFLP began to experience internal dissent over the course of PLO policy. A DFLP internal debate over the future course of the Intifada precipitated the division of the movement into two factions, one headed by Hawatmeh in Damascus and the other headed by Rabbo in Tunis (MEI 27 April 1990). While the former continues to remain steadfast in its unwillingness to make further concessions championed by Arafat, the latter has adopted a more moderate policy stance partly as a result of its cooptation into the Arafat camp (MEI 15 May 1992).

Another autonomous group within the PLO is the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), founded in the late 1970s and formally established as an independent party in 1982. The ideological orientation of the PPP has never rested on

the conviction of armed struggle nor does it retain a following among diasporian Palestinians. Primarily because its constituency lies in the occupied territories, it did not become a player in the EXCOM until after the 1982 Lebanon War when the PLO was forced to move its center of operation from Beirut to Tunis (Brynen 1990).

Additional guerrilla organizations that play, or have played, a role in PLO politics over the years generally have represented the interests of regional powers. Among these groups are Al-Sa'iqa, the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command), and the ALF (Arab Liberation Front). Following the 1967 June War, the pro-Syrian National Command of the Ba'ath Party, motivated by the need to gain influence within the Palestinian movement, established Al-Sa'iqa, or the Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War. When it is active in the PLO, Al-Sa'iqa's ideological disposition has always been directly associated with the state of PLO-Syrian relations. As a broker for Syrian interests, Al-Sa'iqa played an important coalitional role particularly in the early days of PLO policy. In the late 1980s its influence waned dramatically owing to its participation in the anti-Arafat opposition and its membership in the Palestine National Salvation Front. No longer a member of the EXCOM, Al-Sa'iqa presently remains marginalized because its Syrian-backed radical program of action hinders its ability to build a popular base of

support among Palestinians in either the occupied territories or in the diaspora (Sayigh 1988).

Primarily as a counter to Syrian influence, the Iraqi Ba'ath instituted the ALF in April 1969. Ideologically, the ALF assumes a position similar to its Syrian counterpart. According to the tenets of the Iraqi Ba'ath, the Palestinian struggle is not exclusively Palestinian; rather, it constitutes part of an overall Arab struggle for unity. Consistent with this belief, the ALF along with Al-Sa'iqa, continues to reject any notion of a democratic secular state in Palestine. The ALF has always been somewhat isolated in the Palestinian arena chiefly because the idea of pan-Arabism failed to spark much enthusiasm after the dissolution of the UAR (United Arab Republic) in 1961. Moreover, because Iraq has traditionally remained isolated in regional Arab politics, it has not always been able to play a major guerrilla role. Nor has it been able to accumulate a popular base of support in the occupied territories (Shemesh 1988). At present, the ALF tenures a seat on the EXCOM and their member role in terms of bureaucratic influence is generally supportive of Fatah.

The PFLP-GC was formed in 1969 when Ahmed Jibril left the PFLP over what he believed was the overly excessive ideological nature of the guerrilla organization at the expense of military action. The PFLP-GC under the direction of Jibril advocated the total liberation of Palestine

through armed struggle, without the burden of ideological doctrine. Over the years, the PFLP-GC has managed to maintain a significant degree of autonomy from Arab regimes because of the financial and military generosity of Libya. Jibril's past military affiliation with Syria, however, often tendered Syrian interests when the PFLP-GC was active in PLO decision making. Its enrollment in the anti-Arafat opposition in the late 1980s and its inability to forfeit terrorist activities at a time when the PLO favored a more diplomatically-oriented policy route, marginalized Jibril and his followers. The PFLP-GC's conflictual relations with the PLO mainstream led in 1983 to their exclusion from the centers of power that persists to this day.

#### Conclusion

This chapter opened with a brief historical discussion that led to the formation of the PLO. It then proceeded to describe the political framework of the organization responsible for the formation and implementation of foreign policy relative to the decision structures that facilitate this end. Next, a theoretical overview of the decision structure perspective discussed the importance of these units in the foreign policy process. This chapter also reviewed the general characteristics of decision units based on physical size, member role, and power distribution. The function and processes of the three main political bodies

relative to foreign policy followed. Finally, this chapter offered a brief summation of the ideological foundations of the major guerrilla organizations that shape and define PLO foreign policy decision making. In addition to the bureaucratic interplay among the various autonomous groups that dominate foreign policy decision making within the PLO, the impact of other variables weighs equally in any analysis of this organization.

Chapter Four analyzes the first phase of PLO foreign policy within the context of the role modification model. It isolates the specific independent variables that were responsible for PLO foreign policy behavior during this period. Additionally, because the post-1948 historical experiences of the Palestinian people weigh heavily as early sources of PLO foreign policy role enactment, Chapter Four opens with a brief discussion of those experiences.

**Table 3.1**  
**PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS, SEPTEMBER 1991**

<b>EXCOM MEMBER</b>	<b>BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION</b>
Yasser Arafat	Fatah
Farouq Qaddoumi	Fatah
Mahmoud Abbas	Fatah
Abdallah Hourani	Independent
Mahmoud Darwish	Independent
Ali Ishaq	Palestine Liberation Front
Abdel Rahim Mulawah	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Yasser Abed Rabbo	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Tayseer Khaled	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Mahmoud Ismal'il	Arab Liberation Front
Samir Ghousheh	Popular Struggle Front
Suleiman Najjab	Palestinian Communist Party
Muhammad Zuhdi Nashashibi	Independent
Elias Khouri	Independent
Shafiq al-Hout	Independent
Jamal Sourani	Independent
Jaweed al-Ghussein	Palestine National Fund

Source: Al-Fajr 30 September 1991

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FIRST PHASE OF PLO FOREIGN POLICY: FROM SUBSERVIENCE TO ARMED STRUGGLE

This chapter analyzes the first phase of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) foreign policy role behavior within the parameters of the role modification model discussed in Chapter Two.

The first phase commenced with the 1st PNC (1964) and continued until the 4th PNC (1968). Throughout this phase, PLO foreign policy behavior exhibited the roles of subservient and regional subsystem collaborator. Of the six independent variables that the model proposes as determinants of roles, the external shocks variable has been demonstrated to be the primary ingredient that sustained the PLO's subservient and collaborationist behavior. Additionally, the role modification model has illustrated that the leader-driven variable had attempted to internally adapt a divergent set of foreign policy roles despite the overwhelming influence of external shocks. The analysis reveals that throughout this phase the external shocks variable prevailed at the expense of leader-driven influence for primarily three reasons. The first centers around the Palestinians' historical experiences in the

post-1948 period. Many of these experiences served as a point of origin for several of the PLO's foreign policy roles. Second, at the regional level many actors remained preoccupied with Arab Cold War politics that defined inter-Arab relationships throughout this phase. The PLO was often on the receiving end of Arab Cold War politics, whereby actors such as Jordan and Egypt either facilitated or frustrated PLO role behavior based on their own standing in inter-Arab relationships. Third, roles that the leader-driven variable attempted to internally adapt did not embody any given role in its entirety. The PLO's attempt at initiating partial role behavior made it easier for the external shocks variable to frustrate PLO internal role initiation.

Given the importance of the post-1948 experiences of the Palestinian people as a precursor to PLO foreign policy role behavior, Chapter Four begins with a brief overview of those experiences highlighting the roots of eventual PLO role enactment. Chapter Four then analyzes the influence of the external shocks and leader-driven variables as determinants of the first phase of PLO foreign policy role behavior.

#### The Roots of Role Enactment

The post-1948 historical experiences of the Palestinian people established the foundation for the eventual development of PLO foreign policy role behaviors. This



section reveals that many of those experiences account for the earlier restrictions in PLO role output that have characterized the first phase of foreign policy.

Furthermore, those experiences also marked the advent of a resurgence in Palestinian nationalism that had deteriorated following the 1936-1939 revolt. The ideological tenets that descended from this renewed nationalism, which the post-1948 period helped shape, significantly influenced PLO role enactment in later decades.

Palestinian historical experiences in the post-1948 period center around "the disaster" or *an-nakba*. The disaster began with the 1948 Palestine War that precipitated the dispersion and subsequent refugee status of more than half the population of western Palestine (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). At the signing of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, the Arab population within the newly formed Israeli state had stood at approximately 150 thousand in contrast to the 800 thousand Palestinians who had inhabited the area prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The approximately 650 thousand Palestinians who either fled or were driven from their homes, relocated in areas within Arab Palestine, the West Bank, the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and the Gulf States (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973; Ma'oz 1984).

The "national consciousness" of the Palestinian people that matured during the time of the British Mandate now

lacked a cohesive territorial base owing to the physical fragmentation of the Palestinian people (Al-Shuaibi 1980). Moreover, as a result of the war, any territory that the Israeli state had not consumed lost its historical distinction when Egypt became the custodian of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and Transjordan annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1950 to officially form the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973).

Along with the collapse of their local leadership prior to the dispersion, the Palestinians now faced the added social crisis of their new-found status as refugees. They also found themselves stateless at a time when other nations were securing independence. With their national consciousness scattered throughout the region, the Palestinians needed a new political ideology and a program of action. For many, that ideology consisted of pan-Arabism. As part of their program of action, many Palestinians turned toward the broader Arab world as the primary vehicle to address their grievances and secure their central goal of return. The Palestinians' tilt toward pan-Arabism serves as a point of origin for regional subsystem collaboration.

The concept of return matured into a distinct Palestinian phenomenon among the Arab populations in the Middle East. However, the Palestinians had not defined their return in terms of a precise geographic entity other

than reconstructed Arab Palestine. Having had no prior experience as an independent political entity, the national consciousness of the Palestinian people along with the principal goal of return lacked any concrete political distinction. As such, the Palestinians' tilt toward pan-Arabism proved to be a natural inclination for a people in search of a political voice. Palestinian reliance upon pan-Arabism both as a political ideology and as a program of action set the stage for the PLO's first phase acceptance of subservient and regional subsystem collaboration roles.

Among the Palestinians who had come of age in the 1950s a majority shared the belief that Arab unity was a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine. Their physical dispersion dampened their ability to unify and coordinate a plan of action in their search for a pan-Arab solution to their plight; hence, their need to collaborate at the regional subsystem level. In addition, the broad range of political influences in the Arab arena soon enticed many Palestinians, as Arab nationalism came to embrace the Palestinian problem. Palestinians now began to ideologically attach themselves to diverse groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). For many, Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism provided the ideal ideological haven. Some, who resided in the West Bank of Jordan, exchanged their

nationalist sentiments for employment within the governmental apparatus of the Hashemite regime (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973).

During this time, there were also a number of Palestinians who did not subscribe to the principle that Arab unity was a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine. These Palestinians continued to emphasize the primacy of Palestine rather than the Arab nation. They contended that the Palestinians themselves had to take the lead in their struggle for liberation, and the role of the Arab states in this effort was merely supportive. This view was championed by the leaders of the vestiges of the pre-1948 Palestinian political institutions harbored in Cairo that still managed to persist. Those representative institutions consisted of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) under the direction of the exiled Haj Amin al-Husayni, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Government of All Palestine headed by Ahmad Hilmi Basha (Baumgarten 1987).

The views that the leaders from Cairo promulgated proved especially significant for the future development of PLO foreign policy on at least two counts. In the first instance, the explicit focus on Palestine at the expense of pan-Arabism provided an important element of continuity in Palestinian political thought. This continuity basically served to sustain the distinctiveness of the Palestinian people. The retention of separateness facilitated the PLO's

internal adaption of the independent role throughout the second phase and its continued positive adjustment in the third. It should also be noted that despite the preponderance of subservient role behavior throughout the first phase of PLO foreign policy, the organization's initial members remained cognizant of the independent role and did attempt to internally adapt the political aspect of this behavior.

In the second instance, al-Husayni's convictions mentored several Palestinians who organized themselves around the principle of Palestinian self-reliance, i.e., independence. Prominent among this group was the Palestine Liberation Movement, better known as Fatah, founded in 1958 by Arafat and a handful of others residing in Kuwait. Fatah, which succeeded in dominating the decision making structures of the PLO by 1969, emphasized the role of Palestinian self-reliance in the struggle to liberate their land. Fatah also adopted the motto of "armed struggle" as a means to achieve liberation, thus laying the groundwork for the visionary revolutionary liberator role. As noted in Chapter Three, events such as the success of the Algerian revolution captured the attention of many of these groups. The Algerian case demonstrated to the guerrillas that a nation could wage a successful military campaign for independence.

In contrast to Fatah, the ANM initially supported a nonmilitant and pan-Arab orientation as a solution to the Palestine problem. In the early 1960s, the ANM began to experience an orientation change and splinter groups such as the Vengeance Youth and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) began to form. These offshoots of the ANM would later constitute vital opposition forces within the bureaucratic element of the PLO. Although some of these groups centered around the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, they nonetheless shared with Fatah the similar belief that armed struggle constituted the most viable means to liberate Palestine. The guerrillas' espousal of armed struggle as the principal means of liberation, coupled with their belief in Palestinian self-reliance, yielded a policy of action that primarily consisted of commando raids against Israeli targets. The guerrillas carried out these raids with the intention of inciting a conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors as a means of recovering lost territory (Quandt, Jabber and Lesch 1973).

As the level of commando activity increased, Arab regimes began to express concern over the possibility that Israeli reprisals would strike back at Arab targets. In part, it was the growing militant nature of these groups that prompted the members in attendance at the January 1964 Arab Summit Conference in Cairo to fashion an organization to contain the resurgence of Palestinian nationalism and its

accompanying commando activity. That organization was the PLO. Egypt, which took the lead in constructing the PLO, precluded the guerrilla groups from membership as part of its effort to avert a premature war with Israel. A docile and nonrevolutionary PLO would also further Nasser's ambitions to maintain political and ideological control over the nascent organization. The *fedayeen's* initial exclusion facilitated the external imposition of the subservient role. It also meant that the roles of the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles that the guerrillas pronounced prior to the formation of the PLO would have to be suspended.

#### Phase One:

##### Subservience and Regional Subsystem Collaboration

Throughout the entire first phase (1964-1968), external shocks remained the primary determinants of PLO foreign policy output. The major players in the Arab arena essentially confined PLO foreign policy to two roles, subservient and regional subsystem collaborator. The PLO was to remain subservient to the extent that Egypt, and to a lesser degree, Jordan, determined the ideological context and political activities of the organization's overall behavior. That ideological context and its corresponding political endeavors meant that the PLO would have to forego the idea of asserting its own independent brand of

Palestinian nationalism in favor of pan-Arabism. Most of the regional environment also expected the organization to act as a regional subsystem collaborator by cooperating with other Arab actors in addressing a pan-Arab solution to the Palestine problem (APD 1964, DOC 93).

The primacy of pan-Arabism under the tutelage of Nasser partially explains why the PLO acquiesced into playing a secondary role in the liberation of their land. The fact that regional actors, notably Egypt, were primarily responsible for the establishment of the PLO also accounts for the organization's acceptance of subservient role behavior from the external arena. Despite the external imposition of these roles statements from the 1964 National Charter and PNC resolutions adopted at the 1st session indicate that the PLO continued to recognize its distinction as a separate entity and had every intention of implementing total political independence once military cooperation achieved total liberation.

Analysis of the resolutions of the 1st PNC (1964) reveals that the organization only conditionally accepted the idea of collaboration at the Arab regional level. Those conditions pertained to military collaboration in order to realize liberation. The documents also indicate that the regional subsystem collaborator role would not come at the expense of any plan that would "disintegrate or weaken" the Palestinian personality, even though reality dictated



otherwise (Middle East Record 1978).

The data also acknowledge the role played by the organization's first leader, Ahmed Shuquairy, who openly campaigned for the adaption and positive adjustment of PLO independence. External shocks, however, dampened the individual efforts of Shuquairy and the organization under his direction. During the first phase of PLO foreign policy behavior, the external shocks variable consisted of state and nonstate actors at the regional and international levels as well as the guerrilla groups. Since the guerrillas remained external to the decision-making process of the PLO during this time, they are treated as part of that external environment.

Addressing a major agenda item during the PLO's founding National Congress in 1964, the 400 members present adopted the text of the National Charter. As noted earlier, the National Charter is the ideological manifesto of Palestinian beliefs that embodies the substantive features of PLO behavior. The PLO has amended the National Charter only once. Those revisions took place during the 4th PNC (1968) when the guerrilla groups openly participated in the decision making structure of the PNC.

With their ratification of the 1964 National Charter at the 1st PNC, the original PNC delegates demonstrated both the presence and their partial acceptance of subservience and regional subsystem collaboration. Excerpts from the

endorsed charter that evidence the attendance to and approbation of these roles, particularly in the political arena, include the following statements:

Palestine is an Arab homeland bound by strong ties to the rest of the Arab countries, which together form the great Arab homeland....

The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint is a national (*qawmi*) duty. Its full responsibilities fall upon the Arab nation...for this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, material and spiritual capacities for the sake of the liberation of Palestine...

The Palestine Liberation Organization will co-operate with all Arab states, each according to its capacities and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state...  
(Middle East Record 1978).

Despite the appearance of these roles, the PNC delegates also acknowledged both the need to preserve their particular identity as Palestinians and to exercise some measure of political autonomy from other Arab regimes. Articles from the 1964 National Charter that indicate the substance of these ideas include:

The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent characteristic that does not disappear, and it is transferred from father to sons...

Whoever is born to a Palestinian father after this date [1947], within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian...

After the liberation of the homeland is accomplished the Palestinian people will choose for its way of life any political, economical, and social system it wishes  
(Middle East Record 1978).

Their preoccupation with the separate notion of a "Palestinian personality" in the 1964 National Charter indicated the PNC's intent to incorporate the political aspect of the independent role within the body of PLO foreign policy behaviors. This is significant because the PLO's sustained positive adjustment of this role within a decade would earn for the organization its near universal distinction as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The process of external recognition for the PLO's total adaptation of the independent role culminated at the 1974 Rabat Arab League Summit held during the third phase of PLO foreign policy.

In addition to ratifying the National Charter, the delegates to the 1st PNC (1964) also succeeded in adopting a number of resolutions at the political, military, and financial levels. It should be noted that even though the National Charter contains the essence of Palestinian beliefs, it simply functions as a blueprint to guide the PLO in the formulation of foreign policy. Resolutions adopted during each PNC session proclaim the organization's actual course of foreign and domestic policy.

Some of the general resolutions the delegates accepted at the 1st PNC recognized the primacy of the leader-driven variable as a determinant of PLO role behavior. These included the election of Ahmad Shuquairy as both president of the conference and chairman of the Executive Committee

(EXCOM). They also accepted Shuquairy's opening conference address that emphasized Palestinian self-reliance as groundwork for the "revolutionary activity" that the Palestinian Arabs must pursue in their course of liberations" (APD 1964 DOC 94).

Resolutions that the delegates endorsed at the financial level illustrate the presence and extent of their subservient status. Owing to the dispersal of the Palestinian population throughout the Arab region since 1948, the PLO was not able to directly exercise financial control over its constituent population. Therefore, the PLO had to rely on the generosity of Arab states for financial contributions to its National Treasury. Obviously aware of its dependent economic status, PNC financial resolution number six set forth practical suggestions the Arab states could utilize as a means of contributing to the economic existence of the PLO. These suggestions included the proposal that the Arab states levy taxes in their countries on a host of items that ranged from imports and exports to airline tickets, cosmetics, tobacco products, and even a special lottery (APD 1964 DOC 96).

The PNC financial resolutions also appear to indicate that the PLO genuinely believed that Arab financial support would always be forthcoming regardless of what role the PLO played in foreign policy. This is congruent with the PLO's acknowledgment of the leader-driven variable as a

determinant of foreign policy. Yet, bordering on conspicuousness, what is missing from the PNC financial resolutions is the PLO's recognition that it did not possess the means other than subservience to ensure the sustained level of Arab financial contributions (APD 1964 DOC 96). What appears to be a reluctance to admit subservience becomes even more apparent at the political level.

Resolutions passed by the PNC in the political arena announced the organization's intent to pursue a national, albeit political, independent and active independent role alongside its status as subservient. Indicators of their bid at least internally to initiate this role in foreign policy consisted of statements such as

The Liberation Organization is to represent Palestine at the Arab League, the Boycott Offices, the UN and its various organizations and agencies, and at all official and popular conferences. The PLO alone has the right to represent, organize and act as spokesman for, the people of Palestine (APD 1964, DOC 96).

In order to positively adjust the PLO's claim to implement political independent, the delegates entrusted Shuquairy with the task of selecting an EXCOM. Second to the PNC, the EXCOM functions as the "supreme executive authority" imparted with several functions, one of which remains the representation of the Palestinian people. However, Shuquairy's vision of representation required a politically nonsubservient PLO. It also included the idea of achieving some degree of "personal autonomy" for West

Bank Palestinians whose then present allegiance to the PLO as a domestic constituency remained problematic because Jordan ruled the West Bank. Shuquairy only intended West Bank personal autonomy to translate into popular support for the PLO. In order to legitimize that support, Shuquairy needed an institutionalizing device to integrate West Bank Palestinian allegiance into the infrastructure of the PLO without jeopardizing Jordanian sovereignty. The device that would allow Shuquairy to legitimately adapt the political side of independent consisted of West Bank participation in elections to the PNC (Mishal 1978; Shemesh 1988).

Although the idea of West Bank elections constituted a foreign policy opportunity for the PLO to adapt and positively adjust political independence, elections posed a major threat to the Jordanian regime. The mention of West Bank elections to the PNC not only jeopardized the legitimacy of the regime but also threatened to exacerbate the crisis of identity that Jordan was attempting to overcome. Along with pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, a strong thread of separatism permeated Palestinian thinking. West Bank allegiance to a politically distinct entity--by Palestinians living under Jordanian rule--could threaten the continued legitimacy of the Jordanian regime.

The idea of West Bank elections also clashed with King Hussein's conception of Jordanian-PLO relations. The starting point of Jordan's position vis-a-vis the overall

Palestine problem proceeded on the basis of the 1962 White Paper issued by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry that recognized the centrality of collective Arab efforts as a solution to the problem (Mishal 1978; Shemesh 1988). Proceeding on that basis, Jordan's position toward the PLO as the institutional expression of the Palestinian dilemma could not tolerate anything short of a subservient PLO. The Jordanian policy position regarding the likelihood of a politically independent PLO confirmed Jordan's intent to maintain the organizations's subservient role. The Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tall developed and enforced several principles which, together with the 1962 White Paper, formed the essence of Jordan's policy vis-a-vis the PLO.

According to al-Tall, PLO activity had to center around maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom. Furthermore, because a majority of Palestinians resided within the boundaries of the Jordanian state and were considered Jordanian citizens, Jordan, and not the PLO, claimed the prerogative of "sole representative" of the Palestinian people. Additionally, al-Tall believed that the PLO was only a "diplomatic necessity" whose singular purpose was to maintain awareness of the Palestine problem. As such, the PLO would function merely as the "Arab arm of Jordan" (Shemesh 1988).

Jordan's position remained primarily rhetorical until months after the 2nd PNC (1965) when it became clear that

Shuquairy had no intention of relinquishing the leader-driven determination to adapt independent political behavior. The delegates in attendance at the 2nd PNC (1965) resolved to garner Palestinian popular support for the political adaption of the independent role through the process of elections. In a press conference held in Amman shortly after the 2nd PNC (1965), Shuquairy confirmed that the newly appointed EXCOM would begin work on drafting a "scheme" to hold general elections. The PNC also assigned Shuquairy the task of contacting emigrated Palestinians in order to strengthen the representative composition of the PNC (APD 1965 DOC 96).

The PLO's determination to electorally adapt the political side of the independent role was accompanied by concrete steps for its positive adjustment. These steps included expanding the number of PLO offices by establishing "centers in various towns of its homeland, Jordan" and "strengthening the Voice of Palestine Radio Station and its programmes" (APD 1965 DOC 96).

At this point, Jordan did not overtly attempt to thwart the growing mood of PLO political independence for a number of reasons. First, Jordan still retained some measure of political control over the organization because Jordanian Palestinians still held an absolute majority of PNC seats. Until such time as the EXCOM's scheme for PNC representation altered this political balance, Jordan refrained from



reacting to idealized political rhetoric.

Second, by 1965, King Hussein already instituted the process of "Jordanizing" the West Bank. This process involved coopting local Palestinian leaders into the government's economic and political infrastructure as a means of fragmenting and diluting their power. The regime also extended citizenship to West Bank Palestinians and called for voluntary recruits to serve in the Jordanian army as opposed to conscription required by the Palestine Liberation Army. Additionally, the process of West Bank Jordanization involved the East Bank in terms of economic policy. The government consolidated its economic development projects on the East Bank in its efforts to lure Palestinian business interests. In addition to bolstering the East Bank economy, the transfer of Palestinian funds across the Jordan River ensured the regime that the economic accumulation of resources as a formula to secure mass support would not be available to West Bank Palestinians (Sahliyah 1988).

The third reason for Jordan's initial prudence in quelling the PLO's drive for political independence had to do with the lack of Arab League endorsement regarding the PLO's position. Jordan understood that without the Arab League's sponsorship, the PLO under Shuquairy would not be capable of freely implementing this form of role behavior.

The fourth and final reason centered around the open support that Nasser bestowed upon the organization. Until the 1967 June War, the Egyptian government provided consistent support to the PLO in its representative capacity and to Shuquairy as its leader. In addition to material and ideological support, Egypt provided the PLO with a vital propaganda tool in the form of information, i.e., broadcast, print, and speeches. Not only was Nasser's pro-PLO voice relayed and respected throughout most of entire Arab region, pro-PLO Egyptian newspapers were also widely circulated throughout the entire West Bank (Shemesh 1988).

Nasser's support for the PLO rested on his continued political and military need to avert a war with Israel. It was also based on his personal need to maintain his image as the champion of Arab unity because the PLO represented the symbolic achievement of Arab summit cooperation under his direction. Moreover, since Nasser had hand-picked Shuquairy to head the PLO, the growing tension between his protege and King Hussein over Shuquairy's political independent ambitions triggered Egypt's concern (Shemesh 1988). So as not to overstate the influence of Nasser, it should be noted that relations between Egypt and Jordan throughout this time remained strained. As noted earlier, it was the PLO that often experienced the effects of Arab Cold War pressures at the regional level, whereby external actors either fostered or facilitated certain roles that rested on the status of

inter-Arab rivalries.

Nasser's dramatic address to the 2nd PNC (1965) was meant to strengthen existing PLO internal unity and to support the leader-driven actions of Shuquairy toward Jordan as a means of undermining the Jordanian regime. Nasser's speech also dealt a severe blow to the recent declaration by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, suggesting that the PLO should recognize and peacefully coexist with the State of Israel. Nasser's harsh denouncement of the Bourguiba plan essentially eliminated any possible adaptation of the accommodation role as part of PLO foreign policy output (APD 1965 DOC 90).

Egyptian support for the PLO's efforts in adapting the political independent role, however, was more implied than apparent. In his address to the 2nd PNC (1965) Nasser claimed that

...the Organization has finally come into being. The Organization is asked to prove to what extent the Palestine people can face their responsibilities and face events and challenges. Your formation and presence here today shows the whole world that the Palestine people are able to shoulder their responsibilities (APD 1965 DOC 90).

Shuquairy singularly attempted to bear this political responsibility shortly after the 2nd PNC session. On 18 July 1965, Shuquairy publicly announced the first draft of the election scheme. The Election Law stipulated that the 3rd PNC would contain 216 elected representatives based on the following distribution: Jordan 100, Gaza 40, Lebanon

14, Syria 13, Kuwait 10, Egypt five, Iraq two, Saudi Arabia five, Qatar three, Algeria two, Libya two, diasporian Palestinians 15, and the PLA five. Drawing severe criticism from Jordan over the loss of its absolute majority, external shocks obliged the PLO to accept subservience leaving Shuquairy with no other choice but to revise the distribution of seats.

Meanwhile, bowing to subservient pressure from Nasser as a means of pressuring Jordan, Shuquairy embarked on a limited propaganda campaign against King Hussein. Shuquairy's radio address of 1 October 1965 forced King Hussein's hand to petition Nasser to curb Shuquairy's actions. Nasser suggested instead that both parties attempt to reach some form of agreement. That agreement did not come soon enough, for in December 1965 the EXCOM agreed to the revised version of the Election Law which limited the number of total PNC representatives to 150. The revised version reduced Jordan's allotted representatives even more by giving the Hashemite Kingdom only 60 seats, or a 40% share, in contrast to the 46% it secured from the first draft.

By now, Jordan and the PLO had negotiated a tentative agreement in late December 1965 known as the Khatib-Shuquairy Accord. Named after the pro-Egyptian Jordanian ambassador to Cairo and the leader of the PLO, the agreement is significant because it signals the PLO's early ability to

negotiate and reach a tentative agreement with external actors. However, King Hussein never accepted the accord because the PLO demanded more concessions than he was willing to grant. Both sides now launched intensive and bitter propaganda attacks against one another that ceased only after the secretary-general of the Arab League directly intervened. The Arab League obliged that the two actors meet again to hammer out an accord. The outcome of those talks yielded an important political victory for Shuquairy in that Jordan had agreed to allow the PLO to proceed with the election process. The drawback to this concession was that King Hussein also surreptitiously embarked on a campaign to weaken the PLO (Shemesh 1988).

By June 1966, King Hussein no longer concealed his drive to eliminate the PLO's leader-driven efforts to adapt political independent role behavior. In mid-June, King Hussein terminated the work of the elections committees and prohibited any West Bank contact with the PLO. By July, al-Tall extended the prohibition of PLO contact to Jordan's diplomatic corps and representatives serving abroad (Shemesh 1988). If King Hussein couldn't directly impose subservience upon the PLO, then he would surely undermine the organization's attempt to positively adapt and adjust political independence.

Jordan was not the only external actor attempting to undermine the PLO. Throughout the entire PNC election

debate between Shuquairy and King Hussein, the guerrilla groups had been militarily promoting their version of Palestinian independence through armed struggle. In a communique released shortly after the 2nd PNC (1965), the military arm of Fatah (Al-Asifa) called for the use of "armed revolt," and provided a list of recently successful guerrilla operations carried out against Israeli targets as evidence of this role's usefulness (APD 1965 DOC 93).

Fatah also castigated the PLO for its nonrepresentative composition and claimed that the PNC consisted primarily of "old guard Palestinian nationalists" void of the commando spirit. Fatah now began to openly campaign for the leadership of the Palestinian people. In its bid to assert its potential leadership role, Fatah would have to compete with conventional West Bank leaders burdened by their own traditional rivalries and Jordan's furtive attempts to repress their political ambitions (Mishal 1978).

While Egypt remained the chief supporter of the PLO, Syria actively sponsored Fatah by coordinating guerrilla activities from positions in the region and by providing the guerrillas with necessary training and fighting equipment. The Syrian persistence in prescribing the role of visionary revolutionary liberator acquired added significance following the 1967 June War.

Despite the nationalist awakening among Palestinians living under Jordanian rule in the West Bank, their direct

influence on PLO behavior at this time was negligible. Although supportive of the PLO as the representative of the will of the people, the Jordanian Palestinians also began to recognize that armed Arab struggle could also play a role in the liberation of their homeland.

Their aspirations caught the attention of the public when the "preparatory committee" from a group of West Bankers managed to publicize the text of a "national covenant" originally intended for delivery at a Jerusalem convention in mid-December 1966. The text of the covenant declared West Bank support for the PLO as the representative of the "will of the people"; their support for Arab [italics added] armed struggle as the sole means to combat Zionism; along with their professed dissatisfaction with the Jordanian regime.

Even though the notion of armed struggle gathered some degree of West Bank support, they still thought of *fedayeen* activity as being integral to the pan-Arab struggle. The domestic constituency's commitment to Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism envisioned the PLO as playing the primary roles of regional subsystem collaborator and subservient despite their conferral of the PLO's independent representative capacity. Their belief in a politically independent PLO did not approach the magnitude of Shuquairy's because their bestowal to the PLO of the role of representative of the "will of the people of Filastin" remained more rhetorical

than political. Political realities accounted for a large part of their rhetorical support because the West Bank constituency remained subject to Jordanian rule despite their declared opposition to the policies of the Hashemite regime. In addition, West Bankers were not immune from King Hussein's determination to eliminate PLO political activity. In response to their announced national covenant, King Hussein closed the PLO offices in Jerusalem and banned the activities of the Union of Palestinian Women (Shemesh 1988).

In the period immediately following the 1967 June War, a now occupied domestic constituency attached greater importance to the role of independent. The occupied territories now had to supplant their rhetorical interest in independence with concrete political goals. For many, the adaptation of the independent role contained risks: too much independence might encourage the Arab world to discontinue its material and ideological support for the Palestinian cause; or independent Palestinians might demand only material support from Arab states free from political guidance (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). The latter remained a greater concern for the external environment, as it signaled the demise of a subservient and selective regional subsystem collaborator PLO.

The 1967 June War remains a watershed event in Middle East politics. In addition to altering a central part of the region's political borders, the war also demonstrated



that collective Arab responsibility failed to defend, let alone liberate, Palestine. The effects of the Arab defeat marked a significant turning point in PLO foreign policy. Essentially, the war drew to a close the first phase of PLO foreign policy based on subservience and regional subsystem collaboration. The political realities that remained demonstrated to many Palestinians the futility of these roles, especially at the military and political levels. Moreover, the failure of these roles provided a renewed impetus for the PLO's adaption and positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles championed by Fatah.

Fatah's success at the Battle of Karameh in March 1968, following the 1967 Arab defeat, yielded a major political victory for the guerrillas. As news of the events of Karameh spread, the ranks of the guerrilla movement swelled with new recruits eager to join in the fight against Israel. Armed struggle now had a mobilizing effect among the Palestinians. Fatah's success at Karameh also captured the attention of Nasser who began to pressure the guerrillas-- Fatah in particular, to integrate within the PLO. Nasser also proved instrumental in paving the way for the guerrillas' ascension within the PLO by providing material assistance to Fatah and garnering Soviet political support for their cause (Shemesh 1988). At the 4th PNC (1968), a handful of the guerrilla groups were able to predominate

over the national assembly to bureaucratically adapt and positively adjust their own brand of foreign policy role behavior.

At the close of the first phase of PLO behavior, Egypt began to tilt its position toward support for the organization's adaption of visionary revolutionary role behavior. Nasser altered Egypt's political direction in favor of the fedayeen based on the positive feedback of their activities and as a counter to Syrian-backed guerrilla support. With his political net cast in the direction of Fatah, Nasser effectually terminated his support for Shuquairy as leader of the PLO, who resigned his post on 24 December 1967.

The organization also began to experience an internal crisis. The PLO could no longer revert to complete subservient role behavior because the war had essentially discredited the pan-Arab military and political aspects of this role. The organization, however, still remained economically subservient. Subsystem collaboration at the regional level proved even more difficult to adjust since key Arab states now advocated an entirely different set of roles for the organization. Under Shuquairy, the PLO's internally initiated attempt to adapt the political side of independent role behavior by relying mainly on the West Bank left the organization with a domestic constituency who now lived under Israeli occupation instead of Jordanian rule.

The PLO was unable to adapt this role owing to the external constraints discussed above. In contrast, the guerrillas harnessed both the political and military support of diaspora Palestinians who would form the core of the PLO's outside domestic constituency. The PLO's primary reliance on the diaspora constituency would remain throughout the entire second phase. It wasn't until the third phase that the PLO would return to the occupied territories as its primary constituency. Speculation suggests that had the PLO under Shuquairy's direction been successful in capturing the exclusive political support of the West Bank for the adaptation of independence, the exigencies of West Bank life under eventual occupation hints that this role would have been short-lived.

#### Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the leader-driven and external shocks independent variables outlined in the role modification model remained the driving determinants of PLO foreign policy role behavior throughout the first phase. However, the external shocks variable relegated the PLO to its subservient and regional subsystem collaborator foreign policy role behaviors. Notwithstanding the influence of external shocks, this chapter also demonstrated that the post-1948 historical experiences of the Palestinians prepared the newly established organization to accept,

albeit conditionally, the imposition of these roles. Although the leader-driven variable played an important part in the PLO's attempt to internally adapt its own version of foreign policy output, Shuquairy was only able to pursue isolated aspects of particular behaviors. His efforts to adapt and positively adjust the independent role remained confined solely to the political facet of this behavior void of its financial and military components. This factor contributed to the external shocks ability to thwart the PLO's leader-driven efforts.

This chapter analyzes the second phase of PLO foreign policy role behavior. The 4th PNC (1968) marks the beginning of this phase. Throughout this phase, the influence of the bureaucratic advocacy variable secured a permanent foothold when the guerrilla organizations succeeded in dominating the decision making apparatus of the PNC. The bureaucratic advocacy variable would now begin to compete with the external shocks variable as a determinant of PLO role behavior. No longer subservient to the extent that the organization had been under Shuquairy, the PLO successfully adapted and positively adjusted the roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent. They also retained the regional subsystem collaborator role and adjusted it in accordance with internal needs and external demands. It is also during the second phase that the PLO began to negatively articulate the use of certain roles.

The PLO's negative denunciation of role is significant because it suggests an organizational awareness of specific role behaviors at the PLO's disposal.

## CHAPTER V

### THE SECOND PHASE OF PLO FOREIGN POLICY: FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO INDEPENDENT

This chapter investigates the second phase of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) foreign policy role behavior. The attendance of key guerrilla groups at the 4th Palestine National Council (PNC) in 1968 marks the initiation of this phase that lasted until the 11th PNC in 1973.

The application of the role modification model in this chapter reveals that the bureaucratic advocacy and external shocks variables remained the primary determinants of PLO foreign policy role behavior. During this phase, the PLO had adapted and positively adjusted the roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent. On the negative end, the PLO totally repudiated the former practice of subservient role behavior by asserting their "Palestinian Arab independence" and by rejecting "all forms of interference, tutelage or dependence" (IDP 1968 DOC 360).

The second phase also marks the inauguration of the PLO's official denunciation of pragmatic role behavior. However, this chapter demonstrates that despite the PLO's condemnation of this role, the organization was not adverse

to the selective adoption and positive adjustment of pragmatic role behavior to achieve tactical gains.

The role modification model also indicates that, throughout the second phase, the organization had preserved the regional subsystem collaborator role adapted during the first phase. The PLO continued to preserve this role mainly because it lacked an autonomous territorial base from which it could operate and because many of the guerrilla groups retained the support of external and sometimes competing patrons.

Primarily because the bureaucratic advocacy variable plays a major role in shaping PLO foreign policy in this period, this chapter also includes some discussion on guerrilla ideology. Because the PLO relied on consensus decision making to arrive at foreign policy output, ideological positions are key to understanding the gradual modifications in role behavior that occurred both tactically and strategically.

#### The Aftermath of the 1967 June War

The political environment leading up to the 4th PNC (1968) revolved around the 1967 June War. This war dealt a crushing military defeat to the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The near-total destruction of Arab conventional forces along with the substantial loss of territory created a military vacuum in the region. In

addition to the military void, the war had precipitated a far more consequential political vacuum when the prestige and moral leadership of both conservative and revolutionary regimes collapsed under the sudden weight of military defeat (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1974).

In October 1967, Fatah indicated its commitment to visionary revolutionary behavior in a political statement attributing the 1967 June military defeat to "Arab error" for excluding the Palestinians from exercising their "proper heroic role" based on commando methods. Against this backdrop, Fatah announced that it intended not only to resume, but to escalate the "revolutionary war against Zionist occupation" through popular armed resistance (IDP 1967 DOC 426).

Both Arab regime and popular support for fedayeen activity peaked in March 1968 when Fatah forces, aided by Jordanian artillery, militarily engaged an Israeli armored column in the East Bank town of Karemeh. As noted in Chapter Four, Fatah's political success at Karemeh captured the attention of Nasser who urged the group to incorporate itself into the institutional framework of the PLO. Despite Nasser's earlier withdrawal of political support for Shuquairy as head of the PLO, the Egyptian leader still retained his belief in the viability and legitimacy of the organization as the institutional expression of Palestinian nationalism.



By July 1968, Fatah had acquired a sufficient amount of Arab regime support and mass popular appeal that produced an opportunistic political climate conducive to participation in the upcoming PNC. In addition to Fatah the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash, decided to attend.

#### The 4th Palestine National Council

The 4th PNC (1968) convened in Cairo between 10 and 17 July. Preparatory committees agreed in advance that the number of delegates in attendance would be limited to one hundred--a considerable decrease from the 466 members who participated at the 3rd PNC (1966). The distribution of seats consisted of the following representative proportions: Fatah 38; the PFLP 10; the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Popular Liberation Forces 20; and non-factional groupings 32. The PLO based its rationale concerning the reduction in delegate numbers on the assumption that fewer members would improve consensus decision-making (Al-Fajr 12 April 1987).

During the 4th session, the members adopted the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or Basic Law. This document established the structural and procedural guidelines for the PLO's two basic governing institutions: the PNC and the Executive Committee (EXCOM). Not unlike other constitutions, the Basic Law's 32 articles

specify the functions of both the PNC and the EXCOM, membership provisions, quorum requirements, and amendment procedures (IDP 1968 DOC 361).

The members also amended the 1964 Palestine National Charter by adding a total of seven new articles to the original document. As noted in earlier chapters, the Charter serves only as an ideological blueprint to guide PLO foreign policy behavior. The PLO's actual positive or negative use of any particular role has to be extracted from official documents and actual foreign policy acts that provide specific examples of foreign policy output.

In the amended 1968 Charter, the PLO declared its intent to adapt and positively adjust the role of visionary revolutionary liberator as the main component of its foreign policy output. This translated into a tactical policy of commando action or guerrilla warfare. The significance that the PLO attached to the means is noted in Article 9, which maintains that "armed struggle is the *only* [italics added] way to liberate Palestine."

In Article 21, the PLO set forth its policy position regarding the use of pragmatic role behavior. In addition to stating its resolve to neither adapt nor positively adjust this role, the Charter proclaimed the PLO's determination to implement and adapt pragmatism only in a negative direction. In theory, the PLO's strict adherence to the Charter's tenets should have translated into a

negative policy of subverting or refusing to accept all diplomatic solutions, negotiated agreements, or relevant U.N. resolutions in formulating foreign policy output. In reality PNC resolutions and other documents indicate a gradual deviation from the Charter's tenets, especially regarding foreign policy output directed at the Arab regional level. Subsequent analysis in this chapter reveals that the PLO did indeed adapt and positively adjust pragmatic role behavior on a situational basis. This is evident based on regionally concluded agreements with Lebanon and Jordan. The PLO did remain faithful to the 1968 Charter by sustained negative adjustments in pragmatic foreign policy with its rejection of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the Rogers Plan (Appendix E), and the United Arab Kingdom Plan (Appendix F).

The PLO's rejection of subservient role behavior and its emphasis on the role of independent is noted in Article 28 of the Charter which states: "The Palestinian Arab people insists upon the originality and independence of its national revolution and rejects every manner of interference, guardianship and subordination" (IDP 1968 DOC 360). The PLO sustained the Charter's sanction of the independent role throughout this entire phase.

The PNC political resolutions endorsed at the 4th PNC (1968) exhibited a large degree of congruency between the Charter's ideologically prescribed roles and the PLO's

actual selection and implementation of roles, such as visionary revolutionary liberator. The PLO also began to positively increase the use of the defender of the faith role which acts as the rhetorical accompaniment to visionary revolutionary liberator.

The PLO's emphasis on the newly adapted roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent along with the negative adjustment in subservient and pragmatic behavior stands in sharp contrast to the roles articulated during the 1st PNC (1964). The raw differences in role articulation for the 1st PNC and the 4th PNC based on content analysis of the respective PNC resolutions are presented in Table 5.1.

#### External Shocks versus Bureaucratic Advocacy

The 4th PNC (1968) convened at a time when the principal question was one of Palestinian sovereignty vis-a-vis the Arab states. Consequently, the PLO's internally initiated new direction in foreign policy role behavior triggered the external shocks variable into reacting at the regional Arab level. The external shocks variable often competed with the bureaucratic advocacy variable in determining which role the PLO would implement in response to a given situation. While content analysis of the documents reveals that the external shocks variable did provide sustained, positive support for the PLO's

implementation of the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles as tactical devices, that support lagged far behind the PLO's own bureaucratic articulation of these behaviors.

The lack of comparable Arab support at this time, relative to bureaucratic advocacy, primarily centered around the region's overriding preoccupation with the political and territorial changes brought about by the 1967 June War. In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, local actors such as Syria and Iraq had to contend with the sudden thaw in relations between Jordan and Egypt, whose interests rapidly converged around the need to recover territory lost in the war. These overriding self-interests led many regional actors to attempt specific role imposition on the PLO such as regional subsystem collaborator while restricting the positive or negative adjustment of other behaviors that clashed with either broad Arab objectives or individual state interests. Yearly totals of role articulation for the visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, and total liberation variables from 1967 through 1973 offer a comparison of external shocks versus bureaucratic advocacy role articulation throughout the second phase. The raw totals are presented in Table 5.2.

After the 1967 June War, the guerrillas attempted to launch their war of popular resistance against Israel from

within the occupied territories. In the West Bank, Fatah was especially active in attempting to organize underground networks of resistance. Even though the guerrillas were successful at launching several military operations against specified Israeli targets, their hope of transforming fedayeen activity into a "popular armed revolution" from within Israeli occupied territory failed to materialize. Fatah's revolution did not occur, partly because Israeli security forces were quick to check fedayeen action and partly because the West Bank leadership could not politically afford to have commando actions undermine their search for a way to function under military occupation (Bailey 1984; Mishal 1981). As a result, the guerrillas were forced to relocate their bases of operation into the East Bank of Jordan. By 1969, PLO guerrillas would also find "sanctuary" in the south of Lebanon, drawing another regional actor into their struggle (Brynen 1990).

The *fedayeen's* physical relocation to Jordan meant that the guerrillas were no longer under the exclusive territorial domain of Damascus. Although Syria still remained a major patron in terms of supplying arms, the guerrillas relied on Egypt to provide the needed political guardianship in addition to material assistance.

Primarily because of its Ba'athist leadership and its label as a confrontation state, Syria at this time was politically isolated in the Arab arena. That isolation

obliged Syria to play a secondary role behind Egypt in the promotion of political support for the PLO guerrillas immediately following the 4th PNC (1968). Fatah's increased movement toward Egypt with a view of gaining a majority foothold in the PNC triggered an external shocks response on the part of Syria.

The Syrian response was to establish its own "Palestinian" organization known as the Organization of the Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War, or Al-Sa'iqah. Officially formed in December 1968 just prior to the 5th PNC (2/1969), Al-Sa'iqah consisted of three merged guerrilla groups closely linked to the Syrian Baath: the Palestine Popular Liberation Front, the Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War, and the Popular Upper Galilee Organization. Ideologically, Al-Sa'iqah mirrored the tenets of the Ba'ath party that stressed the pan-Arab dimension of the Palestinian problem and the revolutionary nature of the struggle (Shemesh 1988; Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981).

#### The 5th Palestine National Council

The formation of Al-Sa'iqah enabled Syria to extend its current level of influence within the PNC and the EXCOM. The regional competition for influence within the PLO gained a new momentum following Nasser's dramatic opening address at the 5th PNC (2/1969) in Cairo. Nasser unconditionally extended total Egyptian support to the PLO for their

continued positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles along with the organization's sustained negative adjustment of both subservient and pragmatic role behaviors. The Egyptian president reinforced the bureaucratic component of the PLO's current program of foreign policy role behavior when he declared that:

The United Arab Republic offers Palestinian resistance every material and moral support, with no limits, no reservations and no conditions.

The United Arab Republic is absolutely opposed to any attempt to impose any form of tutelage on the resistance organizations, because any such tutelage can only lead to impeding the resistance's freedom of action....

The United Arab Republic respects the attitude adopted by the resistance organization in rejecting the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which the United Arab Republic itself accepted (IDP 1969 DOC 367).

When the 5th PNC (2/1969) convened, the guerrilla groups held a combined total of 57 out of the 105 available council seats. At a preparatory meeting the preceding month, the EXCOM announced that the present numerical composition of the PNC would be expanded from 100 to 105 members to accommodate the entrance of additional guerrillas into the decision structures of the PLO (Al-Fajr 12 April 1987). Fatah had been assigned 33 seats (a decrease of five since the previous session), and the PFLP and Al-Sa'iqah were each accorded 12 seats. Whereas the PFLP had increased its standing by two seats, the PLA and the PLF combined received



only 15 seats, a loss of five from the original 20 they held at the 4th PNC (1968).

In protest over what they perceived to be disproportionate representation, the PLA and the PFLP boycotted this session. The absence of these members enabled Fatah to capitalize on its numerical advantage and achieve the consensus it needed to gain control over the PNC. Fatah also managed to secure four out of the 12 EXCOM seats which, in turn, elected Arafat to the post of Chairman of the EXCOM.

At the strategic level, the PLO indicated its potential for goal redirection with the added concept of forming a "free and democratic *society*" [italics added] in Palestine once total liberation had been achieved (IDP 1969 DOC 370). This is the first signal of positive support for any goal other than total liberation.

At the political level, the members at the 5th PNC (2/1969) reaffirmed the PLO's continued adaptation and positive adjustment of the tactical roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent officially adopted during the 4th PNC (1968). Despite the PLO's reaffirmation of these roles as foreign policy output, bureaucratic support for these behaviors was not as strong during the 5th PNC (2/1969) when compared to the 4th PNC (1968).

Specifically, the visionary revolutionary liberator role demonstrated a 4.7 negative decline in bureaucratic

role endorsement while the independent role experienced a 0.9 loss of positive inside support. The rhetorical defender of the faith role also evidenced a marked decrease of 3.6 endorsements that closely matched the visionary revolutionary liberator role. The PLO's adaptation and negative adjustment of the pragmatic role decreased considerably from -1.3 in 1968 to -0.7 rejections in 1969, signaling the potential for an internal shift toward the positive adaptation of pragmatic role use.

The negative adjustment in role support on the part of the bureaucratic advocacy variable is attributed to the absence of the PFLP's participation at the 5th PNC (2/1969). The decline in bureaucratic support from 8.7 to 4.0 for the visionary revolutionary liberator role corresponds with the PFLP's hard-line ideology that emphasized the primacy of armed struggle above all other behaviors. The lack of a dramatic negative decline for the independent role relative to visionary revolutionary liberator (4.7 versus 0.9) is also consistent with the PFLP's belief that Palestinian independence should only be asserted as a means of separating it from other liberation movements. The -0.6 decrease in support for negative pragmatic role behavior is illustrative of the Front's total rejection of compromise solutions that deviate from the goal of total liberation (IDP 1969 DOC 379).

Organizationally, the 5th PNC (2/1969) entrusted the

EXCOM with the task of forming a body to coordinate the commando activity of the guerrillas. This led to the formation of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), which made its formal appearance in April 1969. Still bitter over the issue of representation, the PFLP initially remained outside this coalition, which consisted of Fatah, Al-Sa'iqqa, the newly formed Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and the Popular Liberation Forces.

Fatah believed that the formation of the PASC would serve as an important step toward the unification of the commandos both militarily and politically. Militarily, unity would ease the logistical problems associated with coordinating commando activity. It would also enable Fatah to eventually forsake the "hit and run" tactics of traditional guerrilla warfare in favor of "occupying enemy controlled positions, mopping them up and holding them." Moreover, since armed struggle was no longer a strategic end in itself but a tactical means to liberation, it required "planning and strategic thinking" within a centralized framework (IDP 1969 DOC 409).

For Fatah, unity of the commandos was also politically important since this period witnessed the formation of additional guerrilla groups that demanded inclusion within the decision structures of the PLO. Fatah believed that forging political unity among disparate ideological groups

averted the potential for internal divisions that could weaken or challenge the viability of the organization. Political unity was also needed to arrive at consensus in formulating foreign policy. Moreover, if the PLO intended to project itself as the representative organization for the Palestinian cause, internal unity remained a major concern.

By the 6th PNC (9/1969), two additional groups were incorporated within the PLO, increasing Fatah's preoccupation with internal unity as well as contributing to the strength of bureaucratic advocacy relative to external shocks. The two additional groups were the PDFLP and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF).

In February 1969, a group of left-wing adherents within the PFLP broke away from the "centrist" politics of Habash and founded the PDFLP. Rather than promoting the Arab dimension of the Palestine problem, the PDFLP under the direction of Naif Hawatmeh advocated an extreme "leftist" approach based more on the Southeast Asian and Cuban models of revolution rather than the Moscow prototype adhered to by Habash. Despite its extreme ideological orientation, the PDFLP emerged as the frontline bureaucratic advocate of evolutionary change when it introduced the idea of forming a popular democratic state in a liberated Palestine as part of the PLO's overall strategic package of foreign policy output (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981).

In July 1968, the Ba'ath party assumed power in Iraq.

As a matter of consequence, relations between the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'athist regimes intensified as both actors actively competed for influence in the Palestinian arena. The heightened rivalry between the two regimes induced the Iraqi leaders to follow the Syrian example by establishing their own Palestinian organization known as the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). Officially formed on 11 April 1969, the ALF emphasized the primacy of popular armed struggle under the "banner of Arab revolutionary ideology" as the principal means of liberating Palestine. In its ensuing political statement, the ALF firmly contended that the liberation of Palestine was not a prerequisite to Arab unity. The ALF also asserted that the Palestinian guerrillas greatly exaggerated their capability for self-liberation without the support of the Arab masses. Purposely labeled Arab [italics added] rather than *Palestinian* [italics added], the ALF's foremost purpose as a bureaucratic advocate within the PLO was to thwart the growing process of *palestinianization* [italics added] leading to the role of active independent by revitalizing the Arab dimension of the Palestinian problem (IDP 1969 DOC 423; Shemesh 1988).

In order to achieve their purpose, the ALF's policy of action consisted of bureaucratically opposing the PLO's adaptation and positive adjustment of either the independent or active independent roles. It also meant that the ALF would fully support the PLO's continued negative adjustment

in pragmatic role behavior against any solution that threatened to compromise the strategic goal of total liberation. The ALF also called for an increase in the positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaboration role as a means of reviving the Arab part in the Palestinian theater.

#### The 6th Palestine National Council

When the 6th PNC convened in early September 1969, the following movements and organizations participated: the Independents, the PLA, and the Popular Liberation Forces, Fatah, al-Sa'iqqa, the PDFLP, the Front for Popular Struggle, the Arab Organization for Palestine, and the PFLP-GC. The ALF took part as an observer while the PFLP refrained from actively participating at this session (IDP 1969 DOC 429).

At the organizational level, the members agreed to expand participation in the EXCOM from 12 to 15 seats. They did this in order to accommodate the growth in new members.

At the political level, the council formally endorsed the PLO's continued positive adaptation of visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, and independent roles as tactical foreign policy output. They also reaffirmed the PLO's commitment to confine the pragmatic role to its present negatively adjusted state.

While bureaucratic support for the PLO's sustained

negative use of pragmatic role behavior remained unchanged when compared to the 5th PNC (2/1969), internal support for the remaining tactical roles waned since the last session despite the inclusion of new guerrilla groups. The differences in bureaucratic tactical role articulation throughout the 5th (2/1969) and 6th PNCs (9/1969) are presented in Table 5.3. Moreover, external role support never exceeded that of the bureaucratic advocacy variable for any role, either tactically or strategically.

The absence of the PFLP from the 6th PNC (9/1969) partially accounts for the decline in bureaucratic tactical role support for the visionary revolutionary liberator, regional subsystem collaborator, defender of the faith, and independent roles. The PLO's negative adjustment in tactical role support also centers around the internal threat that challenged the organization over the nature of strategic foreign policy.

Internally, the organization was preoccupied with the potential threat to unity precipitated by the PFLP's strategic proposal calling for the establishment of a popular democratic state as a solution to the Palestine problem (IDP 1969 DOC 427). Ideological differences over the nature of the proposed democratic state sparked a debate among the leading bureaucratic guerrilla organizations (Gresch 1983; Shemesh 1988). The ensuing debate forced the PLO to divert role attention away from the tactical side of

foreign policy to the strategic end, contributing to a decline in bureaucratic tactical role support.

As noted earlier, the PLO signaled its early inclination for goal redirection when the members at the 5th PNC (2/1969) endorsed the idea of establishing a "free and democratic society" to accompany the previously adopted strategic goal of total liberation. As a point of reminder, Fatah was the only major guerrilla group in attendance during the 5th PNC (2/1969) following the PFLP's withdrawal over the issue of representation. In the absence of any ideological debate among competing guerrilla factions, Fatah seized the opportunity to introduce a modified version of its long-term, strategic foreign policy objective to the council members. The members at the 5th PNC (2/1969) adopted a final statement of policy that included the modified version of Fatah's long-term objective:

The objective of the Palestinian people behind the bitter struggle in which it is engaged for the liberation of and the return to its land is to set up a free and democratic *society* [italics added] in Palestine for all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians and Jews, and to liberate Palestine and its people from the domination of international Zionism (IDP 1969 DOC 370).

While the 5th PNC (2/1969) endorsed the idea of a democratic society, Fatah's paramount strategic aim was the eventual establishment of a "free, democratic Palestinian *state* [italics added] in the whole of Palestine" (IDP 1969



DOC 392). Immediately following the 5th PNC, Arafat in his capacity as both spokesman for Fatah and chairman of the EXCOM began to openly promote Fatah's long-range strategic vision in a series of interviews and policy statements (IDP 1969 DOC 392 402 409 425).

Despite the activity of Arafat, PLO documents acknowledge the PDFLP, and not Fatah, as the formal initiator of goal redirection. At the opening of the 6th PNC (9/1969), the PDFLP submitted a draft resolution to the national council offering a strategic solution to the Palestine problem. Among the list of items in the draft, the PDFLP declared

to work for a popular democratic solution to the Palestine and Israeli problems.

Such a solution would mean setting up a popular democratic Palestinian state for Arabs and Jews alike in which there would be no discrimination and no room for class or national subjugation and in which the right of both Arabs and Jews to perpetuate and develop their indigenous cultures would be respected.

In view of the fateful and historical affiliation of Palestine with the Arab nation, the popular democratic state of Palestine shall form an inseparable part of a federal Arab state in this area (IDP 1969 DOC 427).

The PDFLP's proposal differed from Fatah's on a number of key issues. Whereas Fatah emphasized a nonsectarian state in which "Muslims, Christians, and Jews" would peacefully coexist in liberated Palestine, the PDFLP depicted a somewhat more nationalistic scenario that

envisioned both "Arabs and Jews" residing in a more socialistic setting. Furthermore, Fatah's stress on the Palestinian character of the future democratic state contrasted sharply with the PDFLP's attachment of a Palestinian state to the larger Arab nation.

The 6th PNC (9/1969) subsequently adopted a resolution that neither acknowledged the separate national identities inherent in the PDFLP's democratic solution, nor did it explicitly endorse Fatah's vision of a nonsectarian democratic state. However, the concluding political statement demonstrates that some degree of bureaucratic compromise occurred in the process of drafting the final resolution to reach consensus on the following strategic addition to foreign policy output:

the goal of the Palestine revolution is the achievement of the total and complete liberation of all the territory of Palestine from Zionist occupation...it declared the determination of the people of Palestine to go forward with their revolution until victory is achieved and a Palestinian democratic state is created, free of all forms of religious and social discrimination (IDP 1969 DOC 429).

Although Fatah's objectives are implicit in the final resolution, Arafat was unable to fully impose Fatah's version of goal redirection on the 6th PNC (9/1969). Arafat's inability to prevail rests largely on the fact that Fatah was not politically strong enough to surmount strategic ideological differences to reap the necessary bureaucratic consensus. Moreover, the guerrilla groups were

still in the formative stages and even though consensus on many tactical roles usually proved facile, strategic behavior remained subject to extreme controversy.

Fatah's conception of a democratic state differed from the "old guard Palestinians" and the exiled traditional Palestinian leadership of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) that supported Fatah's rise to prominence within the PLO. The AHC, under the direction of the Haj Amin al-Husayni, refused to accept the secular aspect of the future democratic state.

Fatah's insistence on Palestinian primacy regarding the character of the future state also isolated Arafat and his proponents from the ALF, the PFLP, and the PFLP-GC. These bureaucratic groups still retained the belief that Arab unity was a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine and that a Palestinian state would form part of the broader Arab nation. Throughout the ensuing debate, the only guerrilla group that supported Fatah was the Syrian sponsored al-Sa'iqa. The basis of that support reflected Syria's intent to replace Egypt as the champion of the Palestinian cause (Gresch 1983).

Superficially, the PPDFLP's version appears to have stood a better chance of striking ideological harmony among the various guerrilla groups. Analysis reveals that it contained theoretical contradictions inimical to the PPDFLP's Marxist-Leninist orientation. In order to maintain

compliance with the tenets of Leninist doctrine, the PDFLP was later forced to clarify its proposal regarding the concept of "Jews." Clarification was in order because any acknowledgement of distinct Arab and Jewish nationalities implied the existence of separate Arab and Jewish nations. This, in turn, could lead to the recognition of either nation's right to self-determination culminating in the formation of a separate independent state. Bureaucratic groups such as the PFLP charged that the PDFLP's proposal was tantamount to accepting a binational solution that acknowledged the State of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish nation (Gresch 1983). Hawatmeh subsequently resolved the PDFLP's theoretical dilemma during an interview in which he noted that:

The Popular Democratic Front is of the opinion, as an ideological consideration, that Judaism is a religion, pure and simple. The Front does, however, recognize the legitimacy of "Jewishness" as a culture for Jewish communities, particularly in the case of the Jewish community that is found in the land of Palestine today, with special emphasis on the post-1948 generation that was born and raised in the land of Palestine (IDP 1969 DOC 450).

The PLO's strategic goal of a nonsectarian democratic state remained a pervasive theme throughout subsequent PNCs in the second phase of foreign policy. Even though role articulation for this particular goal never exceeded the amount of bureaucratic support given to total liberation, the organization nevertheless continued to endorse the idea

of a democratic Palestinian state during the 8th (1971), 10th (1972), and 11th PNCs (1973). In terms of the role modification model, the PLO's ability to internally compromise and adopt new strategic behavior serves as a precursor for the future accommodationist role eventually directed at the external level of analysis. It also highlights the organization's ability to accept short-term evolutionary change as part of its overall foreign policy package.

#### The 7th Palestine National Council

Less than a year after the bureaucratic debate, the PLO convened the 7th PNC (1970) for the express purpose of increasing national unity. The outcome of this session is significant for two main reasons. The first concerns the organizational change that occurred with the formation of the Central Committee (CC). Second, the PLO introduced political resolutions that defined foreign policy relationships with specific external actors, including its domestic constituency in the occupied territories (IDP 1970 DOC 397).

The National Assembly's concluding statement indicated that the PLO firmly believed that the formation of the CC as an intermediary decision structure between the PNC and the EXCOM was a "propitious start on the road to unity" (IDP 1970 DOC 399). Comprised of the members of the EXCOM, the

president of the National Assembly, the commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and three independents, the main purpose of the CC was to act as the "supreme command for the struggle" uniting the guerrilla groups. The National Assembly also charged the CC with overseeing resolutions passed by the PNC and working for "more extensive formulae for national unity" (IDP 1970 DOC 398).

The formation of the CC tenders an explanation for the rise in bureaucratic support for the defender of the faith role relative to visionary revolutionary liberator throughout the 7th PNC (1970). During this session, the bureaucratic component positively adjusted the defender of the faith role from 2.9 at the 6th PNC (2/1969) to 11.4 endorsements during the 7th PNC (1970). This total exceeded role articulation for the visionary revolutionary liberator role by 3.0 pronouncements. As the PLO expanded and developed its institutional base, the presence of this additional decision structure contributed to the daily flow of organizational rhetoric. Content analysis indicates that, following the 7th PNC, bureaucratic support for the defender of the faith role surpassed that of visionary revolutionary liberator only during non-PNC months. Moreover, the CC's various communique and resolutions issued between sessions of the National Assembly were primarily ideological in content. The symbolic content of the CC's documents is consistent with its characteristic as

a delegate assembly decision structure detailed in Chapter Three. In addition, Fatah cadres constituted a large portion of the CC and the rise in ideological rhetoric relative to visionary revolutionary liberator is indicative of the more moderate position advanced by this bureaucratic group.

In contrast to the 6th PNC (9/1969), the bureaucratic advocacy variable increased its support for the roles of visionary revolutionary liberator, regional subsystem collaborator and independent throughout the 7th PNC (1970). Specifically, positive adjustments in the use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role increased from 2.2 to 8.4 bureaucratic endorsements. The regional subsystem collaborator role also experienced a positive adjustment from 0.7 to 2.9 articulations, while the independent role increased by only 0.5 for a total of 0.7 positive endorsements. These figures are presented in Table 5.4.

Throughout this session, the leader-driven variable also endorsed the positive adjustment for the above mentioned roles. Even though content analysis reveals that leader support for key tactical roles peaked during the 7th PNC (1970), it never exceeded bureaucratic support throughout the entire second phase of PLO foreign policy. The bureaucratic advocacy variable demonstrated the same amount of negative adjustments in pragmatic role behavior during the 7th PNC (1970) as it did during the 6th PNC (9/1969).

During this period, the PLO faced a series of regional external threats. The existence of these threats accounts for the rise in bureaucratic support for the visionary revolutionary liberator, regional subsystem collaborator, and independent roles. The PLO evidenced its problems in the region in the PNC political resolutions that prescribed foreign policy output specifically directed at both Lebanon and Jordan.

In the Lebanese theater, the PLO basically declared its intent to strengthen relations between the PLO resistance fighters and the masses of the Lebanese people. The PLO based its invitation for increased regional subsystem collaboration on the Cairo Agreement (Appendix G) negotiated between the Lebanese authorities and the commando organizations on 3 November 1969. Under the auspices of Egyptian Ambassador Yusuf Sayegh, the PLO's Yasser Arafat and Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief, General Emile Bustani, concluded a secret agreement governing relations between the PLO guerrillas and the Lebanese government. The starting point for the accord occurred following a series of armed confrontations between PLO commandos and the Lebanese army that threatened Lebanon's stability and jeopardized the PLO's continued presence in the southern portion of the state. In concluding this agreement, the PLO addressed the use of several foreign policy roles, including independent, pragmatic, and visionary revolutionary liberator.



In essence, the 1969 Cairo Agreement legitimized the presence of the Palestinian guerrillas in south Lebanon. Article One provided the commandos with relative freedom of movement and assigned them various crossing points and observation posts along the Lebanese border. Under the terms of Article Three, the PASC was responsible for controlling armed struggle in the refugee camps by "limiting the presence of arms." Article Four sanctioned the PLO's use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role provided that commando activities did not impugn Lebanon's sovereignty or threaten state security (IDP 1969 DOC 449).

Arafat's willingness to accept restrictions, albeit minor, in visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior reflects the ideological influence of Fatah that preferred to emphasize regional subsystem collaborator and pragmatic roles at the expense of armed struggle.

The 1969 Cairo Agreement allowed the PLO to engage in positive pragmatic role behavior. The potential for Israeli reprisals into south Lebanon to challenge the Agreement and to halt commando activity led the PLO to safeguard the existence of the document. The secrecy of the Cairo Agreement accounts for the PLO's lack of positive adjustments in pragmatic role behavior at the 7th PNC (1970). Public disclosure of the Agreement's existence in April 1970 attested to the organization's willingness to institute pragmatic role behavior rather than visionary

revolutionary liberator activities when faced with a potential external threat. It also attests to the PLO's willingness to positively adjust the regional subsystem collaborator role.

In contrast to the political agreement reached with the Lebanese government, the PLO faced an opposing threat from the Hashemite regime in neighboring Jordan. At the 7th PNC (1970), the PLO called for an increase in the regional subsystem collaborator role between "the Palestinian Revolution and the nationalist forces in the East Bank" as part of its Jordanian foreign policy (IDP 1970 DOC 397).

However, King Hussein obstructed the PLO's ability to achieve those positive adjustments because the King's concerns were still directed at recovering territory lost during the 1967 June War. To achieve his goal, King Hussein absolutely required the political support of Nasser as testimony to his nationalism and to facilitate the prospect for political negotiations with the United States. The political cost to King Hussein for Nasser's endorsement was unconditional support for the Palestinian guerrillas, who by now had relocated their base of operation to the East Bank of Jordan. This scenario created a major predicament for the ruler of Jordan. King Hussein's dilemma revolved around his inherent claim to represent the Palestinians as part of his territorial plan while simultaneously having to support the guerrillas in their struggle for liberation as

Nasser demanded. In addition, King Hussein risked transferring political loyalty from West Bank Palestinians to the PLO by extending his government's support to the Palestinian guerrillas (Shemesh 1988).

The guerrilla presence in the East Bank of Jordan was anything but subtle. Small bands of extremists posed the greatest danger because of their steadfast commitment to the visionary revolutionary liberator role and the goal of total liberation. They openly moved about the towns and countryside sporting their guerrilla uniforms and touting their weapons. They refused to comply with the Jordanian authorities in observing municipal ordinances. Palestinian guerrillas accused of criminal activity were tried in their own courts. Moreover, because the guerrillas avoided anything that might identify them as Jordanian, they refused to register their automobiles or mount Jordanian license plates. They maintained jurisdiction over their bases of operations and flew the Palestinian flag. The Palestinian guerrillas regulated the entry of persons into their "staging areas" where it is reported that even King Hussein himself was once denied admission (Bailey 1984).

In essence, their behavior amounted to the practice of extraterritoriality, *i.e.*, state-within-a-state behavior that directly challenged the viability of King Hussein's leadership. As a result of this behavior on the part of Palestinian extremists, clashes between the guerrillas and

the Jordanian army were becoming frequent events.

In July 1970, Nasser announced Egypt's intention to accept the U.S. sponsored peace plan advanced by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Sensing an opportunity to extricate himself from having to support the Palestinian guerrillas to placate Nasser, King Hussein quickly followed the Egyptian lead by announcing Jordan's acceptance of the Rogers Plan.

Basically, the Rogers Plan called for the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt and a resumption of the Jarring mission's mediating efforts under the auspices of the United Nations (IDP 1970 DOC 142). Although Israel ultimately rejected the proposal, Nasser's acceptance of the Rogers Plan delivered an external threat to the PLO. The possibility that Egypt would enter into a separate political settlement with Israel implied the loss of Egyptian guardianship over PLO guerrilla activity in Jordan. To the PFLP and the PDFLP, Nasser's decision constituted a betrayal to pan-Arabism by attempting to forge a peace with Israel at the expense of the Palestine revolution.

In response to this external development, the PLO held an emergency session of the PNC in Amman on 28 August 1970. In the ensuing PNC resolutions, the PLO declared its "unequivocal rejection of and opposition to the American conspiracy known as the Rogers Plan" (IDP 1970 DOC 435). In addition, the members also refused to accept any external

imposition of accommodationist behavior proposed at the time. This accounts for the PLO's adoption and negative adjustment (-0.3) of any strategic offer of a two-state solution that threatened to partition Palestine into "petty states" and dilute the revolutionary nature of the Palestine National movement (IDP 1970 DOC 435).

Fearing a possible external attempt at reimposing subservient role behavior, the members at the emergency PNC emphasized the PLO's need to positively adjust independent role behavior. The National Council affirmed that the PLO, and not Jordan, had a "natural right" to declare itself the "sole representative" of the Palestinian people. However, the PLO's historic right to the independent role clashed with King Hussein's assertion to legitimately represent the Palestinians as part of his territorial package. To avoid the return role of subservient behavior and in defense of the PLO's right to exercise its independent role, the PLO enlarged the function of the CC when it charged the delegate assembly with the task of turning the

whole of the Jordanian-Palestinian theater into a fortress for the overall popular revolution the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization must take all effective steps and measures to protect the forces of the popular revolution from the conspiracies and the moves that are at present being made with the object of striking at and liquidating the Palestinian armed resistance movement (IDP 1970 DOC 435).

Before the CC could implement its task, the potential for armed confrontation between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian regime intensified after an alleged attempt on King Hussein's life (IDP 1970 DOCS 437 438). The events that followed threw the PLO into a bureaucratic struggle between Fatah and the left-wing extremists over which roles should be employed in responding to the Jordanian threat.

Fatah preferred to temporize the situation until a PLO policy consensus could be developed. Arafat believed that if the crisis were not diffused the PLO might antagonize Nasser and the organization would find itself without regional Arab support. Acting through the CC, Fatah called for a cessation in visionary revolutionary liberator behavior in the hope that a pragmatic solution could be found. In its policy directive issued after the alleged attempt on King Hussein's life, the CC ordered the guerrillas to stop "all show of military strength inside the city [Amman]," to remove their barricades, and to allow the Armed Struggle Command to assume responsibility for "maintaining order and ensuring security" (IDP 1970 DOC 440).

However, the PFLP independently set out to thwart what it perceived to be external attempts to "liquidate the Palestine problem and the Palestinian resistance" by relying on visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior. To this

end, the PFLP carried out a series of hijackings by blowing-up a Pan-Am commercial aircraft to Egypt and Swissair and TWA planes to Dawson Field in Jordan (IDP 1970 DOC 443). Although the PFLP's actions were directed at both Egypt and Jordan, Jordan stood to politically forfeit the most. In light of the PFLP's recent behavior, the sponsors of the Rogers Plan now questioned the stability of King Hussein's leadership and his ability to contain guerrilla activity.

This induced the Jordanian monarch to outwardly seek a settlement of the crisis. On 8 September, the CC and the Jordanian government issued a joint communique declaring their intent to agree to a cease-fire (IDP 1970 DOC 444). Before the day ended, however, the CC issued a second statement repudiating that morning's communique when the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade surrounded several commando bases in northern Jordan wounding and killing a number of Palestinian guerrillas (IDP 1970 DOC 445).

As the level of confrontation intensified, Arafat's only option short of military confrontation was to appeal to the Arab kings and presidents to aid the Palestinian resistance as part of their "historic and national" responsibility (IDP 1970 DOC 446). Forming an Arab Five-Man Mediation Committee to address the situation, the Arab response essentially directed Arafat to regain control over extremist guerrilla activity and halt the independent activities of the PFLP. The committee also accused Jordan

of violating the 8 September 1970 cease-fire agreement and threatened to submit a report to the Arab League holding both parties accountable if the hostilities continued (IDP 1970 DOCS 446, 447).

Threatened with Arab League sanctions, armed confrontation with Jordanian troops, and internal disunity, the PLO accepted externally imposed pragmatic behavior. Within days, the CC endorsed a resolution suspending the PFLP from membership to unify the PLO behind a single policy position and to distance itself from the PFLP's visionary revolutionary liberator activities (IDP 1979 DOC 449).

On 15 September 1970, the CC and Jordanian government reached an agreement concerning security arrangements in Amman. On the same day, however, King Hussein began to form a provisional military government to crush the commandos and demonstrate his political reliability to the United States while simultaneously preempting the possibility of independent action by his army that threatened to move on its own against the guerrillas.

In response to this threat, the CC called for the immediate unification of all the Resistance forces and installed Arafat as commander in chief. It also withdrew the previous suspension of the PFLP from its ranks. The PLO would now primarily rely on visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior to address this threat. When fighting broke out on 17 September 1970 between Jordanian



troops and Palestinian guerrillas, Iraqi troops stood poised on the Jordanian-Iraqi frontier ready to intervene on the side of the guerrillas. The Iraqi intervention never occurred.

On 20 September 1970, units of the Syrian 5th Infantry Division began their advance to Amman crossing the border at Ramtha where they engaged Jordanian tank forces. Sensing the urgency of the situation, the Arab League met in extraordinary session and called for an immediate stop to the hostilities (IDP 1970 DOC 462). It was Nasser's direct appeal to both sides that finally brought the hostilities to a halt.

On 27 September 1970, Arafat signed the Inter-Arab, or 1970 Cairo Agreement (Appendix H), along with the heads of state of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and Jordan. In addition to the call for a cease-fire, the Cairo Agreement demanded that both the Palestinian commandos and Jordanian troops withdraw from Amman so civilian authorities could administer internal security, and that henceforth Jordan support the Palestine liberation movement (IDP 1970 DOC 504).

Although the crisis yielded a pragmatic outcome, Fatah would have preferred that the PLO's acceptance of the 1970 Cairo Agreement reflect more internally initiated role behavior rather than external imposition. Moreover, the external environment's imposition of pragmatic role behavior

upon the PLO denied the organization the ability to exercise independent role behavior.

The subsequent accord agreed upon by Jordan and the PLO compensated Fatah as it paved the way for Fatah's full scale attempt to initiate independent role behavior. On 13 October 1970, Arafat and King Hussein signed the Amman Agreement (Appendix I) regulating relations between the two regimes. Both sides agreed to principles that, *inter alia*, recognized that the East and West Banks of Jordan were an indivisible unit and that the Palestinians alone were entitled to decide their own future (IDP 1970 DOC 514).

The events in Jordan forced the PLO to take a serious inventory of its foreign policy output. While the organization remained committed to armed struggle as the vehicle to total liberation, the PLO now remained fixated on positively adjusting independent role behavior. Although compelled to accept pragmatic role behavior, the PLO understood the practical effects this behavior offered. In announcing their intention to abide by the 1970 Cairo and Amman agreements, the PLO bought itself valuable time to reorganize its bureaucratic component left ideologically weakened by the Jordanian crisis. Both the ALF and Al-Sa'iqa experienced a change in leadership. Hawatmeh's PDFLP was on the verge of collapsing and the PFLP under Habash was unable to challenge Fatah's campaign for dominance. Many of the smaller and extremist guerrilla groupings, such as the

Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP), either dissipated or were incorporated into the ranks of Fatah (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973).

The PLO also underwent several internal changes. It reconstituted the EXCOM in favor of Fatah, which, in turn, reduced the predominate role played by the CC in an attempt to firmly unite the PLO under the executive leadership of Fatah. The recent activity on the part of Fatah also served to push the recovering major bureaucratic groups into a Syrian backed anti-Fatah coalition.

#### The 8th Palestine National Council

When the PLO convened the 8th PNC (1971) in Cairo between 28 February and 5 March, one of the major items on the council's agenda consisted of the organization's need to formulate and project a unified policy front. The PLO's need to forge this front surfaced as a result of bureaucratic differences over which tactical roles to apply as a counter to King Hussein's sustained resolve to expel the Palestinian resistance from Jordan.

Nasser's sudden death on 28 September 1970, the day after Jordan and the PLO concluded the 1970 Cairo Agreement robbed the PLO of its most powerful protector. To King Hussein, the absence of Nasser's regional authority and popularity came as a relief in his efforts to drive the guerrillas from his kingdom. In addition to Nasser's

demise, King Hussein also exploited the Iraqi failure to intervene on behalf of the guerrillas during Black September; the inadequate military performance on the part of Syria; and the PFLP and PDFLP's violations of the Amman Agreement, as motivation to institute his total crackdown on the guerrillas. This sparked another round of armed confrontation in the winter months preceding the 8th PNC (1971) between PLO extremists and the Bedouin soldiers of the Arab Legion. As King Hussein intensified his attack on the Palestinian guerrillas, Fatah continued its search for a more pragmatic and less confrontational solution to the problem.

For Fatah, this search involved renewed regional subsystem collaboration with Egypt, now under the leadership of President Anwar al-Sadat, while attempting to pacify the Jordanian King. Accepting Fatah's offer to deliver the opening address before the 8th PNC (1971), Sadat's speech differed from the ideological rhetoric espoused by his late predecessor. In addressing the Palestine problem, Sadat signaled Egypt's preference for pragmatism and accommodation. He claimed that any political activity must minimally include:

Withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967;

Insistence on the rights of the people of Palestine as determined by United Nations resolutions.

The 1967 Security Council resolution refers to a just solution of the problem of the refugees, but the only basis for a just solution lies in all the relevant United Nations resolutions adopted since 1947 (IDP 1971 DOC 285).

Sadat also indirectly minimized the PLO's use of visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior when he stressed the need to develop more practical strategies as a solution to the Palestine problem. While Sadat's moderation appealed directly to Fatah, the PFLP and PDFLP continued to advocate for a more revolutionary track consistent with their respective ideological orientations.

In a policy statement presented to the 8th PNC (1971), the PFLP called for a reconstitution of the PNC to reflect a more equitable distribution of commando representation. Additionally, as long as the PLO remained committed to the idea of forming a united front, the PFLP insisted on a framework of action that incorporated certain principles. Those principles included the need for a clear definition of the revolution's enemies and the ideological independence to amalgamate with other groups. To the PFLP, the immediate enemy was the Hashemite regime in Jordan. According to Habash, the Jordanian situation left the PLO with only two available options: surrender or struggle. Not yet willing to accept surrender, the PFLP openly called for the establishment in Jordan of a "democratic national regime" favorable to the Palestinian Revolution (IDP 1971 DOC 282). In response to the PFLP's call for a reconstitution of the

PNC, Fatah also submitted a recommendation for revamping the legislative component of the PLO. In a meeting of the CC chaired by Arafat, the committee endorsed a number of structural changes for submission to the PNC as a means of fostering internal unity.

Among the proposed changes, the CC recommended expanding the number of National Council seats to 150 members, that the PNC meet yearly rather than every other year, and that representation reflect a more broad-based geographic distribution. The CC proposed that an *ad hoc* committee be formed to select a new body of PNC members. The committee also recommended several changes in the structure and functions of the CC, including the numerical expansion of members to 21, and the assumption of the PNC's functions when the latter was not in session. In addition, the committee proposed the formation of an additional structure in the form of a Political Bureau to take charge of the day-to-day activities of the PLO. Comprised of nine individuals to be chosen by the PNC, the proposed Political Bureau resembled a revised EXCOM in structure and function purposely designed to placate the left-wing extremist elements within the PLO.

The resolutions adopted by the 8th PNC (1971) contained strong ideological overtones representative of competing bureaucratic factions. On the strategic side, the members positively adjusted the goal of total liberation. With the

exception of supporting the idea of a democratic state, the members rejected all other strategic arrangements such as a two-state solution. The PLO viewed any goal short of total liberation coupled with the establishment of a democratic state as "surrenderist solutions."

Tactically, the bureaucratic advocacy variable continued to support visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior (+7.4) as the main component of PLO foreign policy output. The PLO directed the application of this role primarily at Jordan. The PLO's support for this role satisfied the minimum ideological requirements of both the PFLP and the PDFLP. While the rhetorical defender of the faith role maintained the same level of bureaucratic support as it did during the 1970 August Emergency Session, the independent role received its highest positive adjustment to date with 2.7 endorsements. This is consistent with Fatah's resolve to positively adjust independent role behavior following the imposed negotiated agreements concluding the events of Black September. Although the bureaucratic advocacy variable accorded visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior the greatest amount of support, the ensuing resolution signaled the potential for a tactical change in PLO foreign policy output. Specifically, the resolution stated that:

The armed struggle sparked off by the revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people at the beginning of 1965 is the *principal*

[italics] form of struggle for the liberation of Palestine (IDP 1971 DOC 288).

The PLO's modification in the use of visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior from that of sole [italics added] means to *principal* [italics added] means symbolized the ideological persuasiveness of Fatah. Moreover, Fatah could now legitimately pursue more practical forms of struggle as suggested by Sadat in his opening address to the 8th PNC (1971). Resolutions endorsed regarding foreign policy in the Jordanian theater, however, revealed the ideological attendance of both the PFLP and the PDFLP. Specifically, the resolution claimed that:

In raising the slogan of the liberation of Palestine it was not the intention of the Palestine revolution to separate the East of the River from the West, nor did it believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people can be separated from the struggle of the masses in Jordan.

The unity of Palestine and the East Bank of the Jordan is a national duty which it is our duty to protect and strengthen (IDP 1971 DOC 288).

In short, the PNC's endorsement of the Jordanian resolution sanctioned the PFLP's earlier call for the establishment of a "nationalist regime" in Jordan favorable to the PLO at the political expense of King Hussein. The King's reaction to the resolution was swift. By mid-July, the Arab Legion had surrounded the PLO extremists and commenced their final assault on the remaining guerrillas in the Ajlun Hills and the Jordan Valley. By 19 July 1971, the



PLO's brief tenure in Jordan had come to a violent end.

#### The 9th Palestine National Council

As the PLO extremists were about to face their final encounter with King Hussein's Arab Legion, the 9th PNC (7/1971) convened in Cairo. This session met for the express purpose of deciding on the EXCOM's proposed reorganization scheme mandated by the previous session.

At the start of the session, the EXCOM submitted a report on the recent work of the committees for revising the National Council along more representative lines. The proposed distribution of seats, subsequently approved by the 9th PNC (7/1971), consisted of 41 independent members with technical qualifications; 85 members representing the fighting forces; and 25 members representing the unions for a comprehensive total of 151 members (IDP 1971 DOC 356).

The final communique issued by the 9th PNC (7/1971) contained no mention of the proposed Political Bureau; instead, the council unanimously elected the EXCOM as the PLO's highest executive body. The PNC also approved the suggested adjustments in leadership positions that enabled Fatah to secure a majority of votes in the EXCOM.

Because this PNC convened specifically to approve certain structural changes within the PLO, bureaucratic role articulation was not as pronounced as in previous sessions despite the severity of the situation in Jordan. The final

communique issued by the members was brief, and politically limited to the crisis situation in Jordan. Bureaucratic endorsement for the visionary revolutionary liberator role remained dominant with 4.2 positive articulations. The external shocks variable also supported the PLO's positive use of this role with 2.5 endorsements.

Furthermore, this session marks the first time that the bureaucratic advocacy variable positively adapted and adjusted pragmatic role behavior (+0.2). However, the members at the 9th PNC (7/1971) confined the application of this role to the PLO's strict adherence to the 1970 Cairo and Amman Agreements. The bureaucratic advocacy variable firmly rejected the positive adjustment of any other form of pragmatic role behavior with -1.0 renunciations. In denouncing pragmatic behavior, the PLO specifically referred to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. The PNC also renounced the positive use of accommodationist behavior with -0.2 renunciations. To this end, the PLO refused to compromise on the issue of territory regarding the future Palestinian state. Additionally, the PNC members reiterated their positive support for the implementation of independent role behavior as a tactical means to victory. During this time, the PLO's interpretation of tactical independent role behavior meant the independence to freely apply visionary revolutionary liberator activities against the Hashemite regime in Jordan (IDP 1971 DOC 358).

### The 10th Palestine National Council

The PLO convened the 10th PNC (1972) in Cairo to counter a series of external threats that challenged the organization's continued positive adjustment in independent role behavior. These threats not only emanated from the external shocks variable, but also from the occupied territories as well. The combination of external shocks and the domestic constituency independent variables, both attempting to influence PLO foreign policy, introduces the environmental process variable as a determinant of PLO role behavior.

At the regional level, leadership in the Arab world recently experienced a decisive change in status. In addition to Sadat's emergence in Egypt, the Jordanian regime's effective removal of the PLO in July 1971 reaffirmed King Hussein's unquestioned authority to govern. In 1970, Saddam Hussein assumed the reigns of political power in Iraq, while Hafez al-Assad successfully formed a new regime in Syria.

The status change in leadership of certain regional actors coupled with the death of Nasser, created an atmosphere of intense competition among the various regimes for political dominance in the Palestinian area. The PLO often experienced the effects of that competition in the realm of foreign policy as each actor attempted to impose its own agenda of foreign policy role behavior on the

organization.

For example, Sadat established his preference for positive pragmatic behavior at the 8th PNC (1971) with his emphasis on the PLO's need to pursue other forms of struggle besides visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior. In Syria, Assad's rejection of political solutions furnished support for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior that appealed to the PLO's more extreme factions. Additionally, Syria retained a vested territorial-nationalistic interest in the PLO's goal of total liberation because it also served to fulfill Syrian territorial aspirations to regain the Golan Heights. In contrast to Egypt and Syria's fundamental approach to the Palestine problem, Jordan remained adamant in its drive to block the PLO from exercising independent role behavior.

In the occupied territories, the West Bank traditional leadership passed the stage of searching for a way to function under military occupation. By 1970, nationalist segments of the West Bank population completed their search for ways to accord public character to their protest activities in response to the Israeli military government's prohibition of any form of political mobilization. This led to the formation of organizations, such as the Supreme Muslim Council and the Committee for National Unity, to institutionalize West Bank protest activities. To the veteran traditional elite, these activities undermined their

ability to collaborate with the Israeli authorities on certain practical matters.

During this period, the traditional elite attached themselves to the PLO for instrumental purposes only. In exchange for recognition of the PLO as their official spokesman regarding West Bank political aspirations, the PLO provided the traditional elite with justification to exercise restraint at the local level. This translated into a policy of PLO support for passive resistance rather than overt acts of civil disobedience that threatened the status of the traditional elite (Misahl 1981; Sahliyah 1988).

Throughout the second phase, the PLO limited its involvement in the occupied territories to the dissemination of rhetorical support for the inhabitants' steadfastness under military occupation. Concerned primarily with visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior and total liberation, the PLO, and Fatah in particular, relied primarily on the diaspora Palestinians as the mainstay of their constituency.

In late 1971, the Israeli government delivered an external threat to the PLO when it announced plans to hold West Bank municipal elections in the spring of 1972. Israel hoped that municipal elections would yield a cooperative group of mayors and council members. Israel's announcement obliged the PLO to direct its attention toward the West Bank where it immediately called for an election boycott.

The PLO attempted to frustrate West Bank elections for several reasons. One reason centered around the possibility that municipal elections could install nationalist candidates as mayors and council members willing to accept a territorial solution short of total liberation. Second, elections threatened to create a local leadership that challenged the PLO's claim to represent the occupied territories thereby curtailing the organization's ability to adapt active independent role behavior (Sahliyah 1988).

Jordan delivered an additional threat to the PLO when King Hussein unveiled his United Arab Kingdom (UAK) plan on 15 March 1972. The UAK's intended purpose was to halt the accelerated disengagement of the West Bank from Jordan that began in September 1970. Moreover, King Hussein wanted to block any claim that undermined Jordan's intent to represent the Palestinians and regain the West Bank lost to Israel in the 1967 June War.

The timing of the Jordanian monarch's plan was key, because the PLO was still militarily weak in the aftermath of the civil war in Jordan and the mood among the inhabitants of the West Bank was not optimistic. Moreover, because many Arab regimes severed relations with Jordan following the crisis of July 1971, the UAK plan could enhance King Hussein's standing in the region.

King Hussein's announcement of the UAK plan, which proposed a federation between both banks of the Jordan

River, came on the heels of Jordan's support for the West Bank elections. Initially, the Hashemite ruler opposed the idea because elections threatened to confer legitimacy on Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank. By January, King Hussein reversed his position and favored the elections as a means of maintaining Jordan's political influence over the West Bank.

The PLO's reaction to the UAK plan consisted of vehement rejection and condemnation of the Jordanian regime. After several meetings of the EXCOM which were called to debate the plan, the PLO officially announced its decision to reject this external attempt to impose strategic goal change. The PLO based its decision to reject the UAK plan around the following considerations: (1) the plan threatened to liquidate the Palestine problem and the Palestine Resistance; (2) King Hussein sought a separate solution; and (3) the UAK plan was an attempt by the Jordanian monarch to prove himself the official spokesman of the Palestinian people (IDP 1972 DOC 189). In terms of role behavior, the UAK plan essentially prevented the PLO from positively adjusting independent role behavior.

The environmental process variable also lent support to the PLO's choice of foreign policy output. Syria, Iraq, and Kuwait all issued official statements condemning the UAK plan because it failed to liberate the whole of Palestine. Egypt announced that it was severing relations with Jordan

because the object of King Hussein's plan was to "destroy the Palestinian cause completely" (IDP 1972 DOC 197). Palestinians residing in the East Bank also repudiated the UAK plan asserting that it denied them the right to exercise self-determination (IDP 1972 DOC 195).

As a means of extricating itself from its present "strategic distress" caused by Jordan's proposed UAK plan and Israeli planned West Bank municipal elections, the PLO once again rallied around the theme of national unity. To foster that unity and to legitimately assert its right to positively adapt and adjust independent role behavior, the PLO convened a Palestine People's Conference (PPC) in conjunction with a meeting of the 10th PNC (1972).

The 10th PNC (1972) convened for the sole purpose of endorsing the resolutions reached by the PPC. Designed to create an impression of representation, the PLO invited over 700 Palestinians to participate in the PPC of which approximately 400 members attended. Although the 10th PNC (1972) subsequently endorsed the PPC's recommendations, the PFLP and the PDFLP criticized Arafat for flooding the PPC with "independents" sympathetic to Fatah.

The presence of alleged Fatah sympathizers accounts for the decrease in bureaucratic support for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior from 4.2 to 2.5 endorsements. However, it does not indicate that the PFLP and PDFLP's ideological support for the visionary



revolutionary liberator role suffered a serious setback in the presence of so many independents. The PPC endorsed the PLO's positive adjustment of this behavior against Jordan. During the 10th PNC (1972), the members adopted a resolution that specifically called for the liberation of Jordan and the "overthrow of the subservient regime" of King Hussein (IDP 1972 DOC 201).

The PPC did indeed support the PLO's positive adjustment of independent role behavior. The 10th PNC (1972) also marks the first time that independent role behavior received the same amount of positive bureaucratic support as visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior with 2.5 endorsements.

In its ensuing policy statement presented to the PNC, the PPC affirmed the PLO's full-scale implementation of independent role behavior. The PPC's declaration paved the way for the PLO's adaption of the active independent role when they declared that:

The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, expressing their aspirations and will.

No one is entitled to take any decision on the land or the people of Palestine other than what is decided by the Palestinian people themselves, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Any measure, arrangement or agreement issuing from any other source is and will always be devoid of all legality whatsoever (IDP 1972 DOC).

Bureaucratic role articulation also increased its support for regional subsystem collaboration since the previous session. The PPC's recommendation that Jordan be "punished" for proposing a solution designed to liquidate the Palestinian cause led the PLO to propose the formation of an Arab Front to participate in the revolution.

The outcome of the 10th PNC (1971) proved significant for the future of PLO foreign policy on a number of important issues. In the first instance, the idea of Israeli-sponsored West Bank municipal elections forced the PLO to direct its attention toward the occupied territories. From this point on, the PLO would have to at least consider its inside constituency as a potential determinant of foreign policy role behavior. In addition, the 10th PNC (1972) provided the PLO with a mandate to positively adjust independent role behavior. This mandate also set the stage for the PLO's positive adoption and adjustment of the active independent role in the third phase of PLO foreign policy.

#### The 11th Palestine National Council

When the 11th PNC convened in January 1973, the PLO had expanded the number of National Council seats from 154 to 180. Membership in the PNC was distributed along the following representational lines: Fatah 33, the PFLP 12, the DFLP eight, al-Sa'iqah twelve, the ALF eight, the PFLP-GC three, and 95 seats for the independents (students, trade

unions, writers, and other professionals).

Even though the guerrillas held a combined total of 85 PNC seats compared to the 95 retained by the larger body of independents, the PLO still relied on consensus decisionmaking rather than majority rule in formulating its overall foreign policy output. Because the independents generally aligned themselves with one or another guerrilla organization, the PNC was able to reach consensus regarding broad foreign policy output. However, the outcome of bureaucratic interplay among the various guerrilla groups actually determined which role behaviors the PLO would apply in specific situations. The bureaucratic groups prevailed primarily because they held the majority of seats on the EXCOM and CC which, unlike the PNC, remained in permanent session.

Throughout this session, the 180 PNC members positively adjusted the tactical roles of visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, and regional subsystem collaborator. The PNCs negative support for pragmatic role behavior remained unchanged since the 10th PNC (1972). Strategically, the members positively adjusted the goal of total liberation alongside the establishment of a democratic state.

The visionary revolutionary liberator role received its highest bureaucratic adjustment to date with 10.9 positive endorsements. This is an increase of 8.4 articulations from

the previous session. Bureaucratic support for the defender of the faith role gained 3.4 positive adjustments, for a total of 4.7 endorsements, while support for regional subsystem collaborator increased by 0.2 for a total of 1.1.

The bureaucratic advocacy variable also positively adjusted its support for the strategic goal of total liberation by 1.1 endorsements for a sum of 2.7 articulations. This increase marks the highest positive adjustment in the strategic goal of total liberation since the 4th PNC (1968) by any independent variables employed in this study. A comparison of bureaucratic advocacy's role articulation for both tactical and strategic roles for each PNC throughout this phase is presented in Table 5.5.

The PLO intended to implement its adjusted tactical roles in accordance with the four principles embodied in the interim political program adopted by the members at the 11th PNC (1973). These principles included: (1) a return to visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior as the means to liberate Palestine; (2) the liberation of Jordan from King Hussein's rule; (3) increased regional subsystem collaboration with regional Arab actors hostile to imperialism, Zionism, and neo-colonialism; and (4) "solidarity" with international actors struggling against imperialism (IDP 1973 DOC 223).

In its longest political resolution to date, the 11th PNC (1973) attributed the rise in bureaucratic support for

visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior and the need for an interim political program to the presence of threats in the external environment that jeopardized the movement. To the PLO, the external "conspiracies" against the revolution consisted of the Rogers Plan, the UAK plan, imposed pragmatic behavior such as the Cairo (1970) and Amman Agreements, and the Israeli-sponsored West Bank municipal elections (IDP 1973 DOC 223).

The bureaucratic advocacy variable's increased support for the strategic goal of total liberation was in direct response to Sadat's attempt to impose goal redirection on the PLO. In a speech made before the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union on 28 September 1972, Sadat called upon the PLO to establish a Palestinian government-in-exile (IDP 1972 DOC 233). Sadat's proposal not only challenged the PLO's ability to exercise the independent role, it also signaled an external attempt to impose accommodationist behavior on the organization.

Both Fatah and the PFLP based their decision to reject Sadat's proposal on the idea that a government-in-exile would minimally require some form of recognition from its Arab neighbors. In exchange for that recognition, the PLO would be obliged to grant concessions that would force the organization to concede to externally imposed accommodationist role behavior. Moreover, the PLO acceptance of imposed accommodationist role behavior would

hinder the organization's ability to partially maintain independent role behavior.

According to Fatah, the establishment of a government-in-exile would further weaken the delicate internal unity that already existed within the organization. Any erosion of that unity could only make the PLO vulnerable to the reimposition of subservient role behavior on the part of the external environment. Moreover, for Arafat in particular, the idea of a government-in-exile triggered an alarm in which he reminisced about the now defunct All Government of Palestine established by the Arab League following the region's defeat in the 1948 first Arab-Israeli war.

The outcome of the 11th PNC (1973) demonstrated that the PLO adamantly refused to allow itself to become marginalized in the Arab arena, particularly regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The organization especially refused to follow the path of the All Government of Palestine and whither away into irrelevance. In an effort to counter external attempts aimed at "liquidating" the PLO, the bureaucratic groups temporarily reverted back to the tactical foreign policy behaviors that served the organization well during the late 1960s. Those foreign policy behaviors consisted of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent role behavior. While an escalation in visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior would suffice for the interim, the PLO required a

program of action to legitimately move the organization toward an internally initiated settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The PLO unveiled that program of action at the 12th PNC (1974) which marks the start of the third phase of PLO foreign policy.

### Conclusion

In sum, this chapter demonstrates that the bureaucratic advocacy and external shocks variables remained the primary determinants of PLO foreign policy role behavior throughout the second phase. In terms of the role modification model the PLO positively adopted and adjusted the roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent as the mainstay of its foreign policy output.

This chapter also demonstrates that despite the PLO's denunciation of pragmatic behavior prescribed in the revised 1968 National Charter, the organization was not adverse to the selective adaptation and positive adjustment of pragmatism for tactical gains, as the Lebanon case illustrated. Moreover, the civil war in Jordan also demonstrated that the PLO was not immune from the imposition of the pragmatic role by external actors regardless of what behaviors the Charter may have dictated.

In 1969, the PLO signaled its early ability to address foreign policy goal redirection beginning with the 5th PNC. During that session, the members endorsed the idea of

establishing a democratic "society" once armed struggle succeeded in liberating Palestine. The PDFLP expanded this idea at the 6th PNC (1969) when it formally introduced the idea of setting up a popular democratic state in liberated Palestine (IDP 1969 DOC 427). The notion of a democratic state remained a pervasive theme throughout subsequent PNCs in this phase.

The PLO also emphasized the theme of internal unity and adjusted its foreign policy role behavior accordingly. The organization's drive to implement independent role behavior also led the PLO to reject any form of accommodationist behavior that contained territorial compromise short of total liberation.

Chapter Six examines the third phase of PLO foreign policy role behavior. Throughout this phase the PLO positively adapted and adjusted the tactical role of active independent. The PLO also redirected the strategic side of foreign policy by gradually modifying the organization's goals.



Table 5.1

## RAW TOTALS FROM PNC RESOLUTIONS: 1ST PNC VERSUS 4TH PNC

Role	1st PNC	4th PNC
subserv	0	-3
visrevlib	0	+13
deffaith	+5	+22
regsubcol	+9	+4
independ	+3	+8
pragmatic	0	-4
totaliber	+1	+7

Source: International Documents on Palestine, 1968.

Table 5.2

YEARLY RAW TOTALS OF BUREAUCRATIC ADVOCACY AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS  
 ROLE ARTICULATION, 1967-1973

	67	67	68	68	69	69	70	70	71	71	72	72	73	73
Roles	BA	ES	BA	ES	BA	ES	BA	ES	BA	ES	BA	ES	BA	ES
visrevlib	09	71	116	31	109	28	168	77	146	49	27	04	60	00
deffaiith	03	31	69	26	82	15	158	60	87	52	19	17	26	00
regsubsys	01	06	18	03	39	01	48	16	20	04	08	01	06	00
independ	00	04	09	04	11	03	30	10	46	07	03	00	07	00
totlib	07	14	39	12	24	06	49	22	34	06	09	02	15	00

Note: All totals are positive unless otherwise indicated.

Table 5.3

**BUREAUCRATIC ROLE ARTICULATION:  
THE 5TH PNC (2/1969) VERSUS THE 6TH PNC (9/1969)**

<b>Role</b>	<b>5th PNC</b>	<b>6th PNC</b>	<b>Role Differences</b>
visrevlib	+4.0	+2.2	-1.8
deffaith	+3.3	+2.9	-0.4
regsubcol	+2.4	+0.7	-1.7
independ	+0.4	+0.2	-0.2

Source: International Documents on Palestine, 1969.

Table 5.4

**BUREAUCRATIC ADVOCACY AND LEADER-DRIVEN ROLE ARTICULATION:  
THE 6TH PNC (9/1969) VERSUS THE 7TH PNC (1970)**

	6th PNC		7th PNC	
	BA	LD	BA	LD
visrevlib	+2.2	0	+08.4	+4.5
deffaith	+4.7	0	+18.6	+3.8
regsubsys	+3.8	0	+04.7	+0.6
independ	+0.6	0	+01.2	+0.3
pragmatic	-1.2	0	-01.8	0.0
totlib	+0.6	0	+02.1	+0.6
secdemsta	+2.6	0	+00.3	+0.3

Source: International Documents on Palestine.

Table 5.5

DIFFERENCES IN BUREAUCRATIC ADVOCACY ROLE ARTICULATION:  
4TH PNC (1968) - 11TH PNC (1973)

Role	4th PNC	5th PNC	6th PNC	7th PNC	8th PNC	9th PNC	10th PNC	11th PNC
visrevlib	+08.7	+04.0	+02.2	+08.4	+07.4	+04.2	+02.5	+10.9
deffaith	+06.9	+03.3	+02.9	+11.4	+02.2	+01.5	+01.3	+04.7
regsubcol	+02.7	+02.4	+00.7	+02.9	+01.8	+00.4	+00.9	+01.1
independ	+01.3	+00.4	+00.2	+00.7	+02.7	+02.0	-	+01.3
pragmatic	-01.3	-00.7	-00.7	-01.1	-00.7	+00.2 -01.0	-00.5	+00.2 -00.5
accomodat	-	-00.2	-00.2	-	-	-00.2	-	-00.2
totlib	+05.6	+01.3	+00.4	+01.3	+01.6	+01.6	+00.2	+02.7
secdemsta	-	+00.2	+01.6	+00.2	+00.4	+00.2	+00.4	+00.4
twostatsol	-	-	-	-	-00.2	-	-00.4	-00.4

Source: International Documents on Palestine

## CHAPTER VI

### THE THIRD PHASE OF PLO FOREIGN POLICY: FROM INDEPENDENT TO ACTIVE INDEPENDENT

This chapter examines the third phase of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) foreign policy role behavior. The phase began with the 12th Palestine National Council (PNC) convened in 1974 and the PNC's official endorsement of a 10-point political program that laid the foundation for future PLO foreign policy role behavior. This phase concludes following the 15th PNC (1981) and the relocation of the PLO from its enclave in Beirut to its new headquarters in Tunis.

As noted in Chapter Two, due to nonavailability of consistent data, this study does not extend beyond 1981, after the 15th PNC. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 forced the PLO and its leadership to evacuate their organizational headquarters in Beirut. The PLO's departure was also accompanied by the Israeli government's closure of the Arab sponsored Palestine research center and academic press. This act brought to a halt the yearly compilation of consistently translated Arab and PLO documents. The absence of congruent data, therefore, precludes further analysis and comparison of the remaining PNCs after the 15th session

within the parameters of the role modification model advanced in this study.

The role modification model reveals that throughout the third phase the bureaucratic advocacy variable retained some influence in determining which roles the PLO articulated regarding its tactical and strategic foreign policy output. Notwithstanding bureaucratic advocacy's apparent advantage, however, content analysis of the documents attests to a gradual rise in the domestic restructuring variable as a strong determinant of actual PLO foreign policy role behavior and subsequent role redirection. Role articulation on the part of the leader-driven independent variable often reflected the growing influence of the domestic constituency on the formation of foreign policy output. During this time, the external shocks variable also remained a significant factor in shaping specific PLO foreign policy roles, particularly the active independent role.

During the third phase, the role modification model also demonstrates that one or more of the four independent variables acknowledged at least once the full range of tactical and strategic roles under investigation. However, during actual PNC sessions the PLO's articulation of positive or negative support for any one role generally remained the prerogative of bureaucratic advocacy.

Application of the role modification model indicates that the PLO sustained relatively positive support for: the

visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, and independent foreign policy tactical behaviors. While pragmatic role behavior often experienced a mixture of positive and negative adjustments, the organization generally restricted support for accommodationist foreign policy output to negative role behavior. The PLO also began to positively adjust the active independent role as part of its foreign policy program of action.

Furthermore, in the third phase, the PLO began to modify the strategic goal of total liberation at the 13th PNC (1977) when the endorsed resolutions failed to mention this goal. Afterwards, the PLO gradually began to utilize this role in a rhetorical manner. Bureaucratic advocacy and leader-driven support for this role rhetorically corresponded to threats or opportunities that either hindered or facilitated the attainment of the PLO's more immediate, strategic foreign policy goals.

Changes in the political environment leading up to the 12th PNC (1974) occurred in the aftermath of the 1973 October War, and the 1973 Algiers Arab Summit convened the following month. This led selected PLO bureaucratic circles, in combination with the environmental process variable comprised of external shocks and domestic restructuring, to push for a modification in PLO strategic foreign policy toward a "phased programme." By the 12th PNC



(1974), the organization had officially modified the strategic goal of a secular democratic state in all of Palestine by supplanting it with the concept of a national authority. Although somewhat ambiguous, the concept of a national authority embodied the establishment of Palestinian rule on any portion of occupied territory liberated from Israel. This modification is important because the concept of a national authority euphemistically set the stage for the PLO's eventual abandonment of total liberation in favor of strategic goal redirection toward a bi-national, or two-state solution.

#### The Effects of the 1973 October War

The aftermath of the 1973 October War produced a regional climate that favored political compromise rather than armed confrontation. In contrast to the Arab military defeat in the 1967 June War, the coordinated military efforts of Egypt and Syria in October 1973 scored a significant political victory for much of the Arab world. Egypt and Syria initiated the October War primarily to overcome the political deadlock surrounding the international community's failure to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Egypt and Syria anticipated that a limited war would restore Arab unity and allow them to recover portions of Israeli held territories as a bargaining chip in subsequent peace negotiations with the Jewish state

(Khouri 1976).

Even though Egypt and Syria's combined military efforts failed to liberate any portion of the Palestinian territories, their efforts restored a sense of self-respect lost as a result of the 1967 June War. This important psychological achievement was responsible for the PLO's renewal of the regional subsystem collaboration role along with the regional resurrection of Arab solidarity. In turn, this solidarity fostered the rise of a formidable leadership center that coalesced around a number of issues ranging from politics to economics. This center included both Sadat and Assad, who commanded the military and political reigns of power; Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who regulated the economic sphere which included the oil weapon; and Boumedienne of Algeria, who politically dominated the Arab Maghrib.

Because the October War also brought about a superpower commitment to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sadat believed that the Nixon administration was prepared to bring a more balanced approach to the region's problems than earlier U.S. administrations. Capitalizing on his rejuvenated prestige and credibility, Sadat seized the opportunity and pressed for an international peace conference that would include PLO participation.

To maintain the political momentum that emerged following the October War, Sadat began to champion

region-wide accommodationist behavior as part of an interim strategy to effect a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much of the Arab world extended its support to Sadat's accommodationist scheme one month following the 1973 October War. This occurred when the Sixth Arab Summit convened at Algiers in November 1973. At Algiers, the Arab leaders officially endorsed an interim, or phased, regional strategy for peace based on specific goals.

In defining their minimum requirements for peace, the summit members present at Algiers insisted on (1) Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories, including Jerusalem; and (2) the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people (IDP 1973 DOC 333). These minimum conditions are significant because prior to the 1973 Algiers Summit, the Arab world remained firmly committed to the Khartoum Summit resolutions adopted shortly after the 1967 June War. At Khartoum, the Arab heads of state proclaimed what came to be known as the three "nos"--no peace with Israel; no recognition of Israel; and no negotiations with Israel. In effect, the resolutions endorsed at Algiers abrogated the decisions taken at the Khartoum summit. Moreover, the Algiers Summit essentially gave Sadat permission to compromise and to commence the peace negotiation process with Israel on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 (IDP 1973 DOC 412).

The Algiers Summit also provided the PLO with a

significant tactical foreign policy opportunity when the members in attendance adopted the following resolution:

the commitment to the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people in conformity with the decisions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the *sole* [italics added] representative of the Palestinian people. (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has reservations about this paragraph.) (IDP 1973 DOC 332).

The Algiers Summit's endorsement of the PLO as "*sole* [emphasis added] representative of the Palestinian people" basically provided the PLO an opportunity to adapt and positively adjust the active independent role at the 12th PNC (1974). Notwithstanding Jordan's reservation, the external shocks variable demonstrated at the Algiers Summit that the PLO could now minimally speak for the Palestinians in the upcoming peace conventions tentatively scheduled to reconvene at Geneva.

Sadat was cognizant of the fact that the PLO's participation at Geneva would presuppose the organization's positive adaptation and adjustment of accommodationist role behavior. In an effort to persuade the PLO to accept accommodation, Sadat directed his compromise arrow toward the moderate leadership of Fatah. In addition to relying on Fatah's prudent leaders, Sadat had hoped that Fatah's sheer numerical advantage within the PLO could pressure the remaining factions and facilitate the organization's acceptance of political compromise.

The Fatah leadership was astutely aware that the 1973

October War had created a new political reality in the region that favored accommodation. This reality created a major dilemma for Fatah regarding the PLO's tactical and strategic foreign policy role behavior. The problem centered around how to positively adapt and adjust accommodation that required compromise, based on the PLO's "present right" to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the Palestinian masses without organizationally compromising the Palestinians' "historic right" that demanded total liberation. Fatah understood that the price of rejecting a political opportunity could signify a possible loss of Egyptian, Syrian, and Soviet Union support. At the international level, it was the Soviet Union who promoted the idea of PLO participation at Geneva in order to achieve a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Fatah was also attentive to the fact that bureaucratic consensus for externally directed accommodation would be difficult to attain owing to the presence of the left-wing extremists committed to the tactical role of visionary revolutionary liberator and vehemently opposed to tactical accommodation.

A potential solution to this dilemma occurred when the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) shifted the focus on tactical accommodation to the strategic end of foreign policy role behavior. In what essentially amounted to a reality check regarding attainable

strategic ends, the PDFLP again proved to be a leading proponent of foreign policy goal redirection when it called for the establishment of a "national authority" in any portion of the occupied territories liberated from Israel (IPD 1974 DOC 217). In a speech marking the fifth anniversary of the PDFLP's founding, the PDFLP's Secretary-General Hawatma noted:

The struggle for the right to self-determination, for wresting the occupied territories from occupation and for establishing a national authority therein are gains won by all the Palestinians who belong to a single people.

This national authority would make it possible for our masses in Lebanon and Syria to consolidate, organize and fortify the struggle to return to their homeland and further to wage a long war of national liberation until the imperialist, Zionist entity is finally defeated, no matter how long this takes (IDP 1974 DOC 217).

Hawatma's speech is significant on two counts. First, it indicated selective bureaucratic awareness of the PLO's need to positively adapt accommodationist behavior to achieve short-term political gains on the road to a democratic state in all of Palestine. In other words, Hawatma reasoned that the PLO should accept a partial, territorial solution while the political environment remained opportunistic. The PLO could then progress toward its long-term goals of total liberation and a secular democratic state following the establishment of the PLO's governmental authority over any portion of Palestinian territory. Second, because Hawatma preserved the option of

armed struggle and the long-term goal of total liberation while simultaneously calling for a short-term strategic foreign policy compromise, the potential for bureaucratic consensus between the Fatah-led moderates and the left-wing extremists remained feasible.

The left-wing extremists comprised chiefly of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), were not eager to compromise. In pre-PNC debates, the extremist groups contended that acceptance of a "partial Palestinian state" would only signify tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist. Moreover, the extremists collectively argued that a partial territorial solution threatened to deter the PLO from accomplishing its eventual goal of a democratic state in all of Palestine (Glubb 1974).

Unlike Fatah, the PFLP did not accept the distinction between Palestinian historic rights and present rights. Regardless of the foreign policy opportunity the environment may have provided, the PFLP did not regard Egypt's attempt to impose tactical accommodation as a major organizational dilemma because it simply rejected any positive adaptation of this role in lieu of armed struggle. Consequently, because the PFLP remained committed to working within the organizational framework of the PLO to advocate its ideological position, bureaucratic consensus over tactical

and strategic foreign policy output still seemed possible.

On the eve of the 12th PNC (1974), the bureaucratic groups reached a tentative consensus around a 10-point political program that reflected internal compromise on the PLO's tactical and strategic foreign policy output. Whether the consensus would hold in order to secure the required unanimous vote within the PNC depended on the final wording of certain key points in the overall political program.

#### The 12th Palestine National Council

When the 12th PNC (1974) convened in Cairo, the balance of power among the various guerrilla organizations remained relatively unchanged since the 11th PNC (1973) despite the addition of seven new seats in the National Council. Of the 187 total seats, the PNC assigned eight to recently expelled leaders from the West Bank who were members of the nascent Palestine National Front (PNF). The expellees joined the ranks of the PNC as independents. As independents they endorsed the political agenda of the PNF whose principle objectives included (1) the liberation of the occupied territories and (2) safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people (IDP 1973 DOC 264)

Organizationally, the PNC expanded membership in the EXCOM from the then current nine to 14 seats. Included in this total were three domestic constituency representatives, signifying the PLO's awareness of the occupied territory's



growing influence on foreign policy; two members from Fatah, including Arafat as chairman; four independents; and one member from each of the following guerrilla groups: the PFLP, the ALF, the PDFLP, and the PFLP-GC. This session marks the first time the PFLP-GC gained membership in the EXCOM--a move that consequently fortified the left-wing extremist position (Shemesh 1988).

Politically, the PNC officially endorsed the PLO's sustained positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, and active independent tactical roles as foreign policy output. Although the PNC extended conditional support for the PLO's positive and negative adjustment of pragmatic role behavior, it continued to relegate the organization only to negative adjustments of the accommodationist role as foreign policy output.

On the strategic end, the PNC maintained positive support for the PLO's long-term goal of total liberation and the eventual establishment of a secular democratic state. The PNC also endorsed the adaptation and positive adjustment of the PLO's goal to establish a national authority as part of the organization's interim foreign policy strategy.

The PNC's endorsement of the above mentioned tactical roles and strategic goals as PLO foreign policy output is embodied in the 10-point political program officially approved by the members at the 12th PNC (1974). This

political program is significant because it represents a bureaucratic compromise reached between the PLO's left-wing extremists and the moderates on the eve of the 12th session. Because no one particular group was able to completely impose its ideological policy position, it took nearly seven months of pre-PNC debates and meetings before the guerrilla groups could hammer out a compromise accord prior to convening the 12th PNC (Gresch 1983).

The guerrilla groups ability to forge any type of compromise in the absence of Fatah's characteristic cry for internal unity is noteworthy. Fatah's sudden focus on regional accommodation at the expense of internal unity eventually proved that compromise to be precarious. However frail this compromise might have been, it nevertheless had a considerable impact on the bureaucratic advocacy variable's role articulation during the 12th PNC (see Table 6.1).

The visionary revolutionary liberator role experienced a precipitous drop of 8.7 bureaucratic endorsements since the 11th PNC (1973) when sponsorship for this role stood at 10.7--the highest amount accorded this role since the PNC convened its first session in 1964. In contrast, the bureaucratic advocacy variable's scant 2.0 positive support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role at the 12th PNC, represents the lowest score attributed to this role by the guerrilla groups since the 4th PNC (1968), when they first participated in the decision structure of the PNC.

In the second clause of the 10-point political program, the PNC endorsed the PLO's redefined use of visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior.

The PLO will struggle by every means, the *foremost* [italics added] of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and establish the people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated (IDP 1974 DOC 246).

The PLO/Fatah leadership's interest in projecting a moderate foreign policy in order to capitalize on the opportunistic political environment following the 1973 October War, partially accounts for the bureaucratic advocacy variable's decreased support for visionary revolutionary role behavior. Speculation suggests, however, that because the PLO did not positively adapt and adjust the accommodationist role to accompany the decline in armed struggle, the PLO's interest in projecting moderation does not offer an exclusive explanation for the drastic drop in visionary revolutionary role behavior.

The host of pre-PNC discussions between the Fatah dominated moderates and the PFLP led extremist groups that preceded the 12th PNC (1974), suggests that the bureaucratic advocacy variable's reduced support for this role represents a major concession yielded by the PFLP in exchange for PLO/Fatah's sustained negative adjustments in accommodationist role behavior. This proposition rests on the observation that, since its founding, the PFLP has

remained ideologically consistent in its commitment to armed struggle as the exclusive means to total liberation.

Content analysis of the relevant documents issued in the months before and after the 12th session corroborate the assertion that the PFLP acquiesced on reducing bureaucratic support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role at the 12th PNC (1974).

On 26 September 1974, within three months of convening the 12th session, the PFLP officially withdrew its representative member, Ahmad Yamani, from the PLO's EXCOM. Habash based his decision to extricate the PFLP from the EXCOM's leader-delegate decision structure owing to the PLO's lack of commitment to revolutionary struggle under the present Fatah-dominated leadership. Habash cited the PLO/Fatah's willingness to accept a piecemeal political settlement short of the total liberation of Palestine as an additional reason for the PFLP's withdrawal. According to Habash, the PLO/Fatah acceptance of any partial settlement not only represented a deviation from the 1968 National Charter, but threatened to "liquidate" the entire Palestinian national movement by acquiescing to surrenderist solutions (IDP 1974 DOC 290).

Following the PFLP's departure from the EXCOM in September, bureaucratic articulation of the visionary revolutionary liberator role in the 28 months preceding the 13th PNC (1977) remained substantially low and, in some

cases, negatively adjusted. This stands in sharp contrast to the strong, positive support that the bureaucratic advocacy variable attributed to this role in the months between the 4th PNC (1968) and 12th PNC (1974) when the PFLP's presence in the EXCOM remained intact. As a point of reminder, unlike the PNC, the EXCOM sits in permanent session. In the course of conducting the day-to-day affairs of the PLO, the EXCOM issues policy statements that often signal the organization's position on any number of foreign policy roles. The physical absence or presence of the PFLP is apparent when the ideological context of relevant EXCOM documents is analyzed.

Additionally, in tendering an explanation for the bureaucratic advocacy variable's reduced support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role at the 12th PNC (1974), a definitional comparison of the PLO's application of this role suggests that the role's relative decline was not entirely intended to project foreign policy moderation. In the second clause of the 10-point political program, the PLO characterized its use of armed struggle as "foremost." This characterization does not appear to differ significantly from the change adopted at the 8th PNC (1971) when the PLO redefined its support for this role from "sole" to "principal." Even though the PNC endorsed this redefinition of the visionary revolutionary liberator role at the 8th PNC (1971), bureaucratic support during that

session still remained relatively high with 7.4 positive endorsements. Despite the synonymous use in terms between principal and foremost, the low 2.0 bureaucratic support registered for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior at the 12th PNC (1974) suggests that additional factors were instrumental in contributing to this role's decline that accompanied bureaucratic compromise. Those additional factors are found at both the external and internal level of analysis.

In contrast to the external accommodationist political environment that existed prior to the 12th PNC (1974), the external conditions that prefaced the 8th PNC (1971) were primarily threat-driven. Prior to convening the 8th session, the PLO had to contend with multiple external shocks that threatened the viability of the organization. These external shocks included: (1) the potential loss of Egyptian political and military support when Nasser announced Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan; (2) the civil war in Jordan between the PLO fedayeen and the Hashemite regime that threatened to severely weaken, if not annihilate, the PLO; (3) the external imposition of accommodationist role behavior by Egypt when it obliged the PLO to accept the 1970 Cairo and Amman Agreements; and, (4) the untimely death of Nasser in 1971 and the subsequent rise of pragmatic leadership in Egypt.

Despite the definitional change regarding the PLO's use

of armed struggle at the 8th PNC (1971), the presence of the above listed external threats sustained the bureaucratic advocacy variable's relatively high endorsement for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior.

Threat conditions also existed within the bureaucratic ranks of the PLO around the time of the 8th PNC (1971). As noted in the previous chapter, the threat to internal unity remained perilous as the various bureaucratic guerrilla groups held steadfast to their ideological convictions regarding tactical foreign policy output. Although Fatah was able to predominate over the events in Lebanon and enter into a pragmatic solution leading to the 1969 Cairo Agreement between PLO guerrillas and the Lebanese government, it was unable to pragmatically prevent the escalation of anti-PLO hostilities in Jordan and simultaneously maintain the internal integrity of the organization. However, Fatah was able to accept the relatively high support for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior at the 8th PNC (1971) because the modification in its use from sole to principal provided Fatah with ample room for political maneuverability.

Whereas the PLO convened the 8th PNC (1971) in a threat-driven environment, the 12th PNC (1974), in contrast, assembled amidst a regional and international environment that favored political accommodation discussed earlier in this chapter. Although Fatah might have preferred the PLO

to profit more from this environment by positively adjusting accommodationist role behavior, the left-wing extremists drew the proverbial line in the sand that obstructed Fatah from imposing its ideological position. In a probable *quid pro quo* with the PFLP, Fatah acquiesced on the issue of accommodationist role behavior and accepted negative support for this role in exchange for reduced bureaucratic support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role. Even though the PLO projected negative support for accommodation, both Egypt and Syria still remained supportive of the PLO's refusal to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis of negotiation. More importantly for Fatah, the decline in overall visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior would signal moderation on the part of the PLO more than specific accommodationist declarations.

In addition to bureaucratic endorsement of the visionary revolutionary liberator role, the domestic restructuring independent variable registered its official support for this and other roles at the 12th PNC (1974). This variable's support began shortly before the 12th session when the PLO's inside domestic constituency provided an opportunity for the PLO's adaptation and positive adjustment of active independent role behavior. Operating through the Palestine National Front (PNF), a political organization formed in the occupied West Bank on 15 August 1973, the PNF sent a letter to the EXCOM which



encouraged the PLO to participate at Geneva as their sole legitimate representative and work within an accommodationist framework by accepting the U.N. partition plan of 1947. At the start of the 12th PNC (1974), the West Bank constituency voiced its support for PLO role behavior in an official "message" to Arafat at the start of the 12th PNC (1974). In that message, the PNF rhetorically endorsed the PLO's use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role with 0.2 minimal endorsements compared to bureaucratic advocacy's 2.0 support for this role. The PNF's rhetorical support is evident in the 1.1 positive domestic restructuring support given to the defender of the faith role in comparison to bureaucratic advocacy's 2.0 endorsements.

The basic policy position of the PNF preferred the PLO to take a more diplomatic approach to resolving the issues at hand rather than relying mainly on revolutionary violence. Approaching the bureaucratic advocacy variable's 1.3 positive approval for the independent role, the PNF provided the PLO with 0.7 domestic restructuring support endorsements. Additionally, the PNF rejected the PLO's positive adjustment of accommodationist behavior with -0.4 negative pronouncements. This score closely matched the bureaucratic advocacy variable's total of -0.7 articulations.

Although the PNF's positive promotion of visionary

revolutionary liberator and independent tactical roles did not exceed the patronage supplied by bureaucratic advocacy, the PNF nevertheless surpassed bureaucratic support for the PLO's positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaborator role. Specifically, the PNF assigned the PLO 2.0 positive domestic restructuring articulations for use of the regional subsystem collaborator role, whereas bureaucratic support for this role witnessed a 0.3 decline from the 11th PNC (1973) for a total of 1.4 positive endorsements. The PNF indicated its preference for the PLO's positive adjustment in regional subsystem collaboration when it called upon the PLO to

make every effort to obtain Arab support for and commitment to the Palestinian programme of action, especially from Egypt and Syria, because of their geographical links with Palestinian territory and their direct influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict (IDP 1974 DOC 245).

On the strategic end of PLO foreign policy, the PNF rejected any possible return of the West Bank to Jordan. Instead, it advocated a two-state solution. The PNF's position at the 12th PNC (1974) is consistent with the group's strategic objectives detailed in the third clause of their political program issued shortly after its founding in 1973.

To reject all conspiracies aimed at liquidating the cause of our Palestinian Arab people and renouncing their rights, whether they are Zionist plans such as the Palestinian entity, the civil administration, autonomy and the Allon plan or King Hussein's plan, the American solutions or

similar settlements involving liquidation and surrender (IDP 1973 DOC 264).

The PNF's rejection of strategic confederationist schemes that had previously given Jordan a role in their political future also provided the PLO (Fatah in particular) with support for pragmatic role behavior. The PNF's emphasis on pragmatism stemmed from a number of factors, one of which was the reality of life and its hardships under the continuing Israeli military occupation. Another factor that contributed to the PNF's pragmatic approach was the absence of left-wing extremists from among their ranks (Sahliyah 1988). As long as the left-wing extremists remained within the decision structures of the PLO, however, pragmatic solutions, such as a bi-national state, would continue to be adamantly rejected. In contrast to the domestic constituency within the occupied territories, most of the members of the guerrilla organizations hailed from the diaspora whose familial homes were located inside the present State of Israel. Consequently, the left-wing extremists could not personally achieve any significant territorial victory from the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza (Cobban 1986).

The 12th PNC (1974) also marks the PNC's official inauguration of the active independent role. Even though the bureaucratic advocacy variable only assigned 0.5 positive support endorsements for this role, it was the

environmental process variable that remained primarily responsible for its positive adaption by the PNC. External shocks in combination with the domestic restructuring variable promoted the PLO's legitimate place to actively represent the Palestinian masses as part of the organization's phased approach. The PNF declared its support for the PLO's adoption and positive adjustment of the active independent role in its message to Arafat prior to the 12th PNC (1974). That message stated that the PLO is

the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be and which alone expressed their national will (IDP 1974 DOC 245).

The external shocks variable advanced the PLO's use of this role beginning with the November 1973 Algiers Arab Summit. Its primary use intended to include the PLO in regional peace negotiations. Sadat believed that the PLO's inclusion at the peace conference would hopefully lend credibility to the notion of Arab solidarity that would yield tangible results at the negotiating table. The PLO's application of this role, however, was to acquire greater significance in the inter-PNC years following the 12th session.

It took nearly three years for the PLO to convene the 13th PNC (1977). In the interim, the external environment that now influenced the direction of PLO role behavior gradually shifted from an opportunistic-laden environment to

that of threat-driven. In responding to this changing reality, the PLO had at its disposal the full range of tactical role options to adjust in either a positive or negative direction, depending on the political climate. The PLO also remained attentive to its constituency in the occupied territories and its increasing influence on foreign policy output. Additionally, the leader-driven variable assumed greater importance during the inter-PNC period as the main champion of the active independent role.

The October 1974 Rabat Arab Summit's wholehearted endorsement of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, facilitated the ascendancy of Arafat as the chief spokesman for the PLO. The erosion of bureaucratic advocacy after the withdrawal of the left-wing extremists from the EXCOM, coupled with the political activities of the PNF in the occupied West Bank paved the way for Arafat to promote a moderate approach for the attainment of Palestinian goals.

### The Inter-PNC Years

#### The Rise of the Active Independent Role

External support for the PLO's adoption of the active independent role began at the November 1973 Algiers Arab Summit when the members endorsed the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO's positive adjustment of this role at the 12th PNC (1974)

signaled a readiness on the part of the organization, in general, and Fatah in particular, to champion on the world stage the cause of the people it represented.

The initial reservation recorded by Jordan at Algiers centered around King Hussein's reluctance to allow the PLO to act as arbitrator on behalf of the West Bank Palestinians. Even though King Hussein still held territorial designs over the occupied West Bank, his misgivings about the PLO's adoption of the active independent role were more political than territorial. King Hussein realized that the PLO's active participation at Geneva precluded Jordan from representing the West Bank Palestinians at the peace table. Jordan needed a viable reason to take part at Geneva because their nonmilitary participation in the 1973 October War excluded the Hashemite regime from the subsequent disengagement agreements. In an effort to avoid being marginalized in the peace process in favor of the PLO, King Hussein acted upon the advice of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and sought an alliance with Sadat.

On 18 July 1974, Egypt and Jordan issued a joint communique which recognized the PLO as the *legitimate* [italics added] representative of the Palestinian people. Conspicuously absent from the communique was any reference to the PLO's sole representative status. The joint communique further noted that the PLO's active participation

at Geneva would only occur "at the appropriate time in affirmation of the Palestinians' right to self-determination" (IDP 1974 DOC 264). The implication behind the communique's use of the term legitimate representative in lieu of sole, was intended to (1) preclude the PLO's use of the active independent role and (2) ensure Jordan a seat at the negotiation table. Moreover, if King Hussein could regain even a portion of the occupied West Bank in the forthcoming peace talks, Jordan would be vindicated for its relative inactivity during the 1973 October War.

The PLO, however, was not about to relinquish its claim to the active independent role and its corresponding right to exclusively represent the Palestinian people. In an effort to secure its current role status, the EXCOM issued a statement posthaste that vehemently rejected the Egyptian-Jordanian joint communique and charged the proponents with reneging on the resolutions endorsed at the 1973 Algiers Arab Summit.

At the regional level, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia immediately issued statements extending their support to the EXCOM for its rejection of the joint communique (IDP 1974 DOCS 270 271 273 277). Among the PLO's domestic constituency in the occupied territories, the PNF registered the strongest support for the EXCOM's policy position on the joint communique. In its message to the EXCOM, the PNF also charged that Jordan's recent conduct directly opposed the

Palestinians' right to self-determination and their "aspirations for liberation." Moreover, the PNF openly disavowed Jordan's claim to represent the occupied territories and reaffirmed the PLO's right to speak on the Palestinians behalf as their sole, legitimate representative (IDP 1974 DOC 280).

Egypt quickly worked to temper the PLO's hardline position regarding its joint communique with Jordan by emphasizing the regional subsystem collaborator role. In a reversal of Egyptian policy, Sadat convened a "tripartite conference" in Cairo among Egypt, Syria, and the PLO to coordinate their views for presentation at the upcoming eighth Arab Summit scheduled to convene at Rabat. In addition to the PLO's objections, Egypt's sudden reversal occurred when the United States informed Sadat that Israel would not negotiate a separate disengagement treaty with Jordan as called for in the Egyptian-Jordanian joint communique.

This revelation, in combination with the Arab arena's sustained criticism of the joint communique, led Sadat to realize the futility of an Egyptian-Jordanian axis. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain Arab support as a means of furthering his strategic aims, Sadat was instrumental in rallying the Arab League to place the Palestinian cause as a separate item on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. This act served to reinforce the



PLO's continued positive use of the active independent role. In addition, at the request of the PLO, the Arab League also sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution that would allow the PLO to address this body during debate on the Palestine problem (Shemesh 1988). The Arab League's efforts resulted in the passage of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3210 on 14 October 1974, inviting the PLO to participate in the deliberations on the Palestinian question (IDP 1974 DOC 20). Resolution 3210 is significant because it reflects a major modification in PLO foreign policy toward pragmatic role behavior with its tilt toward the United Nations as a forum for the articulation of the PLO's political views.

Even though Jordan had earlier attempted to supercede the role of the PLO at the Geneva talks by cavorting with the Egyptian regime, King Hussein capitulated and supported the decision made during the 1974 October Arab Summit at Rabat which unanimously endorsed the PLO as the rightful spokesperson for all Palestinians. Resolution Two adopted at the Rabat Arab Summit affirmed:

The right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the *sole legitimate* [italics added] representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated (IDP 1974 DOC 308).

The PNF was also instrumental in gaining regional support for the PLO as their official spokesperson. In a petition signed by 180 West Bank notables and forwarded to

the Rabat Arab Summit, the PNF strongly endorsed the PLO's ability to exercise the active independent role when it declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

This endorsement from the environmental process variable marks a crucial foreign policy turning point for the PLO. In essence, the Arab League's decision adopted at Rabat, along with the support extended by the PNF, helped to equip the PLO's moderate leadership with an implied mandate to pursue diplomatic activities in accordance with the 12th PNC's (1974) phased strategic approach.

In addition to the opportunistic factors presented by the environmental process variable, the bureaucratic advocacy variable simplified Arafat's diplomatic agenda owing to the withdrawal of the PFLP from the EXCOM in September 1974. Shortly after the PFLP's departure, the PFLP-GC and the ALF emulated Habash and withdrew their respective representative member from the EXCOM in protest over the PLO's deviationist foreign policy under the direction of Arafat.

By the end of 1974, the PFLP, ALF, PFLP-GC, and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), had collectively succeeded in forming the Rejection Front. Based largely in Baghdad, the Rejection Front primarily functioned as both an internal and external check against Arafat and the remaining moderates from fully implementing pragmatic and

accommodationist foreign policy roles as a means of optimizing Fatah's phased approach.

Throughout its four year tenure, the various communiques and memorandam generated by the Rejection Front remained critical of the PLO's apparent willingness to negotiate an interim settlement based on a two-state solution. The Front argued strongly against this approach because it failed to take into consideration diaspora Palestinians whose homes and property remained inside Israel's 1948 Armistice lines (Cobban 1988).

Despite the presence of this formidable opposition, Arafat persisted in his pragmatic endeavors to promote the active independent role and to obtain international recognition of the Palestine question. On 13 November 1974, Arafat addressed the U.N. General Assembly during the separate debate on the question of Palestine. On that date, he delivered his famed olive branch and freedom fighter's speech. In that speech, Arafat unilaterally expressed support for the PLO's adoption and positive adjustment of pragmatic and accommodationist tactical foreign policy roles. The PLO chairman cautiously refrained from promoting the application of "political and diplomatic struggle" as successors to the visionary revolutionary liberator role. Instead, Arafat noted that the PLO had matured enough to "accommodate political and social struggle in addition to armed struggle." Regardless of the function still accorded

to armed struggle, Arafat's message indicated a major modification in PLO tactical role behavior. From this point on, the PLO would situationally renounce the positive use of pragmatic and accommodationist role behaviors as opposed to their earlier practice of altogether rejecting their positive application.

Strategically, Arafat's speech confined the PLO's immediate goal to the establishment of a national authority on liberated Palestinian territory. The PLO chairman declared that the national authority would be democratic in nature without specifically mentioning the term "state". In concluding his lengthy presentation with the caveat "do not let the olive branch fall from my hand," Arafat intimated that the PLO's positive or negative use of the visionary revolutionary liberator, pragmatic, and accommodationist foreign policy tactical roles would depend on feedback received by the organization from the external environment.

The result of Arafat's speech led the twenty-ninth session of the U.N. General Assembly to adopt resolutions 3236 and 3237. Resolution 3236, passed 89-8, with 37 abstentions, recognizing the political rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and political sovereignty. It also decided to place the Palestine question on the General Assembly's provisional agenda at its thirtieth session (UN DOC A/RES/3236 XXIX). Resolution 3237, passed 95-17 with 19 abstentions, granting to the PLO

United Nations observer status and the license to participate in all activities convened under the umbrella of the General Assembly (UN DOC A/RES3237 XXIX).

In the aftermath of both the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit and Arafat's address to the U.N. General Assembly, offers to open PLO representative offices poured in from various Third World and socialist countries. During the remainder of 1974 and throughout most of 1975, Arafat capitalized on the political environment and carried his diplomatic message throughout the international community in his capacity as chairman of the PLO. By the fall of 1975, however, the regional political environment had begun to deteriorate from its exclusive opportunistic-laden climate to that of threat-driven.

On 1 September 1975, Egypt and Israel concluded an interim agreement on the re-deployment of forces in the Sinai (Sinai II). Even though the Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement was not a final peace accord, the United States had intended the agreement to act as a catalyst for resuming the stalled Geneva peace talks. In order to ensure Israeli compliance with the interim agreement, the United States agreed not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless the organization accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Although Arafat still held the diplomatic mantle, he could not unilaterally accept the Egyptian-Israeli interim

agreement as a step toward peace, nor could he deliver the PLO's acceptance of 242 and 338 as a basis for the PLO's participation at Geneva without the endorsement of the PNC. Arafat's inability to impose the leader-driven variable as a determinant of accommodationist PLO foreign policy is found in a press interview given by the chairman shortly after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement. In the text of that interview, Arafat acknowledged, *inter alia*, that he was bureaucratically constrained from taking unilateral action (IDP 1975 DOC 302). Fierce opposition to the interim agreement and the U.S. assurances to Israel were voiced by the Rejection Front, whose members still maintained their representative seats in the PNC. Arafat's own guerrilla organization, Fatah, also expressed its condemnation of the agreement.

Role articulation during September 1975, registered the PLO's official response to the Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement. Specifically, Arafat articulated 3.3 positive leader-driven endorsements for the visionary revolutionary liberator role--the highest score on the part of the leader since the start of the third phase--the 12th PNC (1974). Bureaucratic advocacy increased its support for this role with 2.5 positive endorsements which signaled an internal rise in the articulation of this role from the previous session.

For the first time since the 12th PNC (1974), Arafat

assigned negative support for pragmatic role behavior with -0.5 leader-driven articulations. Interestingly enough, only the bureaucratic advocacy variable expressed support for the strategic aspect of PLO foreign policy. The bureaucratic advocacy variable assigned the goal of total liberation with 0.5 positive endorsements in response to this threat.

In the Fall 1975, the external environment delivered a threat to the PLO. This occurred when Israel announced its intention to conduct West Bank municipal elections in the spring of 1976. Israel's decision to hold elections was probably intended to curb the momentum that exploded at the local level in response to the PLO's political achievements at Rabat and the United Nations (Sahliyah 1988).

As a counter to the nationalist sentiment expressed for the PLO inside the occupied West Bank, Israel began to show a liberal side to its occupation role. The Israeli government attempted to project their alleged liberalism through an autonomous civil administration scheme. This scheme, proposed by Israel's defense minister Shimon Peres, was purposely designed to deflect West Bank support away from the PLO's active independent role by preoccupying the municipal leaders with administrative activities (Sahliyah 1988).

Even though the West Bank's urban elite openly demonstrated its pro-Palestinian nationalist sentiments

alongside its strong support for the PLO, the organization's leadership remained cautiously optimistic that the upcoming elections would indeed secure political office for partisan PLO politicians. In contrast to the guarded optimism retained by the moderates, the Rejection Front absolutely opposed the idea of municipal elections and counseled both candidates and voters against participation (Sahliyah 1988). In a memorandum issued in response to Israel's announcement, the PFLP reaffirmed its rejection of political accommodation based on partial solutions. Habash stated that:

There can be absolutely no question of accepting the principle of elections being held under Israeli military rule, and to accept the elections at this stage, when capitulationist solutions have reached the point where the Sinai agreement has been concluded, is to accept the occupation and the enemy's project for Arab-Israeli coexistence (IDP 1975 DOC 316).

Despite the admonition by the Rejection Front, the inhabitants of the West Bank participated and pro-PLO candidates placed themselves on the ballot. The results of the 1976 West Bank elections brought to power a new circle of pro-PLO municipal leaders who were younger and educated in a number of the professions. The chief effect of this new pro-PLO leadership on PLO foreign policy was their sustained endorsement of an independent West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state. Consequently, the driving determinant for PLO goal redirection toward a two-state solution began with the West Bank constituency in 1976 (Sahliyah 1988).



Throughout the inter-PNC years, events in Lebanon also contributed an additional threat to the PLO when civil war erupted in April 1975. The chief protagonists to the conflict consisted of the Maronite Christian-dominated right that fought to maintain the political, social, and economic status quo and various left-wing forces that comprised the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), aligned with the Palestinian resistance, who sought to change the existing political balance of power. Despite Arafat's long-standing policy of maintaining the PLO's non-interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs in accordance with the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the deteriorating Lebanese confessional system drew the Palestinian resistance into the numerous rounds of in-fighting that eventually forced Syria's hand against the LNM and the PLO.

On the eve of what appeared to be a LNM and Palestinian victory that threatened to fracture the Lebanese state, Syria launched a full-scale intervention on 1 June 1976 to suppress the military advances made by the LNM and the Palestinian Resistance. Syria's chief motive for striking at both the LNM and the Palestinians was designed to preclude a LNM victory which would have triggered direct Israeli military intervention on the side of the Maronites. Even though Syria's intervention deferred the likelihood of an Israeli invasion at this stage, Assad would have to curb the PLO's use of the visionary revolutionary liberator and

independent role activities to avoid providing Israel with a viable pretext for future intervention. To safeguard its national interests, Syria found it necessary to restrain the PLO's visionary revolutionary liberator and independent activities in Lebanon by imposing upon the PLO the regional subsystem collaborator and pragmatic roles.

Furthermore, Syria would secure the PLO's compliance with the regional subsystem collaborator and pragmatic roles owing to the direct involvement of the Arab League. Assad understandably knew that the PLO would be compelled to abide by the decisions of the Arab League owing to the League's support of the PLO at both the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab summits. Additionally, Assad ostensibly understood that the PLO/Fatah leadership would be reluctant to dismiss any decisions made by the League at this time because Arafat was pragmatically lobbying for the PLO's admittance into this body as a full member.

In an extraordinary session of the Arab League, the ministers called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and endorsed the formation of a "symbolic" Arab security force to preserve security and stability in Lebanon. In addition, the ministers preserved the Arab League's support for the PLO with their resolve to:

affirm Arab commitment to support the Palestine revolution and to protect it from all dangers, and to ensure that it is provided with everything that can increase its strength and effectiveness (IDP 1976 DOC 260).

On 21 June 1976, the first units of the joint Arab peace-keeping force arrived in Beirut. On the same day a PLO delegation arrived in Damascus to hammer out an accord with Assad regulating the PLO's activities in Lebanon. This delegation consisted of five members of the EXCOM, two representatives from Fatah, and one each from the DFLP and the PFLP-GC. The outcome of the talks between Syria and the PLO resulted in the Damascus Agreement issued on 29 July 1976.

The provisions of the Damascus Agreement regarding Lebanese-Palestinian relations rested on (1) the Syrian working paper of 14 February 1976 concluded between Assad and former Lebanese president Franjieh whereby Syria would act as guarantor of the PLO's adherence to the 1969 Cairo Agreement; and (2) the existing 1969 Cairo Agreement and all its provisions (IDP 1976 DOC 280). The Damascus Agreement also contained several points not publicly disclosed. Among these points, the PLO agreed (1) not to demand that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon; (2) to cease its propaganda campaign against Syria; and (3) to seek Syrian approval for all measures taken by the Resistance (Odeh 1985).

Although Assad believed that he had secured the PLO's acceptance of regional subsystem collaboration, bureaucratic role articulation suggests otherwise. Content analysis of the relevant documents issued in response to the Damascus

Agreement do not evidence a rise in the regional subsystem collaborator role; instead, they indicate an increase in bureaucratic support for the rhetorical defender of the faith role. Moreover, monthly bureaucratic support for the regional subsystem collaborator role remained positively fixed at 0.2 since December 1975. The PLO would rhetorically declare its support for the regional subsystem collaborator role to placate Syria while it pursued independent role behavior in Lebanon based on the tenets of the 1969 Cairo Agreement that granted the organization limited freedom of action.

Beginning in August 1976, the PLO's support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role began to increase slightly (0.7) compared to July when bureaucratic support for this role was nonexistent. Bureaucratic support for this role started to climb when the forces of the Lebanese right began their siege on the Tal al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut despite the Arab League's call for a ceasefire and the presence of the joint Arab peace-keeping forces.

During the first week of August, the Maronite forces began their assault on the Chouf Mountain region, southeast of Beirut. Having conquered Nabah on 4 August, the Maronite forces began concentrating their efforts to launch a major assault on Tal al-Zaatar. The PLO's appeal to Syria to implement the Damascus Agreement and prevent the fall of Tal

Al-Zaatar proved futile. It remained in Syria's interest to militarily weaken the forces of the LNM, including the PLO, and bring about the collapse of the Palestinian camp that threatened the security of the Maronite forces in Beirut. On 12 August 1976, the Tal al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp fell to the Maronite militiamen after a 52-day siege. On 28 August, the PLO announced the general conscription of all Palestinians (IDP 1976 APPENDIX G).

On 6 September 1976, the PLO was granted full membership status in the Arab League. This act reinforced the PLO's legitimate right to exercise the active independent role by engaging in negotiations at Arab League sessions. The PLO positively adjusted this role in October 1976 when the organization participated at a mini Arab League Summit convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to discuss the continuing crisis in Lebanon. Present at the mini-summit were representatives from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, the PLO, Kuwait, and Egypt.

Among the resolutions endorsed at the Riyadh mini-summit, the six participating members elected to increase the present Arab peace-keeping forces by 30,000 joint troops as a means of effecting a viable deterrent force. The Riyadh mini-summit also reaffirmed the PLO's right to implement independent role behavior and conduct its struggle for liberation from Lebanese territory according to the 1969 Cairo Agreement. However, the mini-summit removed Syria as

the guarantor of PLO pragmatic behavior specified in the Damascus Agreement. The PLO's adherence to the 1969 Cairo Agreement was now the responsibility of the attending members at Riyadh (IDP 1976 DOC 306). On 26 October, the eighth Arab Summit, still in session at Cairo, endorsed the resolutions reached at Riyadh and reiterated its support for the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (IDP 1976 DOC 314).

On 21 December 1976, Egypt and Syria announced the formation of a unified political command that openly supported the PLO's exclusive right to independently conduct its affairs from Lebanon. In response, the decision making process variable, comprised of the leader-driven and bureaucratic advocacy independent variables, echoed strong positive support for the visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, and pragmatic role behaviors. The PLO would promote Arab solidarity and positively adjust the regional subsystem collaborator role only on its own internal initiative. This also applied to the pragmatic role, which received strong decision making process support following the announcement of the Egyptian-Syrian political front.

#### Pre-13th PNC (1977) Political Arrangements

Following the Cairo Summit, Fatah began preparations for convening the 13th session of the PNC. Despite the

series of external threats inflicted on the PLO in the inter-PNC years, Fatah moderates wanted to capitalize on the recent political opportunity provided by the extraordinary Arab summit at Cairo along with the Egyptian-Syrian political front's recent endorsement of the PLO's legitimate right to positively adjust the independent and active independent roles.

In a preparatory meeting preceding the 13th PNC (1977), the EXCOM reaffirmed the PLO's use of the active independent role when it formulated its negotiating position toward the stalled Geneva talks should the newly elected Carter administration push for a resumption of the peace conference. The PLO's minimum conditions for participation demanded that: (1) the PLO must be invited; (2) the PLO should attend as an independent delegation; (3) the PLO should attend the conference from the start; (4) Palestine should be a separate item on the agenda; (5) the PLO acceptance of an invitation to participate must be on the basis of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3236; and (6) the major powers must provide basic guarantees for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in any portion of the occupied territory from which Israel withdraws (Cobban 1984).

Operating primarily through Al-Saiqa, Syria outlined its position on a number of tactical and strategic roles it wanted endorsed at the 13th session. Tactically, Syria

called for an increase in the PLO's regional subsystem collaborator role through the formation of a strategic alliance between Syria and the PLO, and improved PLO relations with Jordan. Syria also advocated an increase in the PLO's positive support for the pragmatic role and strategically endorsed the idea of an independent Palestinian state. In order to effect these role behaviors, Syria pressed for a change in the composition of the PNC. In addition to calling for more pro-Jordanian, pro-Syrian, and occupied territory delegates, Assad wanted to end all guerrilla representation within the PNC. However, when the 13th PNC convened in Cairo in March 1977, the enlarged PNC reflected Fatah's political astuteness and renewed cooperation between the members of the PLO's Rejection Front, rather than accede to Syrian pressures (Brynen 1988).

#### The 13th Palestine National Council

The 13th PNC (1977) convened following the longest interim between national council sessions since the 1st PNC convened in 1964. Organizationally, the PLO's Central Council (CC) beforehand approved to enlarge membership in the national council by 106, for a total of 293 seats. Because Fatah intended PNC membership to represent the whole of the diaspora Palestinians, the 13th PNC appeared far more representational in scope than previous national councils sessions. Some 60 new recruits hailed from a host of



countries including the Soviet Union, the Ivory Coast, Cuba, and Cyprus. Additional delegates arrived from the Gulf states and five new members represented Palestinians residing inside the Israeli state.

Procedurally, the 13th PNC (1977) set a precedent during the session's first order of business when the president of the national council was elected by secret ballot rather than by open voting. This act marked the introduction of democratic procedures within the legislative decision making body of the PNC. Fatah's motivation for introducing a democratic approach exclusively within the PNC was designed to achieve a majority coalition of votes on certain key issues rather than the usual method of strict consensus that required broad unanimity. In relaxing the need for consensus, Fatah could explicitly present its agenda for PLO role direction rather than cloud its objectives in ambiguous terms. Furthermore, the limited initiation of democratization at the 13th PNC (1977) eased the transition for the PLO's full-scale expansion of democratic methods within all three of its decision structures at the 17th PNC (1984).

In its first act of procedural democracy, the PNC re-elected Khaled Fahoum president of the PNC by 172 votes. His opponent received 69 votes. Fahoum's opposition votes came from Fatah who voiced their dissatisfaction with Fahoum's pro-Syrian position (MEI May 1977).

Fatah believed it could count on a substantial majority of council votes to endorse its proposed political resolutions backed by a majority line-up, which included Al-Saiqa, the DFLP, most of the PFLP-GC, and almost all of the independents. Any opposition that Fatah might encounter would come from the members of the Rejection Front minus a large portion of the PFLP-GC that moved over to the majority camp. Aside from a handful of PFLP-GC members who remained with Habash, Jibril's decision to return the PFLP-GC to the EXCOM weakened the Rejection Front's ability to mount a strong opposition against Fatah.

Missing from the 13th PNC (1977) was the usual atmosphere of bureaucratic squabble on substantive issues. Debate at the 13th session remained practical owing in part to the EXCOM and Central Council's (CC) preparatory meetings that removed any contentious items from the PNC's agenda. In addition, the lack of bureaucratic disagreement during this session demonstrated the PFLP's commitment to working within the organizational structure of the PLO. Although Habash did not return to the EXCOM at this session, his group did participate in the national council. Moreover, on 30 March 1976, Arafat and Habash announced from Beirut that they had reconciled their differences. This date is significant because it marks the first anniversary of the "Day of the Land" proclamation by the West Bank. On this date, the PLO's domestic constituency inside the Israeli

state and in the occupied territories held a general strike to protest the Israeli government's confiscation of lands in Galilee (IDP 1976 DOC 223).

The final vote for adoption of the PLO's political program was 194 in favor, and 13 against, with the opposing votes cast by the PFLP. The short notice given for holding the 13th session and the relative global scope of the PNC, accounts for the huge discrepancy in the total number of votes cast (207) versus the total number of PNC delegates (289). Many of the delegates simply had to leave because they were unable to find hotel accommodations or a local available seat on a flight leaving Cairo (MEI May 1977).

The 194 PNC members who cast a favorable vote, endorsed the PLO's adoption of a 15-point political program that reiterated many of the points adopted during the 12th PNC (1974) when pre-PNC bureaucratic debates were particularly acrid. On the tactical side of PLO foreign policy role behavior, the members voted to endorse the organization's continued positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, and active independent role behaviors. The PNC sustained its hands-down negative rejection against the PLO's positive adjustment of the accommodationist foreign policy role, but conditionally accepted both positive and negative pragmatic role behavior.

The 13th PNC (1977) marks the first time the PLO did

not refer to the goal of total liberation in any of the strategic points listed in the political program. The PLO modified its strategic foreign policy goals when it replaced total liberation and the euphemistic national authority scheme with the concrete strategic goal of an independent Palestinian *state* [italics added]. However, the PLO remained ambiguous as to the location of the future state. Resolution 11 of the 15-point political program stated:

The Palestine National Council resolves to continue the struggle to recover the national rights of our people, first and foremost, its right to return and self-determination, and to establish its independent state on the soil of its homeland (IDP 1977 DOC 229).

Despite the PLO's overt articulation of an independent state as the organization's primary strategic goal, bureaucratic advocacy registered a modicum 0.9 positive endorsements for goal redirection compared to the 0.7 articulations conferred on the national authority scheme endorsed at the 12th PNC (1974). The PLO's equivocation over the future site of the independent state accounts for the minimal increase in bureaucratic advocacy's support for strategic goal redirection compared to the previous session. Even though the strategic change endorsed at the 12th PNC (1974) remained ambiguous regarding the form of government the national authority would adopt, the PLO had included its territorial claim to the occupied territories as part of the scheme.

Territorial definition accorded the concept greater political significance which bureaucratic advocacy demonstrated in its articulation of goal support. Conjecture suggests that had the PLO attached a similar territorial claim to the newly articulated goal of an independent state, the domestic restructuring variable might have contributed positive goal endorsements that complemented bureaucratic advocacy's positive support. This observation is based on the existence of the Day of the Land proclamation issued by the West Bank after four months of popular uprisings in protest over Israel's confiscation of Galilean lands. Moreover, the proclamation recognizes the Palestinians' territorial attachment to their national soil, particularly the occupied territories (IDP 1976 DOC 223).

Bureaucratic advocacy's positive support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role escalated to 10.4 endorsements for an increase of 7.4 positive adjustments from the previous session. Table 6.2 presents a comparison of the 12th and 13th PNC role articulations. The 7.4 positive increase represents the highest positive adjustment of this behavior since the 4th PNC (1968). The addition of Palestinian delegates from the East Bank (Jordan) and the Gulf states primarily accounts for the sharp rise in bureaucratic advocacy's support for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior. These new independent members were not exclusively rhetorical in their extreme militant and

anti-Syrian viewpoints. The non-rhetorical nature of their support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role is demonstrated in bureaucratic advocacy's 5.3 positive support endorsements for the defender of the faith role compared to their 10.4 pronouncements supporting the visionary revolutionary liberator role. This stands in contrast to the 12th PNC (1974) which accorded the visionary revolutionary liberator and defender of the faith roles the same 2.0 positive support articulations.

On the surface, it appeared that the ideological views of the East Bank and Gulf PNC members regarding the use of armed struggle approximated the position of the opposition camp. However, the new independents derived their militant and anti-Syrian attitude from having closely followed events in Lebanon. In contrast to the opposition camp, their support for the PLO's use of armed struggle remained confined to the Lebanese theatre (MEI May 1977).

Bureaucratic advocacy's negative support for pragmatic role behavior declined as it moved toward the positive end of the pragmatic spectrum by a full 1.1 adjustments since the 12th PNC (1974). Specifically, the bureaucratic advocacy variable decreased its negative support for this role to -0.5 from the -1.6 negative pronouncements recorded during the 12th session.

The bureaucratic advocacy variable confined its rejection of pragmatic role behavior to the PLO's non-

acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 because it did not explicitly affirm the political rights of the Palestinian people. The PNC's rationale for rejecting 242 no longer centered around the resolution's implied recognition of Israel, nor did the PNC consider the resolution part of any "imperialist capitulation" schemes designed to liquidate the Palestine National Movement. The subtle narrowing of the PLO's rejection of 242 in 1977 portended the organization's eventual acceptance of this resolution in 1988. In contrast to previous PNC resolutions, the provisional rejection of pragmatic role behavior became the first item listed among the 15 points endorsed by the PNC superceding positive support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role.

In Article Six of the 15-point political program, the bureaucratic advocacy variable registered 0.5 positive, albeit conditional, support for PLO pragmatic role behavior. This score remained unchanged from the previous session. In extending positive support for pragmatic role behavior, the PNC intended to bolster Fatah's commitment to adhere to the 1969 Cairo Agreement regarding guerrilla activity in Lebanon.

Article Six also demonstrated support for the PLO's continued adaption and sustained adjustment of independent role behavior which remained steady at 1.3 positive bureaucratic endorsements. According to Article Six, the

PLO would continue to abide by the tenets of the 1969 Cairo Agreement in "spirit and letter" and it would reject any outside interpretation of the agreement's application (IDP 1977 DOC 229).

Positive pragmatic role support specifically directed the PLO to work at promoting U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3236 (November 1974) that reaffirmed the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. In doing so, bureaucratic advocacy also furthered the PLO's positive adjustment of the active independent role.

In Article 14, the bureaucratic advocacy variable demonstrated commitment for the PLO's positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaborator role with 1.3 endorsements. Despite the early March 1977 meeting between Arafat and King Hussein shortly before the opening of the 13th session, Article 14 failed to specifically mention Jordan as a foreign policy party to the PLO's regional subsystem collaborator role behavior. Instead, the PNC voted to endorse the PLO's adjustment and application of this role toward:

"democratic and progressive *Jewish* [italics added] forces, inside and outside the occupied homeland, that are struggling against the theory and practice of Zionism (IDP 1977 DOC 229).

This endorsement is the first time that the PNC officially promoted the idea of PLO contacts with any Jewish group that ideologically opposed Zionism. The PLO



implemented the PNC's endorsement of Article 14 on 4 May 1977, when a PLO delegation officially met with a commission of the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) in Prague, Czechoslovakia, where the two sides exchanged views on their common struggle (IDP 1977 DOC 90). The PNC's formal sponsorship of this behavior paved the way for the PLO's modification in regional subsystem collaborator role behavior at the 18th PNC (1988) that allowed the PLO to establish contacts with Israeli, rather than strictly Jewish forces.

#### Pre-14th PNC (1979)

In the months preceding the 14th PNC (1979), the external environment created a host of new pressures for the organization. The PLO would have to search for a new foreign policy strategy when any hope of reconvening the stalled Geneva talks had been deferred following Sadat's diplomatic initiative in November 1977. The demise of the talks meant that Fatah could no longer count on exercising the active independent role at Geneva to secure an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the inability of the PLO to exercise the active independent role within an international forum might lead to a loss of external support for their cause and leave the organization vulnerable to a number of imposed roles ranging from regional subsystem collaboration to accommodation. In addition to this pressure, the PLO's problems in south

Lebanon intensified as the Maronite forces endeavored to undermine PLO pragmatic role behavior and eliminate the organization's ability to exercise the independent role. A loss of PLO independence in Lebanon threatened a return of the imposed subservient role under the suzerainty of Syria.

As the breadth of its foreign policy output grew, the PLO's exposure to threats and opportunities increased proportionately in both scope and duration. In responding to feedback miscellany, the PLO would no longer be able to rely on a universal or ambiguous foreign policy while positively maintaining the roles of independent and active independent. The PLO would have to define in precise terms the vagueness of its foreign policy output immured within its broad-based political programs adopted at the 12th (1974) and 13th (1977) PNC sessions. Specifically, the PLO would have to relate specific roles to discrete foreign policy events in order to preserve the initiative in the formation of its foreign policy. Consequently, the PLO began to respond to discrete foreign policy circumstances by positively and negatively adjusting roles that extended beyond pragmatism in the months leading up to the 14th PNC (1979).

Throughout the spring and summer of 1977, the United States sponsored numerous rounds of diplomatic activity aimed at reinvigorating the stalled Geneva talks. The PLO, remained firm in its commitment to exercise the active

independent role despite becoming the possibility of becoming marginalized in the process. Regardless of the show of support expressed by President Carter for a Palestinian homeland, the United States remained adamant that PLO participation hinged on the organization's acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (IDP 1977 DOC 95).

On 1 October 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement that specified the necessary steps to be taken to ensure a "just and lasting" peace in the Middle East. These steps included a comprehensive framework that incorporated all parties to the conflict, Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, and a settlement of the Palestine question that ensured the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Even though the co-sponsors of the Geneva peace conference recognized the need to incorporate all parties concerned, the U.S.-Soviet joint statement declined to mention the PLO as a party to the conflict (IDP 1977 DOC 160).

In response to being shunned by the U.S.-Soviet joint statement, the EXCOM issued a formal statement outlining the PLO's official position. Among the various points listed, the PLO reaffirmed its right to exercise the active independent role and act as the national voice of all Palestinians in accordance with the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab summit resolutions. Moreover, the EXCOM

prophetically claimed that a just peace in the region could only be achieved when the Palestinians recovered their "inalienable national rights" to return to their homes, to self-determination, and to establish an independent state on the soil of its homeland (IDP 1977 DOC 279).

On 9 November 1977, the question of PLO participation at Geneva became moot when Sadat suddenly announced before the Egyptian parliament his readiness to visit Israel and negotiate a direct peace with Israeli officials (IDP 1977 DOC 283). On 17 November, Fatah announced its official reaction to Sadat's initiative following a meeting of its own central council. Besides reaffirming its support for tactical diplomatic solutions to attain Palestinian goals, Fatah specifically called for a positive adjustment in the PLO's use of the regional subsystem collaborator role (IDP 1977 DOC 292). In all probability, Arafat had intended to rely on the veil of collective Arab unity to safeguard the PLO's existing foreign policy output should the Rejection Front issue a demand for a positive adjustment in visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior.

In a meeting of the EXCOM on 18 November 1977, the various guerrilla factions, with the exception of the PFLP, cited the Egyptian leader's breach of Arab unity as one of the main reasons for the PLO's rejection of Sadat's unilateral decision to conclude a separate peace with Israel (IDP 1977 DOC 295). In support of Fatah's appeal to

positively adjust the regional subsystem collaborator role, the bureaucratic advocacy variable registered its highest endorsement for the PLO's use of this role since the start of the third phase with 2.2 positive endorsements.

On 20 November 1977, Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset and outlined what he believed were the necessary elements to bring about a "successful" peace in the region. Among the proposed factors, Sadat called for an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab land captured in the 1967 June War and the realization of Palestinian political aspirations that included the right to establish an independent state in the territory now occupied by Israel. However, he avoided any mention of a role for the PLO in the process (IDP 1977 DOC 301).

Because Sadat's speech affirmed the Palestinians' right to an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza at the possible expense of the PLO, the organization's ability to act as the sole legitimate representative to its occupied territories' domestic constituency was threatened. The PLO responded to this potential threat by positively adjusting the independent, active independent, regional subsystem collaborator, and pragmatic tactical foreign policy roles. The organization immediately acted to implement these adjusted tactical roles by politically moving closer to Syria. In a joint Syrian-PLO communique issued within days of Sadat's address to the Knesset, Syria and the PLO

expressed their shared commitment to struggle for peace within the context of Arab League and U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Syria and the PLO also recognized the need for greater Arab solidarity in the wake of Sadat's betrayal (IDP 1977 DOC 309).

The Rejection Front contributed its support for the PLO's positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaborator role when it called on the organization to strengthen Arab ties in an attempt to undermine and isolate the Egyptian regime. Because the Rejection Front believed that Fatah's tenacious use of moderation fostered Sadat's escapade with Israel, it cautioned the PLO regarding the continued use of positive pragmatic role behavior. Specifically, the Rejection Front opposed any move on the part of Fatah to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as a means of ensuring a role for the PLO should Egypt and Israel move toward a mutual settlement. The Rejection Front limited its positive support for pragmatic role behavior to the PLO's adherence of the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab summit resolutions that endorsed the organization's positive use of the active independent role. In further defining its policy position, the Rejection Front failed to express forthright support for the visionary revolutionary liberator role. Speculation suggests that the Front withheld support for this role owing to the PLO's recent compact with Syria that also refrained from commenting on the use of armed

struggle. Nonetheless, the Front's failure to promote the visionary revolutionary liberator role at this time signalled the potential for a reconciliation between the Fatah moderates and the remaining hardliners of the Rejection Front (IDP 1977 DOC 315).

Bureaucratic reconciliation transpired on 4 December 1977 in Tripoli, Libya, following a summit meeting between the various guerrilla factions and several regional actors. At Tripoli, the guerrilla groups announced an agreed upon six-point program that called for a political boycott of the exclusive pragmatic solutions advanced by Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Point One of the "unificatory" or Tripoli Document ratified by all attending guerrilla factions, called for the establishment of a regional Steadfast and Confrontation Front. According to the tenets of the Tripoli Document, the members of the Front would include Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syria, and the PLO. Its purpose was to acknowledge and actuate the PLO regional subsystem collaborator role behavior and unite key Arab regimes behind a political wall of opposition that would collectively work to boycott Sadat's negotiations with Israel.

In the remaining points, the bureaucratic advocacy variable reaffirmed its rejection of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It also rejected any international conference that demanded the PLO's acceptance of them as a

prerequisite for participating in negotiations.

Strategically, bureaucratic advocacy declared its support for the Palestinians' right to return and to exercise self-determination within the context of an independent state on non-negotiated, i.e., liberated, Palestinian land (IDP 1977 DOC 320).

With the exception of Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Syria, and the PLO agreed to the formation of the Steadfast and Confrontation Front. This decision served to temporarily placate the Rejection Front relative to the pragmatic activities of Fatah because the formation of the Steadfast and Confrontation Front ideologically aligned the PLO with the "confrontation" states in opposition to Sadat. For Arafat, the formation of this regional coalition momentarily satisfied the immediate threat to internal unity that surfaced when the DFLP and radical members of Fatah began to distance themselves from the strict pragmatic solutions professed by Arafat. The Steadfast and Confrontation Front also allowed Arafat to safeguard the PLO's active independent role behind a regional facade. The ostensible solidarity of the Front eventually revealed its illusionary nature when the participating members failed to militarily assist the PLO following Israel's invasion of south Lebanon in March 1978 (Gresch 1983).

In the occupied territories, the domestic restructuring variable retained its support for the PLO, despite Sadat's



declared reluctance to negotiate a separate peace with Israel at the expense of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. In a signed memorandum issued on 8 December 1977, a multitude of West Bank and Gaza municipal councils, trade unions, societies, and notables, reaffirmed the PLO's right to exercise the active independent role and speak on their behalf in accordance with the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab Summit resolutions. In the memo, the inside domestic constituency declared its acceptance of the PLO's 15-point political program adopted at the 13th PNC (1977) as the formula for the realization of their national aspirations. In addition, the domestic restructuring variable expressed 0.2 positive endorsements for the PLO's use of the regional subsystem collaborator role provided the PLO not be relegated to playing a secondary role in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

Even though they declared their solidarity with the PLO, the inside domestic constituency's memorandum recognized the central role played by Egypt in their struggle for liberation. This recognition led Arafat to consider the inside domestic constituency as a major influencing factor in framing a foreign policy strategy that would allow him to maintain the PLO's current level of political and diplomatic initiatives. Israel's Prime Minister Menachim Begin inadvertently strengthened the ties between the PLO and the occupied territories when the latter

rejected Begin's proposals for "self-government" as part of Israel's negotiations with Egypt. However, Arafat still had to consider Jordan's influence in the West Bank. As chairman of the PLO, Arafat could not afford to run the risk that the pragmatic West Bank mayors, acting on the behest of King Hussein, would accept a partial solution that parried the PLO (Gresch 1983).

To avert a potential loss of the active independent role, Arafat sought to develop a dialogue with Jordan, which remained outside the circle of confrontation states and movements that coalitionally opposed Sadat's regime. Arafat's unilateral attempt to conserve the PLO's political and diplomatic roles as the basis of his tactical strategy to confront the threat initiated by Sadat, led to an erosion of bureaucratic unity that characterized PLO internal politics throughout much of 1978.

As political instability in south Lebanon began to reach crisis proportions, the PLO's ability to maintain its independent role there became jeopardized. This was due to Sadat's initiative and its impact on the PLO in south Lebanon. To many Lebanese, Begin's 1977 December press interview statement, announcing Israel's sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, removed the foreseeable possibility of a two-state solution as part of the overall Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiation package (IDP 1978 DOC 51). Begin's announcement only served to expose what the Lebanese

viewed as the evolving permanency of the Palestinian refugee and guerrilla presence on Lebanese national soil. In turn, this realization sparked debate in Lebanon over the order of its domestic priorities, i.e., national reconciliation or the effective removal of the PLO from its sanctuary in Lebanon (Khalidi 1979).

Besides reasserting Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, the Likud characterization of the West Bank, Begin alluded to the prospect of Jordanian participation on behalf of the Palestinians in working out an arrangement for his autonomy plan. This disclosure, in conjunction with Likud's announced plan to increase settlement activity in the West Bank, fueled an increase in protest activities within the occupied territories. It also led to a resumption of cross-border guerrilla operations into northern Israel by factions of the Palestinian resistance from their strongholds in south Lebanon. Furthermore, Begin began to consolidate Israel's ties with the right-wing coalition of Lebanese Maronites by offering a "moral" commitment to protect the Christians from a "potential war of annihilation" as Syria moved to improve its relations with the Lebanese national forces and the Palestinian guerrillas (Sahliyah 1986).

The PLO's moderated use in visionary revolutionary liberator activities in south Lebanon rested on the July 1977 Chatura agreement concluded by the Syrians, the PLO, and the Sarkis administration. In assenting to

pragmatically abide by the tenets of the Chatura agreement, the PLO called for a moratorium in visionary revolutionary liberator activities aimed at specific targets in northern Israel from Lebanon's southern frontier; surveillance of armaments in the camps by the Arab Deterrent Forces; and a restriction of fedayeen presence in south Lebanon away from border (IDP 1977 DOC 255). In 1977, the PLO was willing to negotiate a pragmatic solution in south Lebanon because the organization had already redeployed most of its *fedayeen* activities away from Lebanon's southern border into the occupied territories. By March 1978, Arafat's ability to maintain this pragmatic arrangement proved futile.

With the Egyptian front locked into negotiations over the peace agreements, Israel could easily concentrate its military efforts in south Lebanon in order to wear down the Palestinian resistance and tacitly support a Maronite-backed political regime. A pretext for Israel's direct military involvement came on 11 March 1978 when Palestinian commandos raided an Israeli bus traveling between Haifa and Tel Aviv, in which 34 Israelis were killed and some 78 others injured. On 14 March 1978, Israel launched a massive invasion into south Lebanon to allegedly establish a 10-kilometer security zone as a buffer for its northern frontier. The invasion's aftermath introduced the arrival of U.N. peace-keeping forces (UNIFIL) in south Lebanon in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 425. These forces were

prohibited by Israel from entering its self-declared buffer zone which Israel placed under the protection of a Lebanese Christian, Major Sa'ad Haddad (Sahliyah 1986).

In the days immediately following the invasion, the external variable registered the strongest support for the preservation of the PLO's independent role in Lebanon with 0.5 endorsements. In addition to the member states of the Steadfast and Confrontation Front, external support came from the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, who issued condemnations against Israel and signalled their support for the PLO's continued use of the independent role.

In the West Bank, the mayors and various trade union representatives issued a memorandum on 25 March 1978 denouncing Israel's invasion and professed "absolute solidarity" behind the PLO as their sole, legitimate representative (IDP 1978 DOC 233). This support translated into 0.7 positive domestic restructuring endorsements for the PLO's active independent role.

External support for the regional subsystem collaborator role contributed 0.9 positive endorsements when the Arab League and the Steadfast and Confrontation Front called for greater Arab unity behind the PLO (IDP 1978 DOC 235).

By mid-May 1978, friction between Fatah and the various guerrilla groups intensified as Arafat continued to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy approach in south Lebanon. On 18

May, five of the PLO's guerrilla groups submitted a memorandum to Fatah's Central Council accusing Arafat of independent decision-making. The guerrilla groups asserted that Arafat's non-consensual decision making style was a deviation from the frontal procedures required by the 1968 National Charter. The signatories to the memorandum, the PFLP, the DFLP, the ALF, the PPSF, and the PLF, called for a convening of the PNC for the purpose of halting the independent activities of the leader-driven variable and to endorse a formula for collective decision-making that would guarantee their direct participation. According to the guerrilla groups, their participation in the decision-making process should be in agreement with the 1968 National Charter and the six-point unification program embodied in the 1977 Tripoli Document. The signatories cautioned, however, that until Arafat and the PLO agreed to work toward a program of national unity, they would rely primarily on the visionary revolutionary liberator role to combat external threats that emanated from the Lebanese theatre. The guerrilla groups' 4.4 positive bureaucratic endorsements for the visionary revolutionary liberator role, accompanied by their 2.5 positive endorsements for the rhetorical defender of the faith role, provided credibility to their their willingness to rely on armed struggle.

In addition, the five guerrilla groups rejected the PLO's acceptance of any pragmatic, political solution that

included the participation of the Egyptian regime. They registered their rejection of pragmatic role behavior with -0.2 renunciations. These groups contributed 1.4 positive endorsements for the independent role, when they claimed that regional subsystem collaboration with either Jordan or Saudi Arabia could only result in a loss of the PLO's ability to remain in command of the formulation of its foreign policy output (IDP 1978 DOC 248).

On 21 May 1978, the Central Council issued a statement following a joint meeting between members of the CC and the EXCOM convened to discuss, *inter alia*, the guerrilla groups' recent memorandum. The CC's statement indicated that the PLO recognized the need for a democratic dialogue to overcome the obstacles that prevented national unity. In contrast to the guerrilla groups' demand, the CC's statement affirmed that PLO foreign policy would be formulated in accordance with PNC resolutions rather than the 1968 National Charter or the 1977 Tripoli Document. Furthermore, the CC's statement reaffirmed the PLO's commitment to abide by the 1969 Cairo and the 1977 Chatara Agreements. Arafat's continued reliance on pragmatic role behavior registered 0.2 leader-driven endorsements. The CC's indirect reply to the five dissenting guerrilla groups indicated PLO agreement with the memorandum's demand for a PNC session (IDP 1978 DOC 249).

The fact that the CC issued the statement rather than

the EXCOM is significant because it represents Arafat's attempt to retain command over PLO foreign policy output. As discussed in Chapter Three, each decision structure within the PLO has a corresponding set of attributes and behaviors. Because the CC is a delegate assembly that draws its membership from the PNC, Arafat could easily prevail over a decision structure dominated by delegates of his own group. In contrast to the CC, the EXCOM essentially supports a leader-delegate decision structure. Arafat's real power as chairman within this structure rests on his negotiating skills in building consensus. In May 1978, the 15-member EXCOM was comprised of seven independents, two delegates from the West Bank, two delegates from Fatah, and one delegate each from Al-Saiqa, the DFLP, the ALF, and the PFLP-GC. The absence of the PFLP, in combination with only four delegates present representing the various guerrilla organizations, indicated that Arafat could build a formidable consensus to meet the challenge posed by bureaucratic advocacy. Furthermore, the fact that the CC issued the statement rather than the EXCOM, suggested that Arafat intended to deflect attention away from the leader-delegate EXCOM to avoid further charges of independent decision-making on his part. Following the threat to his self-imposed independent leadership role, Arafat persisted in steering the PLO in a pragmatic direction by agreeing to facilitate the role of the UNIFIL in south Lebanon by



denouncing the PLO's use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role in the vicinity of the 10-kilometer buffer zone (IDP 1978 DOC 251). Arafat's condemnation of the visionary revolutionary liberator in south Lebanon totaled -0.2 leader-driven articulations for the PLO's negative adjustment of this role.

Acting independently of Arafat, the CC solicited the cooperation of the EXCOM and the various guerrilla factions to work for a national unity plan following Sadat's proposal to return the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt (IDP 1978 DOC 257). By the end of August 1978, the left-wing extremists groups and Arafat moved closer to reconciliation when both sides agreed to form a joint committee to approve a draft proposal outlining a scheme for Palestinian national unity (IDP 1978 DOC 265).

PLO national unity, however, was forged before any joint committee could be formed. National unity resulted when Sadat, Begin, and Carter signed two agreements collectively known as the Camp David Accords in Washington, D.C., on 17 September 1978 (IDP 1978 DOCS 153, 154).

In essence, the Camp David Accords involved a peace strategy between Egypt and Israel with provisions for parallel negotiations over the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Despite the proposed five-year transitional period that would supposedly yield "full autonomy" to the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories, several

questions remained unanswered. These included the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and the eventual right to a Palestinian state based on the notion of self-determination (Gresch 1983).

In response to the Camp David Accords, all the independent variables expressed positive support for an adjustment in the PLO's tactical roles, with the exception of pragmatic and accommodationist behavior. On 1 October 1978, most of the West Bank mayors and others participated in a political rally held in Jerusalem to formulate a response to the Camp David Accords. The effects of the rally led to the formation of the National Guidance Committee (NGC) on 4 November to coordinate the West Bank's opposition to the Camp David Accords (Sahliyah 1986).

In Gaza, the municipal and village councils plus additional social and professional organizations also met to formulate their official reply. The PLO's inside domestic constituency reaffirmed their full support for the PLO's use of the active independent role. The inside domestic constituency also supported PLO strategic foreign policy behavior by rejecting the idea of self-government as contained in the Camp David Accords (IDP 1978 DOC 311).

In a November meeting of the ninth Arab summit convened in Baghdad, the attending members, *inter alia*, continued to endorse the PLO's use of the active independent role and upheld the right of the Palestinian people to self-

determination (IDP 1978 DOC 326). The convening of the summit in Baghdad is important because it signalled an end to the Iraqi "war of extermination" launched against Fatah moderates that resulted in the assassination of three Fatah representatives. With regional unity secured, the PLO could direct its attention to its own internal state of affairs and formulate a unified policy to combat the new external threat of the Camp David Accords.

#### The 14th Palestine National Council

The 14th PNC (1979) convened in Damascus for the express purpose of condemning the Camp David Accords and rectifying the decision making dilemma that inhibited agreement on national unity. In the ensuing political communique, the PNC reconfirmed its support for the 15-point political program adopted during the 13th PNC (1977). In addition to the political communique, the PNC approved the National Unity Program offered by Arafat as the new political plan that would regulate relations among the various resistance groups (IDP 1979 DOC 16).

The PNC upheld the PLO's positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, and active independent tactical foreign policy roles. However, the PNC failed to support any positive adjustments in the accommodationist role. Pragmatic behavior still received

only mixed bureaucratic support.

On the strategic end of foreign policy, neither the political communique, nor the National Unity Program, specifically mentioned the goal of total liberation. However, the National Unity Program indicated that the Palestinian people had a legitimate right to establish a "democratic state over the whole of their national soil." The political communique limited comment on strategic foreign policy to a renunciation of the "self-rule" plan. The PNC considered the idea of self-rule as part of a conspiracy to undermine the PLO's active independent role.

Organizationally, the National Unity Program stressed the participatory nature of PLO decision making based on democratic principles. In theory, the program reinforced the notion of collective leadership and invited all the various guerrilla factions to participate in the PLO's institutions. In reality, the organizational guidelines of the unity program acknowledged that the application of democratic principles would consequently commit the minority to the decisions adopted by the majority. Despite the proclaimed caveat, bureaucratic acceptance of the National Unity Program signaled a victory for Arafat, who commanded a majority of support in all three institutional decision structures of the PLO.

With the exception of the visionary revolutionary liberator role, bureaucratic advocacy's positive support for

the regional subsystem collaborator, independent, active independent, and pragmatic tactical roles increased since the 13th PNC (1977). Bureaucratic advocacy's 3.3 positive support endorsements for the visionary revolutionary liberator role revealed a sharp 7.1 decline in positive support since the previous session despite the return of the PFLP. However, the rhetorical defender of the faith role received a total of 4.0 bureaucratic endorsements for a 0.7 increase over the visionary revolutionary liberator role. This marks the second time bureaucratic advocacy's support for the defender of the faith role exceeded that of visionary revolutionary liberator. The first instance occurred at the 7th PNC (1970) when support for the defender of the faith role surpassed the visionary revolutionary liberator role by 3.0 pronouncements. As discussed in Chapter Four, the establishment of the CC at the 7th PNC (1970) accounted for the increase in support of the rhetorical use of armed struggle relative to its applied counterpart role.

In contrast to the 7th PNC (1970) when the visionary revolutionary liberator role remained an either-or choice, by the 14th session the PLO had expanded the concept of this role to embrace a variety of forms that ranged from political to economic struggle. Consequently, the rise in bureaucratic support for the defender of the faith role indicated the PNC's approval of other forms of struggle in

addition to the visionary revolutionary liberator role. Moreover, both the National Unity Program and the political communique left several expressions of struggle unqualified, which indicated rhetorical support for the open-ended use of struggle.

Bureaucratic advocacy's support for the PLO's positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaborator role exhibited 1.8 endorsements for a 0.5 increase from the 13th PNC (1979). In their adoption of the political communique, the bureaucratic advocacy variable approved the PLO's move toward renewing relations with Jordan along with the need to strengthen the PLO's "militant relations with the nationalist Lebanese forces, and the heroic Lebanese people, including all sects" (IDP 1979 DOC 17).

In the National Unity Program, the PLO cited several reasons as evidence for renewing contacts with Jordan. Included in the list of reasons was Jordan's rejection of the Camp David Accords and its commitment to the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab Summit resolutions recognizing the PLO, and not Jordan, as the official representative of the Palestinians (IDP 1979 DOC 16).

Bureaucratic advocacy's 1.6 conditional support for the PLO's positive adjustment of the pragmatic role remained confined to relevant Arab Summit resolutions and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237. In each case, the relevant resolutions endorsed the PLO's right to

positively adjust the active independent role (IDP 1979 DOC 16). Besides rejecting U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the PNC denounced all "resolutions, agreements, and settlements" that conflicted with the realization of the Palestinians' inalienable rights (IDP 1979 DOC 16).

Armed with the endorsed national unity program, Arafat launched a new diplomatic offensive following the 14th PNC (1979). First on his list of priorities was Jordan. Arafat not only hoped to strengthen Jordan's commitment to maintain his opposition to the Camp David Accords, but he also aimed to intensify the struggle in the occupied West Bank where the PLO's periodic nemesis preserved some degree of influence with the pro-Jordanian West Bank mayors (Gresch 1983; Sahliyeh 1988). The start of a PLO-Jordanian dialogue was officially announced on 17 March 1979 when the two sides issued a joint communique emphasizing the importance of their renewed contacts and their willingness to keep open the channels of communication (IDP 1979 DOC 47).

Throughout 1979, Arafat also directed his attention toward Europe where he successfully attained the European Economic Community's (EEC) recognition of the Palestinians' right to a homeland (IDP 1979 DOC 156). A year later, the EEC issued the Venice Declaration acknowledging that a just solution in the Middle East needed to take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Palestinians because the Palestine problem was not exclusively a refugee

issue. The Venice Declaration supported the convening of an international conference to negotiate a settlement under the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. However, the Venice Declaration only recognized the PLO as a possible party in any international conference (IDP 1980 DOC 121). Despite the small gain attained by the EEC's refusal to treat the Palestinians as refugees, Arafat noted that the Venice Declaration fell short on several key issues. Following a meeting between Syrian President Assad and Arafat, Habash, and Hawatma, Syria and the PLO issued a joint statement listing the major shortcomings of the Venice Declaration. According to the Syrian-PLO joint statement, the Venice Declaration's main deficiencies were (1) its failure to recognize the active independent role of the PLO, (2) its acceptance of the Camp David Accords as the foundation for a resolution of the conflict; and (3) its insistence that the PLO positively adjust pragmatic role behavior and accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (IDP 1980 DOC 131).

As Arafat worked to achieve definitive political gains in the broader international community, Arab solidarity within the regional subcommunity began to erode, which threatened the PLO's ability to exercise the regional subsystem collaborator role. The break-up of Arab unity began in late 1978 when an Islamic revolutionary movement succeeded in over-throwing Shah Reza Pahlevi of Iran and



announced the establishment of an Islamic Republic. The PLO did not associate itself with the Islamic Republic of Iran along religious lines. Instead, having provided training to Iranian revolutionary forces, the PLO recognized the persistence and success of Islam's revolutionary bearing. In a press conference statement given in Tehran shortly after the revolution, Arafat announced the PLO's solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran by adjusting the regional subsystem collaborator role. Furthermore, Arafat astutely noted that the "existing equations and balance of forces in the area" would change as a result of the Iranian Revolution (IDP 1979 DOC 28).

The existing equations and balance of forces that Arafat referred to in his press conference statement from Tehran centered around the pro-Islamic versus secular alliance lines drawn by regional actors shortly after the revolution. The Arab world became firmly divided following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. As Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf states, and Egypt provided political and economic support to the secular Iraqi regime, Libya and Syria aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran. With the Arab world in disarray, the concluding of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the Soviet Union's preoccupation with Afghanistan, the PLO was forced to redirect most of its attention away from the international community and concentrate on the occupied territories and

south Lebanon where the PLO began to face renewed threats.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the PLO's inside domestic constituency began to exert a strong influence the organization's foreign policy following the 1976 West Bank Municipal elections. The effects of the elections produced a new center of local leadership among the inhabitants of the occupied territories. This new political center consisted of the West Bank mayors who replaced the outmoded PNF which was formed in 1973 for the purpose of pressuring the PLO into modifying its strategic foreign policy to coincide with present realities. Like the PNF, the activities of the West Bank mayors served as a continual reminder to the PLO that its primary constituency was located in the occupied territories. In contrast to the PNF, the West Bank mayors were more politically active and were quick to resort to both conventional and unconventional political behavior. Furthermore, diverse political activity in the West Bank meant that the PLO would have to remain attentive to the political demands of this constituency because unconventional political behavior could easily be directed at the PLO rather than the occupying power.

Not unlike the bureaucratic stress that often characterized internal PLO politics, the mayors of the occupied territories also suffered from their own internal divisions. As a matter of consequence, these divisions would place different tactical foreign policy demands on the

PLO in responding to these groups. On the one side were the pragmatic mayors of Hebron and Tulkarm and the pro-Jordanian mayors of Bethlehem and Gaza who appreciated the role played by the United States in attempting to find a solution to their plight. On the other side were the hard-liners from Ramallah and Nablus supported by the PLO's left-wing extremists. The hard-liners rejected any role for Jordan at the expense of the PLO in their struggle to realize self-determination. Moreover, they opposed the pragmatic initiatives offered by the Americans and refused to cooperate with the Israeli occupying power (Sahliyah 1988).

The policies of the Likud-led coalition formed in 1977 and the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978 served to soften the ideological divisions between both groups of civic leaders. Their political preferences coalesced behind the NGC, formed to coordinate the political activities of the West Bank in their efforts to undermine the Camp David Accords. However, this externally driven solidarity started to erode in June 1980 when the pragmatic and hard-line municipal leaders vied for political control of the NGC, which only served to weaken the organization's overall effectiveness (Sahliyah 1988).

The hard-liners began to challenge the ideological dominance of Fatah in the occupied territories. This led them to reactivate the PNF as a means of domestically opposing Arafat's moderate political approach and his

renewed dialogue with Jordan. On 9 May 1980, the PNF issued a policy statement that reflected the ideological pervasiveness of the PLO's left-wing extremists. In addition to rejecting the self-rule plan and acknowledging the PLO as their "leader," the PNF called for greater regional subsystem collaborator role behavior with the Steadfast and Confrontation Front. They also emphasized the role of visionary revolutionary liberator as a means to advance the goal of an independent state. In essence, their disagreement with Arafat was more tactical than organizational, as it questioned Arafat's positive use of pragmatic role behavior at the expense of militancy (IDP 1980 DOC 128).

Shortly after discovering the existence of the PNF, the Israeli government set out to diffuse the political activities of the organization and instituted a policy of deportation against the mayors and other activists. Rather than subduing potential militancy, Israeli deportations only served to fuel Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and rally the occupied territories behind the PLO. This served to secure the PLO's active independent role in the occupied territories and allowed Arafat to continue his search for a pragmatic solution to meet the strategic demands of the PLO's domestic constituency.

Arab solidarity continued to disintegrate in the months preceding the 15th PNC (1981). Arafat's attempts to

positively adjust the PLO's regional subsystem collaborator role failed when the Arab League refused to honor the PLO's request to postpone the 11th Arab Summit scheduled to convene in November at Amman. The EXCOM issued a statement indicating that the PLO would not participate in the Amman Arab Summit and cited the League's willingness to convene in an atmosphere of Arab disunity as the primary reason for its non-attendance (IDP 1980 DOC 221).

Prior to the 15th PNC (1981), events in south Lebanon began to supercede Arafat's focus on regional subsystem collaborator and pragmatic role behaviors. In the months leading up to the 15th PNC session, Israel embarked on a new policy of aggression against the PLO in south Lebanon. This policy consisted of preemptive air, sea, and land attacks against PLO bases in the south. Israel also engaged Major Haddad's Christian forces to assist in its drive to eliminate the PLO from Lebanon. Part of Israel's preemptive strategy consisted of targeting civilian population centers in and around Sidon and Tyre in an effort to rouse the Lebanese population against the PLO. As Israel increased its aggression against the PLO in south Lebanon, Arafat acted to safeguard the PLO's independent role by returning to visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior. Arafat's 0.2 endorsements for the PLO's positive adjustment of visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior occurred after Israeli forces entered south Lebanon on 19 August 1980

and attacked Palestinian forces in Beaufort Castle and Arnun. Arafat began to positively implement visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior when he called for the general mobilization of all Palestinians to combat the threat to PLO independence in south Lebanon (IDP 1980 DOC 178).

The threat to the PLO's independent role assumed a new dimension when Lebanon's President Sarkis announced before the third Islamic Summit conference that the continued presence of the PLO exacerbated Lebanon's internal problems. Moreover, Sarkis cautioned that the PLO's return to the visionary revolutionary liberator role only served to intensify Israel's aggressive policy against the PLO on Lebanese soil. Sarkis noted that the U.N. mandated UNIFIL forces had proven to be ineffective at preventing hostilities and that a comprehensive plan was needed to save Lebanon (IDP 1981 DOC 16).

#### The 15th Palestine National Council

Against a backdrop of Arab disunity, increased aggression in south Lebanon, and rising protest activities in the occupied territories, the PLO convened the 15th PNC in Damascus from 11-19 April 1981. In what portended to be the last session of the PLO's third phase of foreign policy, the members at the 15th PNC (1981) evidenced the strongest increase in support for the regional subsystem collaborator

role relative to the PLO's remaining tactical roles. Table 6.3 displays PNC support for tactical roles during the third phase.

Specifically, the bureaucratic advocacy variable expressed 2.2 positive endorsements for the PLO's positive adjustment in the regional subsystem collaborator role. This is the highest score attributed to this role during any PNC session throughout the third phase. In its final political statement, the PNC called on the PLO to direct the regional subsystem collaborator role at strengthening relations between the PLO and Syria. According to the political statement, Syria remained the principal base of "steadfastness and struggle" against the Arab world's enemies. The endorsed political statement also stressed the importance of maintaining relations between the PLO and Jordanian nationalists as a means of ensuring King Hussein's continued commitment to abide by the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab summit resolutions that secured the PLO's active independent role.

In the Lebanese theater, the political statement expressed concern for the PLO's continued ability to maintain the independent role. The political statement emphasized the importance of the PLO's positive adjustment of the regional subsystem collaborator role with the Lebanese National Movement and other nationalist forces as a means of preserving the organization's independent role

behavior.

Although Arafat positively adjusted the visionary revolutionary liberator role prior to the 15th session, bureaucratic advocacy's positive support for this role decreased by 0.9 endorsements from the previous session for a total of 2.4 positive endorsements. The positive bureaucratic support provided this role was specifically directed at Lebanon and the occupied territories. Bureaucratic advocacy's support for visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior in Lebanon was meant to safeguard the PLO's independent role. In the occupied territories, the PLO affirmed the use of this role as a means of protesting the increase in Jewish settlement building and Israel's harsh occupation policies.

The bureaucratic advocacy variable extended 1.4 positive endorsements for the PLO's use of pragmatic role behavior. In addition to reaffirming the PLO's commitment to abide by relevant Arab Summit resolutions, the PNC "welcomed" the 1981 Brezhnev plan which called for an international peace conference that included PLO participation. The fact that the bureaucratic advocacy variable endorsed the PLO's acceptance of the Brezhnev plan is significant. Although the Brezhnev plan did not specifically mention U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for convening an international peace conference, the plan explicitly stated that:



It is essential to ensure the security and sovereignty of all the states of the region, including those of **Israel** [emphasis added] (IDP 1981 DOC 28).

The bureaucratic advocacy variable's pragmatic acceptance of this plan, which called for the specific recognition of Israel, suggests that the PLO began to modify its negative opposition to Resolution 242. This is especially significant since bureaucratic advocacy decreased its rejection of the PLO's use of pragmatic role behavior by -1.5 articulations from the previous session for a score of -0.5 at the 15th PNC (1981). This drop in negative support for pragmatic role behavior coupled with the PNC's acceptance of the Brezhnev Plan supports the contention that the PLO began to modify its position on Resolution 242. Moreover, the final political statement failed to specifically mention this resolution. The PLO's bureaucratic component confined its rejection of pragmatic behavior to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Strategically, the final political statement upheld the tradition of the 13th (1977) and 14th (1979) PNCs by not referencing the goal of total liberation. The bureaucratic advocacy variable continued to endorse the formation of an independent Palestinian state on the soil of its homeland as the principal strategic goal. In reaffirming this goal, the bureaucratic advocacy variable also reinforced the PLO's

continued use of the active independent role when it stated that the Palestinian future state would fall under the leadership of the PLO (IDP 1981 DOC 54).

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the 15th PNC (1981) marks the close of the third phase of PLO foreign policy. The PLO entered the fourth phase of foreign policy beginning with the 16th PNC (1983) convened in the aftermath of the PLO's forced departure from Beirut in August 1982.

#### Conclusion

This chapter examines the third phase of PLO foreign policy role behavior. Throughout this phase, the external shocks and domestic restructuring variables remained the primary determinants of PLO foreign policy role behavior. The bureaucratic advocacy variable's influence succeeded in curbing the leader-driven variable from making extreme adjustments in tactical role behavior. The application of the role modification model demonstrated that the PLO gradually began to modify the organization's positive use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role in favor of positive pragmatic role behavior. In addition, the leader-driven variable proved to be the strongest supporter of pragmatic role behavior. The environmental process variable facilitated the leader-driven variable's ability to pursue pragmatic role behavior when it succeeded in bringing about the PLO's adaption of the active independent role.

In addition to tactical modification, the PLO modified its strategic foreign policy when it abandoned total liberation in favor of an independent Palestinian state on any portion of territory liberated from Israel. Chapter Seven compares the findings of all three phases against the hypotheses offered in Chapter Two. Chapter Seven also evaluates the role modification model and offers suggestions for future research.

Table 6.1

BUREAUCRATIC TACTICAL ROLE ARTICUALTION:  
4TH PNC (1969), 11TH PNC (1973), 12TH PNC (1974)

Role	4th PNC	11th PNC	12th PNC
VISREV	8.7	10.7	2.0
DEFFAITH	6.9	4.7	2.0
REGSUBCOL	2.7	1.1	1.4
INDEPEND	1.3	1.3	1.3
ACTINDEPEND	0.2	--	0.5
PRAGMATIC	--	0.2	0.4
	-1.3	-0.5	-1.6
ACCOMMODAT	--	--	--
	--	-0.2	-0.7

Source: International Documents on Palestine

Table 6.2

**LEADER DRIVEN, BUREAUCRATIC ADVOCACY, AND DOMESTIC  
RESTRUCTURING TACTICAL ROLE ARTICULATION:  
12TH (1974) VERSUS 13TH PNC (1977)**

Role	12th PNC (1974)			13th PNC (1977)		
	LD	BA	DR	LD	BA	DR
VISREVLIB	--	2.0	0.4	0.2	10.4	--
DEFFAITH	--	2.0	0.5	0.4	5.3	--
REGSUBCOL	--	1.4	2.0	--	1.3	--
INDEPEND	--	1.3	0.7	--	1.3	--
ACTINDEPEND	--	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	--
PRAGMATIC	--	0.4	--	0.5	0.5	--
	--	-1.6	--	--	-0.5	--
ACCOMMODAT	--	--	--	0.2	--	--
	--	-0.7	-0.4	--	-0.7	--

Source: International Documents on Palestine

Table 6.3

**BUREAUCRATIC ADVOCACY TACTICAL ROLE ARTICUALTIONS:  
12TH PNC (1974) - 15TH PNC (1981)**

Role	12th PNC	13th PNC	14th PNC	15th PNC
VISREVLIB	2.0	10.4	3.3	2.4
DEFFAITH	2.0	5.3	4.0	4.4
REGSUBSYS	1.4	1.3	1.8	2.2
INDEPEND	1.3	1.3	2.0	1.3
ACTINDEP	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
PRAGMATIC	0.4	0.5	1.6	1.4
	-1.6	-0.5	-2.0	-0.5
ACCOMMOD	--	--	--	--
	-0.7	-0.7	--	-0.4

Source: International Documents on Palestine

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

This study is a response to the call by several scholars in the field of Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) for diverse theoretical frameworks to enhance our understanding of an actor's overall foreign policy behavior. As both an approach and a methodology, CFP's proponents stipulate that contributions to the field should incorporate multiple levels of analysis and multiple independent variables to stimulate theoretical growth.

The role modification model described in this study derives its theoretical diversity from aspects of role theory advanced by earlier scholars, such as Holsti (1970) and Walker (1987). The model surmounts the limitations of previous role theory and foreign policy research by utilizing multiple levels of analysis and multiple independent variables. The model also transcends the earlier limitations of role theory because of its ability to account for the origin of and variations in an actor's overall foreign policy role behavior. Additionally, the model incorporates the notion of short-term evolutionary change in order to assess when, and under what conditions,

an actor varies its foreign policy behavior.

The aspect of change in the model devolves from the foreign policy research of Charles Hermann (1990). Hermann posits that in addition to a deterministic response, an actor can deliberately initiate foreign policy change. Even though Hermann was a pioneer in this assertion, his research still focuses on the more traditional theme of dramatic foreign policy restructuring rather than deliberate short-term change.

In contrast to Hermann's model of deliberate dramatic restructuring, one of the premises of this research is that variations, or modifications in foreign policy, can occur on an incremental basis. What often appears as dramatic restructuring in foreign policy is actually the culmination of a series of modifications that transpired over an extended period of time.

The foreign policy behavior of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) serves as the test case for the role modification model developed expressly for this research. As noted in Chapter One, the PLO's empirical significance centers around the lack of research attention given to non-state actors coupled with the absence of any comparable PLO foreign policy research.

To enhance the longitudinal analysis, this study divides the PLO's foreign policy into three distinct phases. Each phase exhibits a characteristic set of foreign policy



tactical roles and strategic goals along with corresponding role-goal determinants. Fifteen sessions of the PLO's Palestine National Council (PNC) were used to mark specific data points across time to permit comparisons of PLO foreign policy output and to measure change.

The role modification model employs four independent variables as determinants of seven tactical and five strategic dependent variables expressed as either roles or organizational goals. The dependent variables include visionary revolutionary liberator, defender of the faith, regional subsystem collaborator, independent, active independent, pragmatic, and accommodationist tactical roles, plus the strategic goals of total liberation, secular democratic state, national authority, confederation, and a two-state solution.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Hermann's model provides the independent variables. These variables, which represent multiple levels of analysis, include leader-driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks.

Two additional independent variables are formed by collapsing Hermann's original four variables. The collapsed variables include (1) the decision making process variable which combines the leader-driven and bureaucratic advocacy variables and (2) the environmental process variable which combined the domestic restructuring and external shocks

variables. These two additional variables allow the model to determine if foreign policy role behavior occurs as a result of a strict internal or external process.

In the process of evaluating and comparing the three phases of PLO foreign policy role behavior, the overall findings reveal a number of generalizations specific to each independent variable. Under certain conditions, the findings tend to support the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Two and presented in the figures at the end of the chapter.

The hypothesis submitted for the leader-driven variable propose that the choice of a foreign policy role results more from the determined efforts of an authoritative decision maker as opposed to the influence of other variables. The empirical findings reveal that only under certain conditions is the chairman of the PLO able to function as the exclusive determinant of PLO foreign policy role behavior. These conditions consist of the presence of an opportunistic external environment in which the environmental process variable (external shocks and domestic restructuring) extends its support for the leader's course of action. Under this condition, the impact of the leader-driven variable is enhanced when bureaucratic unity is intact. However, the leader-driven variable is not able to act as the chief determinant of PLO foreign policy role behavior whenever the external environment remains primarily threat-driven regardless of the presence or

absence of bureaucratic internal unity.

The impact of a threat-driven environment on the leader-driven variable is apparent throughout all three phases. In the first phase, the organization's first leader, Ahmed Shuquairy, attempted to adapt and positively adjust the independent role by holding PNC elections. At this time, the external environment was threat-driven owing to the Arab cold war and the physical dispersion of the Palestinian people. Even though bureaucratic advocacy was not a factor at this time, Shuquairy's "old guard" PNC endorsed his role as leader. His single-handed efforts to create a politically non-subservient and independent PLO elicited a strong response from Jordan, a response that eventually succeeded in curbing the ambitions of the leader-driven variable. In addition, the various guerrilla groups external to the PLO at this time worked to undermine Shuquairy's efforts to adapt politically independent role behavior as well as the organization's overreliance on the role of regional subsystem collaborator.

When Arafat assumed the post of PLO chairman during the second phase, the external environment remained primarily threat-driven as a result of the 1967 June War. Moreover, internal disunity prevented the leader-driven variable from exclusively directing PLO foreign policy output. Throughout this phase, Arafat's primary concern centered around the need to secure and maintain internal unity because the

external environment threatened to reimpose a subservient role. Despite Fatah's moderate policy position relative to the PLO's left-wing extremists, bureaucratic advocacy's ideological dogmatism held Arafat's limited pragmatic intentions conditionally in check. Bureaucratic advocacy restricted consensus for the leader's use of pragmatic role behavior to the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which regulated the PLO's guerrilla activities in south Lebanon. Bureaucratic advocacy only supported the conditional adaption and positive adjustment of this role primarily because pragmatic behavior was not externally imposed and the agreement proved more favorable to the PLO than to the Lebanese government. Moreover, bureaucratic advocacy provided consensus because the 1969 Cairo Agreement legitimized the PLO's exclusive reliance on the tactical roles of visionary revolutionary liberator and independent. However, bureaucratic advocacy refused to extend support beyond the 1969 Cairo Agreement for the leader-driven variable's attempt to positively adjust pragmatic role behavior at the expense of armed struggle. When external shocks forced the PLO into accepting pragmatic role behavior following the events of Black September 1970, bureaucratic advocacy responded accordingly by positively adjusting the visionary revolutionary liberator role.

Throughout the third phase, the leader-driven variable was able to situationally promote the active independent and

pragmatic roles while deemphasizing the PLO's use of visionary revolutionary liberator role behavior. Arafat's positive adjustment of pragmatic role behavior endured, provided that the external environment remained opportunistic and the environmental process variable contributed its sustained positive support. Under these conditions, the PLO's foreign policy proved to be externally initiated, but internally driven. External shocks endorsed Arafat's positive adjustment of the active independent role at the 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat Arab Summits. Operating through the Palestine National Front (PNF), the PLO's West Bank constituency also demonstrated its support for the leader-driven variable's positive adjustment of the active independent and pragmatic role. Arafat's ability to steer an independent and pragmatic foreign policy course was also enhanced by the erosion of bureaucratic advocacy following the withdrawal of the PLO's left-wing extremists from the Executive Committee (EXCOM) and their subsequent formation of the Rejection Front.

During the third phase of PLO foreign policy, the external environment began to change from opportunistic to threat-driven. Consequently, Arafat's ability to exclusively control the direction of PLO foreign policy role direction began to dwindle as conditions in the external environment compelled the leader-driven variable to concentrate on building internal unity to preserve the PLO.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Arafat redirected his focus on the occupied territories to preserve the influence of this variable. Moreover, the various bureaucratic groups began to unify around an anti-leader-driven policy, which further thwarted Arafat's individual efforts.

The validity of the generalization offered for the leader-driven variable is empirically significant eleven years beyond the last PNC session analyzed in this study. On 13 September 1993, Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin of Israel shook hands on the White House lawn following the signing of the Declaration of Principles granting self-government to Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho. Arafat's ability to pragmatically negotiate this agreement occurred in a changing opportunistic external environment following the Gulf War, in which external shocks and the PLO's institutionalized West Bank constituency provided political support. Even though the PLO's left-wing extremists remain opposed to Arafat's pragmatic and accommodationist behavior, support from the environmental process variable surmounted bureaucratic advocacy's opposition.

The hypothesis proposed for the bureaucratic advocacy variable asserts that the PLO's choice of a foreign policy role reflected the outcome of bargaining among competing groups at the expense of other variables. Not unlike the limitations attached to the leader-driven variable, the

findings also revealed that the PLO's bureaucratic component's ability to act as the primary determinant of PLO role behavior was confined to the following set of conditions: (1) Regardless of the PLO's internal state of affairs, bureaucratic advocacy could only adjust the direction of existing PLO tactical roles whenever the external environment was perceived as primarily threat-driven. Specifically, the PLO could not initiate new roles in a threat-driven political milieu. (2) Regardless of the external environment, whenever internal unity is in jeopardy, the bureaucratic advocacy variable functions as a primary, but not exclusive, determinant of the PLO's strategic foreign policy. Specifically, ideological divisions over which tactical role the PLO should adjust in response to a given situation serves to redirect bureaucratic attention toward strategic foreign policy in order to achieve internal unification. The second generalization applies to the 19th PNC (1988) when the PLO officially announced its acceptance of a two-state solution. The PLO endorsed this new strategic goal after the bureaucratic groups reunified following several internal debates over which tactical policy the PLO should pursue in responding to the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987.

Moreover, whenever external actors attempted to either impose or curtail the organization's use of any one particular role, the PNC responded by adjusting its

endorsement or renunciation of roles that the PLO previously adapted on its own initiative. This includes (1) positive adjustments in the visionary revolutionary liberator and independent roles in response to Jordan's drive to reimpose subservient role behavior throughout most of the second phase; (2) an increase in support for the independent role in response to threats that attempted to undermine the PLO's ability to exercise its independent role in south Lebanon during the third phase; (3) negative adjustments in pragmatic and accommodationist role behavior whenever external shocks pressured the PLO into accepting either of these roles. The PNC adapted a new organizational goal whenever the organization experienced a threat to internal unity that originated from within the PLO's own bureaucratic ranks. Ideological disagreement over the tactical course of PLO foreign policy threatened internal unity the most. Consequently, consensus could only be attained on PLO strategic policy.

At the start of the third phase, when internal disunity was particularly acute, the bureaucratic groups managed to forge a tentative compromise when it endorsed the national authority goal. Even though the erosion of bureaucratic advocacy's influence subsequently led the PLO's left-wing extremists to form the Rejection Front, this components of this variable nonetheless continued to endorse strategic redirection at the remaining PNCs in this phase.



The hypothesis offered for the domestic restructuring variable contends that the Palestinian people exercise both a direct and indirect influence on PLO foreign policy role behavior. The findings reveal that the inside constituency aspect of this variable has a direct influence on the formation of PLO foreign policy under the following four conditions: (1) the external environment proves opportunistic; (2) when the Palestinians acquire political institutions such as the Palestine National Front (PNF) and the National Guidance Committee (NGC) to promote their interests; (3) in a threat-driven environment, the inside constituency can only indirectly influence rather than directly determine the PLO's foreign policy role output; and (4) ideological congruency between the West Bank constituency and the PLO's Fatah-dominated leadership strengthens the role of Arafat and enhances the external conditions for the leader-driven variable's ability to determine foreign policy role behavior.

Throughout the threat-driven second phase, the PLO relied more on the support of its diaspora (outside) constituency as the mainstay of indirect support for the organization's positive use of the visionary revolutionary liberator role and the goal of total liberation. Support from this constituency was important because throughout this period the PLO's *raison d'etre* was to militarily champion the diaspora's goal of total liberation.

During the third phase an opportunistic external environment coupled with the West Bank's ability to capture the PLO's attention because of the institutionalization of its political views, forced the PLO to take into account constituent demands for organizational pragmatism and strategic compromise. Even though the results of the 1976 West Bank municipal elections provided overwhelming support for the PLO, West Bank access to the electoral process sent a tacit message to the PLO that signaled the domestic constituency's ability to electorally choose alternative leadership. In a threat-driven environment, the presence of an institutionalized inside constituency indirectly influenced the PLO's gradual modification of pragmatic role behavior with official reminders of alternative external proposals for a two-state solution.

Furthermore, evidence of the inside constituency's growing influence on foreign policy role behavior corresponded with their increased representation within the decision-making structures of the PLO as independents. In a decision making environment that still relied primarily on procedural consensus, the domestic constituency's participation as independents meant that the PLO's leadership would have to modify foreign policy role behavior in order to ensure domestic support. This is owing to the PLO's adoption of the West Bank State goal by the inside constituency which reduced the role of radical groups as

well as its dependency on its external constituents.

The hypothesis proposed for the external shocks variable asserts that threat or opportunity stimuli in the regional and international environment are more responsible for determining PLO foreign policy role behavior than other variables. Furthermore, this study also hypothesizes that a stimulus in the form of a threat leads to a positive or negative adjustment in existing roles, whereas a stimulus in the form of an opportunity leads to the adaptation of new roles.

The findings reveal that the external shocks variable retained the greatest influence on PLO foreign policy tactical role behavior. This influence is particularly strong when the external environment remains threat-driven. In a non-opportunistic setting, external shocks can either impose or hinder specific PLO role behavior.

External actors retain a commanding influence on PLO foreign policy role behavior primarily because the organization lacks sovereignty over its own territory. Most of the PLO's bureaucratic groups were dependent on support from regional Arab actors who sought to influence and control the organization. As noted in earlier chapters, the PLO often experienced the effects of inter-Arab rivalries. At times, external actors imposed a particular role to counter the influence of another actor that might have preferred the organization to adapt or adjust a different

behavior. Over time, the PLO began to capitalize on inter-Arab disputes by adjusting the regional subsystem collaborator role to form alliances with local actors to maintain the initiative in the formation of foreign policy and to preclude a return of the subservient role.

This study proposes an additional two variables--the decision making process variable and the environmental process variable. The findings indicate that the decision making process variable is able to determine the direction of PLO strategic foreign policy in a threat driven environment, whereas the environmental process variable determines tactical role behavior in an opportunistic setting.

In terms of short-term evolutionary change, the findings in this research demonstrate that the PLO modified its foreign policy behavior on a gradual basis. Tactically, the PLO began to modify the visionary revolutionary liberator role at the 8th PNC (1971) when the organization redefined the use of this role as "principal" rather than "sole." Further modification occurred at the 12th PNC (1974) when the visionary revolutionary liberator role was considered to be "foremost" among other forms of struggle as opposed to "principal." By the 14th PNC (1979), the PLO failed to mention the use of this role in its political statement.

Additionally, the PLO modified its initial rejection of

pragmatic role behavior when it began to endorse the positive use of this role on a situational basis. The PLO demonstrated further pragmatic modification when the organization narrowed the basis of its rejection of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 at the 13th PNC (1977) and acknowledged the Brezhnev Plan during the 15th PNC (1981). As the PLO increased its positive use of pragmatic role behavior, the visionary revolutionary liberator role declined even though the organization retained rhetorical support for this role. The presence of exclusive rhetorical support for any behavior is important because it represents an optional role to which the PLO can return should conditions warrant its use. For example, one could expect a positive adjustment of the visionary revolutionary liberator role should bureaucratic advocacy coalesce on its return in a threat-driven external environment characterized by a lack of environmental process support for the PLO's current pragmatic and accommodationist foreign policy direction.

The PLO began to modify strategic foreign policy at the 6th PNC (9/1969) when the organization expanded the goal of total liberation to include the notion of a secular democratic state. The PLO continued to modify strategic foreign policy when the national authority scheme replaced the goal of a secular state at the 12th PNC (1974). By the 14th PNC (1979), the PLO failed to mention the goal of total liberation.

Although the role modification model developed and tested in this study was designed to be comprehensive, its application revealed certain limitations. One of the limitations of the model is the lack of a specific internal unity dependent variable. Because internal unity remained a pervasive theme throughout most of the second and third phases, this study might have exposed additional findings if such a variable had been included as either a tactical role or a strategic goal. This variable would have permitted a comparison of the relationship between PLO internal unity and regional subsystem unity. A comparison of this relationship might have enabled the role modification model to assess the impact such a relationship might have had on other role behaviors. The addition of an internal unity variable might also permit an evaluation of this role's use as a deliberate tactical means to affect either a role change or goal redirection.

The role modification model could also benefit from an expansion of the pragmatic role to include actor types of pragmatic behavior. This would allow a researcher to examine in more detail whether an actor engaged in pragmatic role behavior for military, political, or economic reasons. Comparisons could also be made regarding the number of pragmatic players involved in any concluded agreement. This would allow a researcher to determine if an actor is more likely to engage in bilateral versus multilateral pragmatic

role behavior. Moreover, the success rate of pragmatic behavior could then be determined based on participant type. In the case of the PLO, it appears that the organization experienced greater success at pragmatic role behavior when the organization engaged in bilateral political agreements. Based on this observation, one might reasonably expect that the PLO will abide by the 1993 interim agreement recently concluded with Israel.

The role modification model's four independent variables adequately covered the various levels of analysis. Future research could modify the use of the leader-driven variable to take into consideration the impact and effects of directly elected leaders and representatives. The level and type of political institutionalization among an actor's constituency should also be considered a factor. In the case of the PLO, one finds religious references in later PNC resolutions, owing to the political institutionalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories.

The use of the bureaucratic advocacy variable might also account for non-crisis decision-making. Even though there was a brief period when the leader-driven variable exclusively operated in an opportunistic political environment, bureaucratic advocacy did not. The drawback of evaluating foreign policy under what appears to be a constant crisis situation, makes it difficult for the model to ascertain what the PLO's standard operating role

procedure would be in the absence of an internal or external threat. Additional research could also focus on assessing the power and resources of the various bureaucratic groups and the way each group utilizes its resources to advocate its ideological preference.

An additional limitation of the bureaucratic advocacy variable is the PLO's reliance on consensus in the second phase. Procedural unanimity in decision-making and the numerical preponderance of Fatah restricted the use of bargaining among the PLO's competing bureaucratic groups. However, the ideological steadfastness of the various bureaucratic groups fostered innovative behavior on strategic foreign policy.

Finally, the model allows for a researcher to conduct a more in-depth comparison of any one role or independent variable. The role modification model also permits the isolated study of one independent variable and its impact on one or more roles across time. Furthermore, future research could isolate either tactical or strategic foreign policy behavior and analyze the evolutionary change in that behavior.



APPENDIX A  
EXCERPTS FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION  
NO. 181 OF 29 NOVEMBER 1947

PART I.-FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

**A. Termination of Mandate, Partition  
and Independence**

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem shall be described in Parts II and III below.

PART III-CITY OF JERUSALEM

**A. Special Regime**

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

APPENDIX B

UNITED KINGDOM-SPONSORED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FOR  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT,  
22 NOVEMBER 1967

*The Security Council*

*Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

*Emphasizing further* that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or state of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX C  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION  
NO. 338 OF 22 OCTOBER 1973

*The Security Council,*

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

APPENDIX D  
EXCERPTS FROM THE 1968 PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER

This Charter shall be known as "the Palestine National Charter."

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the great Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation.

Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organizations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on towards popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.



Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilized and organized to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalization of the Palestine problem.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.

Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that people in their revolution to achieve their objectives.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

APPENDIX E  
EXCERPTS OF LETTER CONTAINING U.S. PROPOSALS FOR A  
RESTORATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION  
OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES  
FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS TO  
U.A.R. FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council Resolution 242.

With the above thoughts in mind, the US puts forward the following proposal for consideration of the UAR.

(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the cease-fire for at least a limited period;

(b) that Israel and the UAR (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to the following statement which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary General U Thant:

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242....

APPENDIX F  
SPEECH BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ANNOUNCING  
HIS PLAN FOR A UNITED ARAB KINGDOM

We are pleased to announce that the basic principles of the new plan are:

1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom, and shall be thus named.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:

A. The Region of Palestine and any further Palestinian territory to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join:

B. The Region of Jordan, and shall consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the Kingdom and at the same time shall be the capital of the Region of Jordan.

4. Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of Palestine.

5. The King shall be Head of the State and shall assume the Central Executive Power, assisted by a Central Council of Ministers. The Central Legislative Power shall be vested in the King and in the National Assembly whose members shall be elected by direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each of the two regions.

6. The Central Judicial Authority shall be vested in a "Supreme Central Court."

7. The Kingdom shall have a single "Armed Forces" and its "Supreme Commander" shall be the King.

8. The responsibilities of the Central Executive power shall be confined to matters relating to the Kingdom as a sovereign international entity ensuring the safety of the union, its stability and development.

9. The Executive Power in each region shall be vested in a Governor General from the Region, and in a Regional Council of Ministers also formed from the citizens of the Region.

10. The Legislative Power in each region shall be vested in a "People's Council" which shall be elected by direct secret ballot. This Council shall elect the Governor General.

11. The Judicial Power in each Region shall be vested in the courts of the Region and nobody shall have any authority over it.

12. The Executive Power in each Region shall be responsible for all matters pertinent to it with the exception of such matters as the constitution defines to be the responsibility of the Central Executive Power.

APPENDIX G

UNOFFICIAL TEXT OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE  
AUTHORITIES AND PALESTINIAN COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS

On Monday, November 3, 1969, a meeting took place in Cairo between the Lebanese delegation, headed by General Emile Bustani, and the delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat, head of the Organization. The United Arab Republic was represented at the meeting by Mr. Mahmud Riyad, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Fawzi, Minister for War.

In keeping with the principles of brotherhood and common destiny, Lebanon's relations with the Palestinian Revolution should always be characterized by trust, frankness and positive cooperation; this is in the interest of both Lebanon and the Palestine Revolution, while also respecting the sovereignty and security of Lebanon. Both delegations agree to the following measures and principles:

#### *The Palestine Presence*

It is agreed that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon shall be reorganized along the following lines:

1. Palestinians at present residing in Lebanon shall have the right to work, reside and move about in Lebanon.

2. Local Palestinian Committees are to be set up in refugee camps to look after the interests of Palestinian residents of the camps, in cooperation with the local authorities and in keeping with the principles of Lebanese sovereignty.

3. There shall be Palestine Armed Struggle Posts in the camps which will cooperate with the local Committees so as to ensure good relations with the authorities. These Posts shall be responsible for controlling and limiting the presence of arms in the camps, in keeping with the requirements of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian Revolution.

4. Palestinians residing in Lebanon are to be allowed to take part in the Palestinian Revolution through Armed Struggle with acting in conformity with Lebanese sovereignty and security.

#### *Commando Action*

It is agreed that commando action is to be accorded the following facilities:



1. Passage for the commandos is to be facilitated. They are to be assigned crossing points and observation posts along the frontiers.

2. The commandos shall have the right of passage to the Arqub district.

3. The Armed Struggle Command is to control the activities of all those belonging to its member organizations and is responsible for ensuring that they do not interfere in Lebanese affairs.

4. A joint disciplinary board is to be set up comprising members from the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army.

5. Both sides are to stop their propoganda campaigns.

6. A census is to be carried out of the number of elements in the Armed Struggle in Lebanon, through the Armed Struggle Command.

7. Representatives of the Armed Struggle are to be attached to the Lebanese General Staff to help resolve sudden difficulties as they arise.

8. The distribution of commandos based along the frontiers is to be re-examined and determined after agreement with the Lebanese General Staff.

9. The entry, exit and movements of all elements belonging to the Armed Struggle are to be regulated.

10. The Jirun base is to be evacuated.

11. The Lebanese army shall facilitate the activities of medical evacuation and supply centers belonging to the commando movement.

12. All detainees and confiscated arms are to be released.

13. It is understood that all Lebanese civil and military authorities shall continue to exercise their authority and discharge their responsibilities in full throughout Lebanese territory under all ciurcumstances.

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14. Both sides affirm that Palestinian Armed Struggle is in the interest of Lebanon, the Palestinians and all Arabs.

15. This agreement shall remain top secret. It shall only be accessible to the commandos.

Signed:

Head of the Lebanese Delegation

Emile Bustani

Head of the Palestinian Delegation

Yasser Arafat

3 November 1969

APPENDIX H  
EXCERPTS FROM THE INTER-ARAB (THE CAIRO AGREEMENT)  
EFFECTING A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN JORDAN GOVERNMENT  
FORCES AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

1. All military operations on the part of both the Jordanian armed forces and the forces of the Palestinian resistance shall cease forthwith, as shall all military movements not necessitated by the requirements of normal routine. All information campaigns incompatible with the aims of this agreement shall also cease.

2. All Jordanian armed forces shall be rapidly withdrawn from Amman and returned to their normal bases, and all commando forces shall be withdrawn from Amman and stationed in localities suitable for commando action.

6. A Higher Committee shall be formed to follow up the enforcement both of this basic agreement and of such subsidiary agreements as it may give rise to, and to coordinate action and relations between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance to ensure security and to restore the situation to normal....

14. The Palestinian revolution shall be strengthened and supported until it achieves its aims of total liberation and the defeat of the usurping Zionist enemy.

APPENDIX I

EXCERPTS FROM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF  
JORDAN AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PLO  
REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM

### *General Principles*

1. Both banks of Jordan, as regards both their territory and their people, constitute a single indivisible unity which is the principal base for the Palestinian Revolution and for the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

2. On the strength of paragraph 1 above, and in order to implement its content, both popular and military resources in Jordan shall be placed at the service of the goal of the liberation of Palestine, and the Jordanian government undertakes to support the Palestinian Revolution in the battle for liberation and the recovery of our rights from the usurping enemy, and to take all measures calculated to consolidate mutual support between the Jordanian Arab Army and the Palestinian Revolution, so that, in both word and deed, they may fight in the same trench against the Zionist enemy for the achievement of liberation.

3. Presence, mobilization, popular and combat organization, and freedom of action and movement in the political, military, information and social fields are essential for the Palestinian Revolution, and it may engage in these matters freely.

4. The Palestinian people alone, as represented by the Palestinian Revolution, are entitled to decide their own future.

6. The government undertakes that no body or organization or any quarter in Jordan shall be allowed to take action against the interests of the Palestinian Revolution and of national unity.

### *Commando Action Affairs*

5. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization is in control of, and accountable and responsible for, the Palestine Revolution at both political and military levels and as regards everything connected with the affairs of commando action, its activities, rights, and obligations.

### *Travel and Movement*

- The forces of the Revolution shall be ensured freedom of travel and movement on all main and side roads, to all commands, positions and bases of the forces of the Revolution, including the road which leads in and out of the

country, and it shall not be permitted for either party to erect blocks or impediments of these roads.

- Vehicles of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall be permitted to circulate in towns and villages, whether or not they are armed, on condition that they have a task order duly signed by the competent authority in the Command of the Revolution and that they abide by established traffic regulations.

1. The Jordanian government shall undertake to observe the following:

a) There shall be no intervention or interference in the affairs of members of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution by any authority or in any circumstance, except through their commands.

b) Members of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall be accorded the same treatment as is accorded to members of the Jordanian Armed Forces, and the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall have the same rights and facilities as the Jordanian Armed Forces.

2. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization undertakes to observe the following:

c) To abide by the laws and regulations in force with due observance of such exceptions as are necessary for commando action.

APPENDIX J  
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL ATTENDANCE



4th PNC (1968) 100 delegates  
Fatah 38; PFLP 10; PLA and PLF 20; non-factional  
groupings 32

5th PNC (2/1969) 105 delegates  
Fatah 33; PFLP 12; Al-Saiqa 12; PLA and PLF 15;  
non-factional groupings 33

7th PNC (1970) 115 delegates

9th PNC (7/1971) 151 delegates  
guerrilla groupings 85; independents 41; unions 25

10th PNC (1972) 154 delegates

11th PNC (1973) 180 delegates  
Fatah 33; PFLP 12; DFLP 8; Al-Saiqa 12; ALF 8;  
PFLP-GC 3; independents 95

12th PNC (1974) 187 delegates  
Fatah 33; PFLP 12; DFLP 8; Al-Saiqa 12; ALF 8;  
PFLP-GC 3; independents 102

13th PNC (1977) 293 delegates

15th PNC (1981) 315 delegates

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